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# **THE JOURNAL**

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## **Royal United Service Institution**

**Vol. CI.**

**NOVEMBER, 1956.**

**No. 604**

### **THE PANORAMA OF WARFARE IN A NUCLEAR AGE**

By FIELD-MARSHAL THE VISCOUNT MONTGOMERY OF ALAMEIN  
K.G., G.C.B., D.S.O.

On Wednesday, 10th October, 1956, at 3 p.m.

LIEUT-GENERAL THE LORD WEEKS, K.C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O., M.C., T.D.,  
in the Chair

THE CHAIRMAN: May I first of all thank you for doing me the honour of asking me to take the Chair today, and without any further ado I will ask the Field-Marshal to deliver his lecture.

#### **LECTURE**

#### **THE PREVENTION OF WAR**

**W**ARFARE, especially in a nuclear age, must be prevented if this is humanly possible. Let us start by examining this aspect of the problem.

There are today two great Power groups, East and West, and the progress of science will soon enable each to destroy the other. The situation which would permit such frightful consequences must not be allowed to develop.

The political aim of the West must therefore be peace, and as things stand today it has got to be peace through strength and strength through unity. But there must be a real determination to protect and maintain our way of life in the face of aggression and, if necessary, we must be prepared to fight for this aim. President Roosevelt once said—"we have nothing to fear but fear itself." Certainly the surest way to prevent war is not to fear it. Every activity of the western societies should be geared to this aim—peace through strength and strength through unity.

We Service people must then be clear about the military object. In my view it can only be to prevent armed conflict. Of course the aim would change if the circumstances change. For instance, should war be forced on us the aim would be to gain the initial advantage, and finally to survive. Today, firmness in dealing with aggression is vital. Readiness and preparedness are equally vital, in order to gain the initial advantage if we are attacked.

How can we prevent armed conflict?

There are three contingencies.

#### **UNLIMITED NUCLEAR WAR ON A GLOBAL SCALE**

No side would win this war. It must therefore be prevented and that is best done by means of a deterrent.

This should be two-fold.

First, the power of instant retaliation by an offensive nuclear capability. This must be built up and maintained at a position from which it could physically destroy an aggressor, in any set of circumstances. Some people will say that the H bomb is the 'absolute' weapon and that nuclear war will therefore never take place. We cannot say that any particular weapon is 'absolute' or that any particular type of war is abolished. Unlimited nuclear war could always happen by miscalculation or irrationalism. But we can say one thing with certainty—it will never be started by the West. Furthermore, if the deterrent is as I have outlined, fully ready to operate at short notice, unlimited nuclear war becomes less likely to be started by any nation.

There is a second prong to the deterrent which will make unlimited nuclear war still more unlikely, and that is the known ability of the Western nations to be able to defend their bases and national territories and to retain freedom to operate in the major oceans and seas.

Probably the most likely source of war today is the entry of eastern land forces into western territories. Such action would spark off a war at once. It can be prevented only by maintaining an inter-Service shield, maintained in position at all times. The importance of this shield is very great, and it is an essential component of the deterrent against unlimited nuclear war. The presence in the shield of efficient land forces, able to fight effectively without any mobilization procedure, is vital.

#### LIMITED WAR

I define this as armed conflict other than unlimited nuclear war. Some people think that when East and West have reached parity in nuclear weapons, neither side will use them. They are led to conclude that military aggression with conventional weapons—as for instance in Korea—can be undertaken without fear of nuclear retaliation. My opinion is that it is unlikely that a war as big as that in Korea could be fought again without the use of nuclear weapons. I consider that the West should state publicly that armed aggression against free peoples would be met with instant and adequate retaliation; that would be a risk an aggressor would not care to take.

There is only one way to handle an aggressor who tries to test our firmness in these matters, and that is to oppose limited aggression instantly by strength. I would emphasize the word 'instantly.' The advantage goes to the other side if you are not ready, and your preparations take time to complete—*whatever may be the type of war.*

#### COLD WAR

I define this as measures, short of armed conflict, which are used in the battle of wits between East and West.

If our strategy prevents global nuclear war, and provides means to deal *instantly* with lesser conflicts, it places a powerful weapon in the hands of our political masters. They will be negotiating from a position of strength, not unilateral or national strength, but from a stronger source, derived from the voluntary association of peoples bound by a common cause.

Overall, it is my opinion that as things stand today we have in N.A.T.O. the best organization for winning the cold war, and for ensuring that it does not develop into limited or unlimited war. If we use N.A.T.O. wisely, and strengthen it politically, always keeping in mind our political aim of peace through strength and strength through unity, then the danger of unlimited nuclear war will become steadily diminishing.

## IF WAR SHOULD COME

Now we must pass on and consider the problem that would arise if war should be forced on us, in spite of all our endeavours to prevent it. Service Chiefs and their political masters are collectively responsible for reaching decisions about the pattern of future war, so that organization and training can proceed on the right lines. We do not seem to make great progress in this respect. The tendency is to discuss the opening phases; we neglect the whole pattern. Perhaps we Service Chiefs are to blame.

The advent of the nuclear weapon demands a new conception of war, a full conception. I do not suggest that there will be any changes in the principles of war, but there will be fundamental changes in the way these principles are applied.

I propose that we should now peer into the future and have a look at unlimited nuclear war. We will best do this by placing ourselves at a vantage point from which we can survey the whole panorama. And, to get a balanced view, let us insulate our minds against the day-to-day pressures and influences which obscure clear thinking. This is not easy. But we can try, and I will give a lead. Time does not allow me to discuss limited war or cold war.

To get a firm background for our survey, I suggest we consider an imaginary war between two powerful groups of nations. We will call them East and West, and we will include the N.A.T.O. nations in the West. And let us look back on the conflict, rather than forward to it as is the normal custom.

I propose now to turn myself into an historian. And I will address you from a position in time three years after such a global conflict, which occurred in an age of nuclear plenty for both sides and at a time when short and long range missiles were available as vehicles of fire power in addition to manned aircraft. The war began in 1966. The East was the aggressor. It is now 1969. Looking back at that war, I saw the pattern clearly, and it was obvious to me that the West survived only because it began to do certain sensible things in 1956—which we have not done yet.

## THE PHASES OF THE WAR

I saw that there had been three distinct phases in the war :

Phase 1—the Destructive Phase.

Phase 2—the Exploitation Phase.

Phase 3—the Reconstruction Phase.

## PHASE 1: THE DESTRUCTIVE PHASE

In the initial phase of the war a large number of nuclear weapons were delivered by the manned aircraft and missiles of both sides. The destruction caused to life and property was great. I saw that the West gained an advantage in the initial exchange for two reasons.

*First*, great effort had been devoted to developing the Western intelligence organization and early warning systems. The West got warning of the attack and the initiative was regained in a matter of hours. The West could not have done this in 1956. At that time the intelligence machine was under-developed; the scientists had received insufficient direction, and their contribution to the field of intelligence had been largely untapped.

*Second*, the West had released their air and missile forces from the bondage of decentralization. Under central control the air forces of the Western nations had been welded into one mighty weapon; this weapon crippled the East's ability to deliver nuclear weapons very soon after she began to despatch them. Until the Western nations brought their air forces under central control they did not realize what immense economies, saving of effort, and standardization were possible. For far less expenditure of wealth and effort, a far more efficient and powerful weapon was created; this weapon could be applied instantly to any target system in the world.

In the field of air defence the West had also made great strides. Starting in 1956, a realization that the air battle could not be divided in neat watertight compartments of offence and defence had led to the unification of the many air defence systems previously in being. Only by doing this were the Western nations able to get a unified policy and to develop the very expensive equipments necessary for modern war.

These then are the first two things I would tell our political masters today:—

1. We need better intelligence, far better.
2. The West needs centralized control of its air and missile forces.

But let us return to my imaginary war.

On land, the Eastern armies advanced to contact on all fronts. But interdiction and nuclear 'fall-out' made all movement slow and costly. The ground fighting which followed contact was in many ways similar to previous wars. I noticed, however, two important points of difference.

*First*, the Western air forces played little part in the land battle in forward areas.

*Secondly*, the ground actions proceeded more slowly than had been expected, and certainly much more slowly than they had in the war of 1939-1945.

These two points interested me and I examined them closely.

#### AIR FORCES

To take the air first. The East entered the war with powerful tactical air armies, the primary task of which was to support the land armies and, to a lesser degree, her naval forces. These tactical air forces gave this support for about four days. Thereafter, although they had nuclear and conventional weapons in numbers, they were unable to deliver them with piloted aircraft; the West had so disorganized the Eastern control system, and so destroyed their static air base system, that the East could not sustain the operations of her tactical air forces.

The West on the other hand entered the war with *no* tactical air forces of the type they had developed in the 1940's and 50's. They realized in good time that piloted aircraft with nuclear weapons were *not* the sole or even the main instruments with which to give close support to the land armies. The reason was two-fold.

First, it was realized that the objectives of the land battle were no longer those of the 1939-45 War. The object in the land battle in a nuclear age is no longer to capture your enemy; it is to destroy him with atomic weapons.

And secondly, the communication system would be so badly damaged in the early exchange of nuclear weapons that it would not be capable of relaying the target detail in time—if at all.

The West had decided therefore that land armies must have their own organic atomic fire power on a scale which would enable them to destroy any enemy which managed to get into close contact. The air forces were to be used on the deeper interdiction and armed reconnaissance, which could to a large degree be pre-planned and, more important, could be executed even if higher control were lacking.

This then is the next thing I would tell our political masters today.

Air forces are not the weapon on which the land armies should depend for their main support. They are *admirable* weapons for the deeper indirect support which I have already described. Instead therefore of wasting effort on developing tactical air forces to support the land armies, with the communication systems and operating procedures to provide close support, we should devote this effort to provide the weapons the army really needs, *i.e.*, short-range missiles, and guns and howitzers, with small yield atomic heads.

These weapons must be designed to handle all likely ground targets which have a direct influence on the land battle. For this purpose a 'family' of weapons should be developed, having ranges varying from a few hundred yards up to the maximum range of the short-range missile. These weapons should be of a very simple type, easy to move and operate.

The army must be able to do something which has never been done in history, except by Genghis Khan. The 'Small Battalions' must be able to defeat the 'Large Battalions.' Air forces will play a part in this, but not in the forward battle area; they are not the right weapon.

Reconnaissance and intelligence of course the armies will still need, and the air forces must supply a great deal of this.

#### LAND FORCES

I saw that in Europe during this imaginary war that the function of land forces was 'to hold.' There were two main reasons.

First, it was the nuclear weapons of the deterrent forces, with their delivery systems, which contributed most to the offensive punch. Their function was to destroy, and the principle of economy of effort made it wasteful to launch land forces in addition.

Second, the land forces did not have to do more than hold and survive—nor could they have done so, because of the nuclear weapons *used against them by the enemy*.

I said just now that the ground actions had proceeded more slowly than expected. Why was that?

There were three main reasons.

*First, the human mind.* Every man on the battlefield in the early days heard, and saw the effects of very many nuclear explosions, some far away, some very close. The effect was definite and marked. From the highest headquarters to the soldier on the battle-front, the human mind was so psychologically shocked that its efficiency deteriorated to a degree in which reactions were slow.

*Secondly,* the damage to communications, particularly at the higher echelons, prevented control, sometimes for long periods. Enemy jamming also interfered with control by wireless at all echelons.

*Thirdly,* the movement of formations was slowed by large areas of nuclear 'fall-out,' and by millions of refugees on the roads. I noticed that the plans of the West to deal with the refugee problem were not adequate.

From studying these imaginary events we can see emerging the pattern of our ground forces of the future. Powerful, compact fighting divisions of all arms are what we need for unlimited nuclear war, capable of sustained fighting without reinforcement. The system of control within the Corps must be simple, and should it break down, the divisions must still be able to fight. The Corps will contain three or four of these powerful divisions. A Corps must be able to fight without the interlocking support of other Corps.

Divisions need their own nuclear artillery and short-range missiles.

#### SEA FORCES

I then examined the war at sea. I saw that during the alert period which good intelligence had given the West, the fleets and task forces had been at sea. The long-range submarines of the East had also put to sea, but some of them had been detected and these were shadowed by Western forces until H-Hour, when many of them were destroyed. The bulk of the Eastern submarine fleet never got to the focal shipping areas; they were detected, hunted, and destroyed on their way there and near their home waters.

The Western fleets in the main survived the initial exchanges of nuclear weapons and were, as a result, able to deliver great offensive fire power against sea, land, and air targets.

How were the navies able to do these things?

*First*, much scientific effort and money had been devoted to methods of detecting underwater craft *at long range*. These devices neutralized the advantages so long possessed by the submarine.

*Second*, the Western fleets had also provided themselves with large numbers of surface and underwater vessels, which could launch nuclear missiles. I will not attempt to give these vessels names except to say that they were *not called aircraft carriers*. Most of the larger vessels were, however, equipped with vertical take-off reconnaissance aircraft.

The Easterners, who had never really understood naval power, were completely outwitted. They had, since 1945, placed much faith in their great submarine fleet, admirable tactics for the 1950's, but outmoded thereafter. They had fallen into the error of building for the next war in terms of the last—an error common to military men. Their great submarine fleet had no significant effect on the war at sea in Phase 1—the Destructive Phase.

What can we learn from the naval operations in the war in 1966?

One thing predominates. The supremacy of the submarine *must* be eclipsed, because, as you will see when we examine Phase 2, we shall need our naval power and merchant ships later. Sea power is very important to our success in the later phases.

Can we today say that we have mastered the submarine? Can we honestly say that we are devoting sufficient scientific and financial effort to developing means of doing so? I think the answer to both these questions is 'NO.' I know advances are being made, but not quickly enough; much greater effort is required.

#### ESSENTIAL REQUIREMENTS TO SURVIVE THE EARLY STAGES OF PHASE 1

That is how Phase 1 ended; it was suitably called the Destructive Phase. Before we go on I will summarize what we must have today as a minimum, if we are to survive the early stages of Phase 1 of unlimited nuclear war on a global scale.

*First.*—We must have far better intelligence than we have at present, to give us warning and to acquire targets.

*Second.*—The West needs to bring its air and missile force under appropriate centralized control, in order to destroy an enemy war-machine and to defend our own.

*Third.*—We need powerful and efficient land forces, armed with suitable nuclear weapons which are mobile and easy to handle.

*Fourth.*—We need reliable equipment for detecting underwater vessels at long range.

*Fifth.*—We need fleets of surface and underwater missile firing ships. In other words, means of delivering great fire power from mobile bases.

#### PHASE I CONTINUED

I saw that during this Phase other events occurred from which we can learn a great deal. Mobilization of reserve forces did NOT take place to any great extent in those Western countries which had been heavily bombarded with nuclear weapons. During the first two weeks a few formations were brought up to strength on a regional basis and moved to the battle area.

In fact, the armies which were 'in being' in peace-time, and pre-stocked, had to do most of the fighting; they were not reinforced to any great degree.

I do not believe the present complicated mobilization machinery of the N.A.T.O. countries will ever work under conditions of nuclear war. This subject needs intensive study.

The lesson is that the land forces which are deployed in peace-time to protect the territories of the Western nations must be kept up to strength, fully equipped and pre-stocked. The shield must be firm, and able to handle a hard blow, thus gaining time for the retaliatory forces of the deterrent to come into action.

#### END OF PHASE I

I shall now tell you how Phase I ended. There was no Eastern government or high military authority which could be found. By D plus 20 it was quite clear that, except for the arrival of occasional missiles with conventional warheads, the Eastern air forces were virtually destroyed.

By D plus 25 the Eastern armies in contact were running out of fuel and ammunition; their casualties, which had been enormous, had not been evacuated or treated, and in many cases formations lacked control above regimental level. There were no co-ordinated land operations anywhere after D plus 30.

Between D plus 30 and 50, the remaining Eastern surface vessels and submarines had been eliminated.

That is how the fighting stopped, but it was not the end of the war; it was only the beginning.

#### PHASE 2: THE EXPLOITATION PHASE

Great destruction and chaos were caused in Phase I. If the Easterners were in a bad way the Western Allies were little better, except possibly in one or two respects.

The Western air forces retained a number of piloted aircraft and missiles, and there were still some nuclear warheads left.

The Western armies, like the Eastern land forces, had suffered very severe casualties and were not capable of movement to any great degree. The railways and the major road systems were severely damaged.

The Western navies had had casualties ; but in comparison with the other armed forces of both sides, they were intact, powerful, and capable of further action. This was the situation which faced the Western nations on about D plus 45. How were they to survive ? I saw that the Western leaders decided to do three things, and to do them quickly.

They were :—

*First.*—Start reconstruction of society, industry, and government.

*Second.*—Counter any spread of communism which might arise from the wholesale misery and chaos that had been created.

*Third.*—Remove from the East her remaining nuclear capability and potential.

I saw that the West undertook these tasks in the second phase in the following way.

The Western nations considered that if they were to survive, the strength that remained to them must first and immediately be directed to the reconstruction of their own societies. *If further heavy military commitments were undertaken, the nations would become so weak that Western civilization would decay and disappear.*

There could be no question of taking thousands of Eastern prisoners or of attempting any large-scale disarmament of the East ; the effort would be crippling. The Western nations could not feed and administer themselves, and they could certainly not expend any great effort on their enemy. *There was no question of occupation of Eastern territory in any form.*

What remained of the Western armies slowly advanced to the frontier of Eastland, driving the enemy units before them, using force where necessary. In fact, they needed very little persuasion. Those units which could be disarmed easily were, of course, disarmed. Those units which still had a degree of cohesion and control were ordered to march East ; if they refused they were attacked with nuclear weapons. On the frontier of Eastland the West established a defensive belt, with light forces supported by nuclear weapons, having freed all satellite nations that Eastland had annexed in previous wars. No Western armies entered Eastland : no armies of occupation. Search parties yes, but no occupying forces.

The Western navies with the amphibious forces, including long-range penetration forces, established bridgeheads in Eastland. Some airfields were rehabilitated slowly. Transport, strike, and reconnaissance aircraft were flown in and the search was begun for the remaining nuclear effort, for the scientists, and for the technicians. In some cases Eastland armed forces opposed this search and it was necessary for the Western forces to use nuclear weapons to enforce their will ; but usually the threat of bombardment was sufficient to quell resistance.

Eventually, the commanders in charge of these operations reported that the task was as complete as it ever would be. All Western forces and civil personnel were then withdrawn from Eastland. It took the West about two years to complete this task.

By far the most difficult task confronting the Allies in Phase 2 was to stop the spread of communism. The chaos and misery which had been caused provided fertile soil for that disease.

## PHASE 3: THE RECONSTRUCTION PHASE

The third phase was reconstruction.

It took a very long time to rebuild the economy and society of the democratic world after such a war. The extensive use of nuclear material to produce power in all its forms would have reduced the length of this reconstruction period. The lesson for us today is that great advances will have to be made in the techniques for doing this, and in the methods of applying these techniques easily and quickly to the needs of industry and of society.

I have now given you a panorama of warfare in a nuclear age, some of the things we need, and some of the things we must do to ensure the survival of our Western way of life.

## LOGISTICS

You will have noticed that I have not yet mentioned logistics. The reason is that I found it quite impossible to visualize a war of the future being supported by our present logistic system.

It is time that we looked at this problem more realistically. Wherever I go I hear people say we want more of this and more of that.

We shall NOT get any more. We have a vast complicated organization for the distribution of material all over the world. Hundreds of committees in peace-time, and even more in war, receive millions of reports and issue thousands of instructions every day; no communication system will ever carry the load. Anybody who thinks the present system will work after thousands of nuclear weapons have been exchanged, is mad. After the first nuclear exchange, nothing of any size or quantity will move on land in the areas in which these weapons have exploded or are exploding. *Perhaps at sea alone may surface movement on any scale be possible.* Hence the importance of sea power; it will be needed in Phases 2 and 3.

There is not time to develop this subject further. It is sufficient to say that the most intensive study is essential in order to get us out of the logistic morass in which we are floundering.

## HOW CAN WE DO THESE THINGS?

I have tried to answer the challenge of the politicians and of the scientists:

What will war look like?

and

In what direction should our efforts be directed?

I now propose to suggest how we should set about getting some of the things we need.

## THE MASTER GLOBAL PLAN

The first thing we must do is to make a master global plan for the fight against communism. But we cannot make such a plan without a Supreme Authority for the direction of political policy and military strategy. The West is trying to fight communism; this is a global struggle and we must have a global plan. There is no global plan.

The Supreme Authority is needed *now* to make the master plans and to prepare all the Western nations for what might come, to tell them what parts they should play. They might not wish to play their parts, but that is another matter; at least

they should be told ; the responsibility for non-co-operation will then be on their shoulders.

I have tried to tell you what I think the breadth and scope of these master plans should be. They must be based on the political association and aims of the West. What are our long-term political aims ? We have none. What is the use of working for economic integration or of building up military strength, if the Western nations have not first agreed their political association and long-term aims ?

#### SCIENTIFIC DEVELOPMENT

Here lies the key to saving money and applying it to the best effect.

But it is necessary to take risks—justifiable risks. We know by now what we need in the future, or we should know. We also have a good idea of what the future holds ; the scientists have told us. There are many things we need, as, for instance, ballistic and guided missiles, vertical take-off aircraft, nuclear powered navies, special fuels of high energy for everyday military use, small yield nuclear weapons for the armies, and other things that I have already mentioned. They are all scientific possibilities, but it will be a long time before we have them in quantity.

#### FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES TO BE OBSERVED AS WE MOVE TOWARDS THE MISSILE AGE

We must have a plan for the development of our forces as we move towards the missile age. That plan must be based on certain fundamental factors, some of which, in my opinion, are as follows :—

1. By 1966 we will have seen the start of the transition to the period of the missile, and we will have begun to use the nuclear warhead for our fire power. From that time on, we may expect increasingly rapid progress in this direction until other means of delivery and other forms of fire power become the exception rather than the rule—at any rate in unlimited nuclear war.

2. Manned aircraft will not go completely out of business for a very long time, so far as can be foreseen.

For example, they will be needed for reconnaissance and for certain tactical tasks, since it is not possible to devise a machine which can deal with the unexpected ; the human brain is required for that.

Also, a highly efficient strategic bomber force will always be required in the foreseeable future because of the great difficulty in getting the exact locations of interior targets in enemy territory. Furthermore, manned aircraft will be needed in limited warfare in undeveloped countries, and for cold war activities. And they will certainly be needed for transport purposes so as to give greater flexibility to armed forces generally.

3. In the not too distant future we will reach the stage where almost any amount of destructive force will be able to be despatched from any point, to objectives at any range from zero miles to more than 5,000 miles distance. In fact, we can say that we are almost in that position today. Therefore, the interests of efficiency and economy will dictate modifications in our organization. Integration of control will be absolutely essential to the efficient accomplishment of military tasks. Theoretically, the ideal solution would be to combine all military functions into a single Service, not by any blitz methods of attack but by a gradual process. But today this would not be possible. This is a pity as such a change would make the problem so much

easier. There is today great duplication and great waste in Service affairs ; inter-Service rivalries and mistrust still distort our judgment and make sound decisions impossible.

This might be the ultimate solution but, whether or not we go this far, the barriers that now exist between Services and their functions must give way. The independence that characterizes our Service relationship today must yield in favour of interdependence.

4. In spite of aircraft of ever increasing capabilities, and in spite of the advent of guided and ballistic missiles, there is still a need for well organized and highly trained ground forces. They are vital to our strategy. The concept of massed armies is a thing of the past. But we must have an effective shield on the ground, with an integrated atomic capability.

Nothing that has yet been seen or envisaged in the field of new weapons can replace the need for men on the ground actually holding territory which, without their presence, would certainly fall into enemy hands in war.

5. A major problem will be to devise a system by which national armies will be suitable for cold or limited war, *and also* for unlimited nuclear war on a global scale. For limited and cold wars, divisions need an offensive capability and light equipment. For unlimited nuclear war, divisions require a defensive capability with suitable nuclear weapons.

Nations with overseas commitments which might lead to limited war, require some divisions to be located in the home country ; these must be lightly equipped and the means must exist to transport them by air instantly to troubled areas. Other divisions may have to be deployed in areas in which only unlimited nuclear war is likely. In fact, nations with such dual problems need flexibility above all, so that the problems can be solved within the limits of financial possibilities.

To reconcile all these differing requirements within the field of practical realities will not be easy—but it must be done. We should realize that as unlimited nuclear war becomes less likely, so limited wars and cold war activities will become *more* likely.

6. The proper organization of manpower is of tremendous importance, in order to give confidence to the Regular soldier, sailor, or airman that his future will be safeguarded.

In a world war the whole nation is mobilized and everything gives way to the fight for survival ; there is no problem here.

But in limited or smaller contests the disturbance to the life of the nation should be as little as possible. At present when some trouble arises, a ' stop ' is at once put on all Regular personnel leaving the Services. This bears hardly on the Regular who has made all his plans for retirement and has a job waiting for him. It is an irritant which has a most adverse effect on Regular recruiting. The subject needs urgent study.

An organization is required which will enable the nation to take limited wars, or cold war activities, in its stride—without upsetting the planned lives of a valuable section of the community.

#### CIVILIAN MORALE

The secret of civilian morale under attack, as of military morale, is that the people should be told the truth about what is happening and should believe the

situation to be under control. They must receive regular information and they must be told what to do. None of these things will happen unless full preparations have been made in peace-time.

They are not being made.

It is vital to understand that in a situation of nuclear equality between two sides, each of which has the most modern means of delivery, that side will survive which has the best organized home front. The crucial problem will be the defence of home morale—not only the attack on enemy morale. Home morale is the business of Civil Defence. Civil Defence is vital to the modern fighting chief, because without it his base is not secure.

The political leader must be able to speak to the people. Newspapers must continue to circulate. It is relevant to ask a few simple questions :—

(a) Are there plans for moving broadcasting equipment and personnel to a reasonably safe place whence they could carry on their work during and after nuclear attack? Has the use of ships been considered?

(b) Are there Western plans to ensure that if the broadcasting system of one or two nations is knocked out, other stations could carry on by taking over their wavelengths and providing a skeleton service?

(c) Have the leading newspapers of each Western country been asked to prepare a war plan which would enable a small team with special equipment to produce a minimum national newspaper, or regional newspapers, under war conditions?

Many other such questions could be asked.

The above questions explain themselves. The answer to them is 'No.'

Therefore, our preparations for the maintenance of civilian morale in nuclear war are totally inadequate.

### THE OUTSTANDING POINTS

What are the outstanding lessons from this address?

First, that another world war in a nuclear age would be a most devastating affair. We fighting men are often accused of liking war; in fact, we are the people who dislike it most because we know too well what it means to humanity. But we have to plan for war, and be ready should it be forced on us by some evil man, or evil group of men who seize power and attempt to exert their will by force. Only in this way can we survive if attacked.

From lessons learned this afternoon it is obvious that we must do everything possible to prevent a war from taking place; it would be suicidal for both sides.

We will not get peace by threatening war. But in the modern world peace can be assured only by military strength; this may be sad, but it is a fact. Therefore we must maintain such a position of strength as will make an act of aggression very very expensive for the aggressor. Only in this way can we be assured of maintaining our objective of peace, *at present*.

Next, we are faced with a difficult problem to get the overall military strength we need, and to get it within the limits of financial possibilities. It is vital that we in the fighting Services should not blindfold ourselves with Service partisanship, with outdated concepts, or allow our thinking to become shackled by doctrine and tradition.

The technological race with other nations is not the only problem. There is also the problem of organizing our defences so that we may use the new weapons most effectively. Weapons usually outstrip strategy and tactics; the gap today is bigger than ever before.

The trend in Service organizations today is towards Service self-sufficiency. If we are not careful, we will have three independent self-sufficient Ministries of Defence. That is what would happen if each Service was to have *all* the forces, and *all* the weapons, and *all* the equipment necessary to meet *all* its threats.

We must adopt a different approach to the defence problem; we must study it in a spirit of investigation and honest searching for the truth. We must remember that in a future war the decision will come to the side which can take the appropriate initial action very quickly, and which best uses its weapons from the outset; the decision will come too quickly to learn lessons and make changes.

In line with this thinking, it is time we took a new look at the jobs to be done, and the forces and weapons with which to do them. We must get busy *now*—before it is too late.

Since a lot of Service controversy results from competition for the most important tasks, perhaps the roles and the missions in force today need revision. If so, let's do it.

Let us look at some other measures that might help us solve the problem. The idea of a single Service has been suggested many times. Personally I favour it. But it would not be accepted today. However, if we have another world war, I believe we would end up with a single Service—or two Services, the Quick and the Dead.

Then there is unified command. I favour this philosophy. It would help if we could get the men of all the Services to identify themselves more as members of a mission, and less by the colour of their Service uniforms.

To get better integrated commands we need more well-rounded staff officers to man them—officers who have a working knowledge of *all* the Services. This, in turn, would require a more comprehensive, unified system of military education. Learning about all the Services must start sooner—when an officer is commissioned, or even before. Today many officers reach the equivalent rank of major before coming into contact with other Services.

But the main need is to get the real truth about defence—the kind of defence we must have. If the truth shows we need a new organization, let's have it. Or if we need a new reorganization, let's do it. If re-alignment of roles and missions is necessary, let's do it.

I suggest that the proper way to tackle the problem is to think out and decide what the defence organization should be in 10 years' time.

We should then work towards it slowly, ensuring that each step taken is an advance towards the achievement of the long term objective. Who is doing this thinking today? For instance, in 10 years' time (in the missile age) do you see a very large Admiralty, a very large War Office, and a very large Air Ministry—in addition to a Ministry of Defence? Personally I don't.

The whole of our defence organization needs to be examined closely, working up to a Minister of Defence who has full responsibility and the power of decision.

## CONCLUSION

I suggest you get a better approach to this subject in the way I have used—by looking back upon rather than forward to a conflict.

We have seen the need for planning and for approaching our problems of today realistically. It is probably a matter of opinion whether the main blow in future war will be delivered by the manned aircraft, supplemented by guided missiles, or the reverse. My own opinion is that by 1966 over 50 per cent. of the strategic tasks will be performed by missiles. As regards tactical air forces for the support of land armies—I consider that by 1966 about 75 per cent. of the present type will have been replaced by nuclear weapons in the hands of the land forces.

It is vital to understand that global warfare in a nuclear age will *not* be similar to the 1939-45 War, with the only difference that there will be bigger 'bangs' and noises. Instead, it demands a complete overhaul of our strategical and tactical conceptions. Having grasped this basic and fundamental factor, it is then necessary to tackle the problem with imagination and realism and to bring into focus some of the greatest needs of our times—that is, intelligence, scientific development, plans, and, so far as we can achieve it, central control of some of our forces. It also demands an overhaul of the defence organization.

In this respect many points emerge from the picture I have tried to unfold before you.

One is that it will become increasingly difficult to define the tasks of each fighting Service, or allot tasks by functions. We must try and move towards a greater unification of the Services than we have today.

A second point concerns movement. It is clear that as time goes on, movement of any degree in unlimited nuclear war will be possible only in the air and on the sea. Movement by air is well understood and accepted; more and more must this be used to increase the strategic mobility of armed forces generally.

We must now exploit the sea in the search for mobility. A study of a global map shows at once the enormous advantage conferred on the side which has freedom of movement across the water areas of the world. On the seas, the effect of 'fall-out' is not a serious factor and will not prevent movement.

Fixed nuclear launching sites on land will be vulnerable; on the seas all launching sites can be mobile and these will not be easy to locate and destroy.

The longer I study this problem, the more I reach the conclusion that air power and sea power will provide the main offensive punch in unlimited nuclear war of the future. And their offensive power must, and can, be mobile. Land power will be essential as a direct 'stop' on the ground in order to protect our territories and peoples. But the strategy of those who fight on land will be defensive, since any considerable movement will not be possible.

The sea must be exploited increasingly to give surface strategical mobility and to provide mobile launching sites for nuclear weapons.

I believe the situation today is critical. Either we plan realistically for the future, and survive in a nuclear war—or we drift along, planning from year to year and using *ad hoc* methods, and end in disaster.

You may not agree with one word of what I have said. But that is not the point. If you do disagree, disagree constructively: go one better than I have.

So far we have heard nothing on this subject from any political or military chief in the Western world. If nothing is said, nothing will be done, and no plans will be made. We will then face the East with an archaic war machine, unformed ideas, and in a political muddle.

I have at least said something.

The future of Western civilization will depend on whether we tackle this problem with imagination and with realism—not tomorrow, but *now*.

#### FINALLY

In this address I have talked about war—nuclear war.

But it is my definite belief that if we take a good look at things *now*, and do the things we reasonably should, we will be able to look forward to many years of peace—with *no* nuclear war. But one thing is essential—the nations of the free world must live up to their motto :—

Peace through strength  
and  
Strength through unity

The emphasis must be on the word 'unity.'

In a nuclear age, national wars are things of the past. No nation can do without allies ; these may at times be irritating, but they are necessary. The trouble is that nobody seems clear about how to get the unity and unselfish solidarity which is vital if we are to oppose a strong front to the onward march of communism.

The source of inspiration in the free world should be like a lake of pure water, from which pipes carry the political policy and strategical guidance to the nations. But instead of this 'Lake of Unity,' we have about 30 political puddles.

What is needed today is a united Western Europe within the Atlantic Alliance, with a clearly defined political association. We can of course build up military strength, and defeat the East in battle. But what good will this do if, having survived the war, we lose the West to communism ? The struggle between East and West is a struggle for the hearts and minds of men. In fact, it is *more* a political problem than a military one. But we tend to neglect the political problem, and to concentrate on the military approach. Both are essential. But the political problem must be solved first ; and it will never be solved as long as the nations swim about, each in its own political puddle. The broad 'Lake of Unity' is vital to the free world.

We have a long way to go before we can say that there is true unity among the nations of the West. True unity implies a willingness to make sacrifices for the common good ; we do not see enough of this willingness today.

I often think that we Service Chiefs could do more to help than we do. Are not some of us too national in our outlook ? Do we try and look at the world problems through international spectacles ?

The best way to do all these things is to line up solidly behind N.A.T.O. and to strengthen that organization politically and militarily. N.A.T.O. must be kept viable and effective ; we must redouble our efforts to keep it so.

I said at the beginning of this talk that our aim is peace. The surest road to peace is to hold fast to N.A.T.O., and to dedicate ourselves to its beliefs and principles ; if we follow this road, we and our children may look to the future with confidence.

## DISCUSSION

THE CHAIRMAN : While you are working out in your minds some questions that you might put to the Field-Marshal I just want to make one quick comment, not on the panorama of unlimited war which has been revealed to you by the historian but just in order to highlight and, I think, endorse some of his points on the problem of the defence organization.

The basic structure on which we are now working, I suppose, started in the early part of this century, it was modified to meet two wars, and I think those of us who took part in the last war with conventional weapons would say that the machine did not operate too badly. Well now, owing to this fantastic advance both in scientific development on land and sea and in the air, and our increasing inter-dependence on other countries, and what I might call the economic strain of running a Welfare State while trying to occupy a dominant position in world affairs, the requirements of our defence forces and the conditions in which they have to be met are changing fundamentally, and I agree that it is now time that we took a new look at our overall concept of defence and supply, from the statutory power of the Minister of Defence right down to the supply of even small equipment.

The co-ordination of the Services between themselves—and the Field-Marshal has touched on the possibility of some degree of unification—and the method of arranging the programmes of research and development and supply is one large integral problem in which the Services, the Civil Service, and the part played by industry and the Treasury watchdog have all got to be integrated.

The matter is so vast and so complicated that no one Service or Ministry can investigate it with any hope of finding an effective solution, and a solution certainly cannot be found within the terms of reference of a departmental committee with limited power and scope.

There are many indications that if we proceed on our present course it is most likely to become increasingly difficult to provide for both prosperity and defence at the same time, and all I am trying to say, in supporting the lecturer, is that if there is a reasonable chance of an overall examination leading to any improvement in the present position, such an investigation would be well worth carrying out.

REAR-ADMIRAL SIR A. W. BUZZARD : I am prepared to stick my neck out in order to start the ball rolling !

The lecturer emphasized the importance of keeping the main aim to prevent global war, and said that limited war was likely to become more and more probable. As an ex-intelligence officer (who would have *liked* more money and more scientists when he was in that appointment) I would say that the situation goes rather further than that. I do not believe there is, or ever has been in fact, any danger of intentional global war being started by the Communists. I believe that the real threat has always been, and is certainly increasingly likely to be, subversion with local aggression, local power politics, and unintentional local war. Only if we do not deal adequately with those menaces is there likely to be global war, but if we do *not* deal adequately with them and with the cold war then I would say there is a considerable likelihood of *unintentional* global war.

If that is right, not only should much more attention be paid to limited war, and I would be glad if the lecturer would endorse it or not, but two questions seem to arise. The first is, has N.A.T.O. modified its policy in such a way as to localize and seal off any local conflict that arises ? I have always had the impression that N.A.T.O. has tried to spread any local issue into total war, at least in Europe if not throughout the world. The second question is this : what are the lecturer's views in regard to the use of tactical atomic weapons ? It seems to me that the lack of clarity on that question in the pronouncements of the Western leaders is increasing the likelihood of both local and global war.

It has been our announced policy (and there seem to be preparations for carrying it out) that we shall if necessary initiate tactical atomic war for a local and limited aggression. On the other hand, we seem to have done nothing about convincing the world that there can be effective distinctions between tactical atomic warfare and total war, and there is a great danger that without those distinctions established tactical atomic warfare would spread to total war. Either, it seems to me, we have to go through with our policy of tactical atomic warfare and convince the world that it is real and can be carried out without total war, or it seems to me we should give up spending money on tactical atomic weapons. If we do not clarify the situation I suggest we are in grave danger of failing in our main object of preventing global war.

THE LECTURER: That was a very long speech and I will try to sort it out!

I think the first point was what I thought about the question of the likelihood of unlimited nuclear war. I would agree completely with you, and I would hope it came out in my talk today, that the nations must have flexibility and must have forces in their home countries which can be picked up instantly to deal with those threats, which has not so far been the case. We have had in N.A.T.O. two cases. The French had certain troubles in North Africa and they had not any forces to deal with it because everything they had was deployed in Germany. The same thing has faced the United Kingdom, who have had certain troubles, so I believe, in the Eastern Mediterranean, and they found that everything they had was in Germany. Flexibility is necessary in order to enable a nation to handle these things instantly—and I think I did put the emphasis on the word 'instantly.'

The next question, I think I am right in saying, was this: has N.A.T.O. any organization for dealing with a limited aggression in the N.A.T.O. area? Now we think that these small wars, these limited wars, these cold war activities which can become hot, will be most likely outside the N.A.T.O. area, because any question of the movement of enemy land forces into the N.A.T.O. area would spark off a war at once; there can be no doubt about that. Therefore we think it is unlikely. But we also feel there may be certain places in the N.A.T.O. area in Europe, which extends from Norway to Turkey, where you could have limited aggression, and I think your question was have we plans to deal with that? We have—but you would not expect me to say what they are; that would be awkward. We have plans to deal with such a contingency.

The third question is quite easy to answer. I did say in my talk that it is my view that the Western nations should make it abundantly clear that aggression in any form will be met with instant and adequate means, and "adequate means" implies nuclear weapons—at once—give them 'the works' to start with. Do you agree with that? Give the works to anyone who looses aggression on the world.

We at S.H.A.P.E., at Supreme Headquarters in Europe, with the full political agreement of the N.A.T.O. Council, are basing all our plans on the fact that if we are attacked we use nuclear weapons in our defence. That is agreed; the only proviso is that the politicians have to be asked first. That might be a bit awkward, of course, and personally I would use the nuclear weapons first and ask afterwards. I believe that a firm statement on those lines by the West would stop any aggression.

As regards the difference between the tactical and the atomic weapon, we do not distinguish them; we use a nuclear weapon if we are attacked. Now it is a nice point which you might take me up on as to whether it is considered likely that in a limited war such as, for instance, of the size of Korea, if it occurred again, nuclear weapons would be used. I would not call Korea a small war. It was quite a party, and it is my view that if a war of the size of Korea occurred again nuclear weapons would be used. I do not say our political masters would agree, but you asked me what I thought!

COMMANDER T. WHEELDON: The Field-Marshal said that in Phase 2 of the war the Western countries' main problem would be to prevent the spread of communism in the West. Presumably this Eastern Power we are fighting is a Communist Power, and

perhaps the lecturer could say whether he feels that the loyalties of the peoples of the West can be relied upon in another war, or whether he really thinks there is some division of loyalty? If there is then surely we are hamstrung before we start?

THE LECTURER: Of course, I am not really the sort of guy who would know much about that. He has asked a very direct question about the Western forces and I would say today that the armed forces, and the N.A.T.O. peoples, whom I know very well—that is to say the European nations from Norway right through Europe to the Mediterranean and due east to the Caucasus—are absolutely all right as regards any infiltration of communism into them. That would be my view. I see them a great deal and I think they are good. The National Service boys of all the N.A.T.O. nations are first-class lads; all they need is good leadership, and if they are given that you can do anything you like with them.

With regard to the nations behind, in some cases this question of the Communist infiltration is not quite so good. For instance, let us take one nation—take the French. The French will often tell you that in the late war the Army cracked first and then the nation went afterwards. My view is that the nation went first. If the nation goes behind you, then your base is finished and it is difficult to carry on the war.

I would say I am happy about the situation in that respect in the armed forces of N.A.T.O., and so far as I am able to judge the situation in the home countries would be adequate. I would also say this, and I did say it in my talk, that this fight against communism is a global fight; it is a struggle for the minds and hearts of men, and it is not being handled on a global scale. In fact I know of no plan to tackle it. I do not think I can say any more.

THE CHAIRMAN: I think it is my duty now to wind up a very exciting and exhilarating afternoon, and I will not keep you long on anything I may say myself.

It is so blatantly obvious that every possible step must be taken to prevent this unlimited war, and if that is true—and I am sure it is—I think the Press in 1969 (if there were such a thing at that time) in criticizing the story of the lecturer who turned himself into a historian, might say "Well, why on earth did you ever let it happen?" I think what I am trying to do there is to put the question asked by Admiral Buzzard, and trying to say how important it is to control a limited outbreak, corresponding to what might be called a heath fire, and prevent it turning into a conflagration.

Speaking purely as an industrialist who has had some experience of defence plans and preparations in the last war and during the last 11 years, I do not believe that our financial and our technological resources are such that with the best will in the world, even assuming we get a better organization, we can by ourselves alone achieve a state of readiness such as the Field-Marshal postulates as being essential, going back to 1956.

I only want to emphasize those words "by ourselves alone": with our Allies, and particularly with our N.A.T.O. Allies, anything is possible. That means, as the lecturer so clearly pointed out, first of all a clearer conception of our long-term political aims as a global plan and, secondly, a very genuine and whole-hearted technological give-and-take between us and our Allies, especially our major Ally. Such a policy could produce nuclear submarines, underwater weapons, field equipment for the land forces, guided missiles, and in fact all the aspects necessary to create the essential deterrent.

That concludes the meeting, and it is my great pleasure and duty to ask you to express your appreciation and thanks to the Field-Marshal for the great and wonderful afternoon he has given us. (*Applause.*)

GENERAL SIR GEORGE ERSKINE: On behalf of the Council and the members of the Institution, I should like to thank Lord Weeks for taking the Chair at this extremely interesting lecture this afternoon. (*Applause.*)

## AN OUTLINE OF THE ITALIAN CAMPAIGN, 1943-45

By "J.K."

**I**T is not possible in one short article to give more than an outline of the course that events followed in Italy from 1943 to 1945, two years of bitter and arduous fighting. All that can be done here is to give a brief historical resumé of the main operations, but it must not be forgotten that fighting was continuous throughout, and that there were many important actions or gallant deeds to which full justice could only be done in a full and detailed history of the campaign.

The operations in Italy were to be greatly influenced by the general war situation. North Africa had been cleared of the enemy and the Mediterranean re-opened. Sicily was being rapidly overrun, and when this was completed there would be large numbers of troops and landing craft available for continuing the pressure elsewhere. Italy was already losing heart. Mussolini fell from power in July and the new government under Badoglio was already carrying on secret negotiations for an armistice with the Allies. If this could be achieved it would greatly weaken the German position not only in Italy but also in the Balkans where there were large numbers of Italian troops.

Further afield the Russians had now successfully stemmed the German advances and were pressing them back. In the Far East the tide had turned against Japan, and there was a need to send shipping and landing craft to India to take advantage of it. These could only come from the Mediterranean. Stalin had for long been pressing for the earliest possible establishment of the second front in France. The Americans had always looked on this as their main theatre—indeed it had been with some reluctance at first that they had agreed to go to North Africa at all. All the Allies had accepted that the landing in France should now take place as early as was practicable in 1944, and obviously both troops and landing craft would be needed from the Mediterranean to help build up our strength for it.

Clearly, however, the successful operations in the Mediterranean could not be allowed to peter out after the conquest of Sicily. That they must be carried on with reduced resources was inevitable because of the claims of the second front and, to some extent, the Far East. In the American view there was also a fear that we might get so involved by full scale operations in the Mediterranean that forces intended for Western Europe might get deflected and Operation "Overlord" be weakened or delayed.

It was accepted however by the Western Allies that we must maintain the pressure in the Mediterranean, both so as to ensure that we got Italy out of the war and also to tie down the maximum number of German troops, so as to relieve the strain on the Russians and to prevent the Germans from further strengthening their position in France before we carried out our assault there.

The advantages of invading Italy and occupying the country, at least as far north as Rome, were many. If the Italians could be finally swung over to active co-operation with us, not only would a great strain be put on the Germans in Italy itself but in the Balkans also where Italian formations were used for internal security, thus releasing Germans for more active campaigning. Italy already looked like cracking and her final collapse would be more certain if we made no doubt about landing on the mainland. Above all, the best way to tie down German formations and keep them away from Russia or N.W. Europe was to carry the war on to the mainland of Italy itself.

There were other important but more local factors. The capture of Rome would be of high importance politically, in prestige, and in its effect on neutral opinion, though it might be of less value militarily. The capture of Italian air bases in the south and centre of the country would progressively open up to our bombing attacks large areas in southern Germany and in countries under German occupation which were not hitherto within reach of existing airfields in either Britain or North Africa. This in its turn would contribute to German difficulties on every front whether in Russia or later in Northern Europe.

Throughout the Italian campaign the main object always in view was to tie down or destroy the maximum number of German forces, and the more tenaciously the Germans resisted the more chance there would be of so tying them down.

#### GEOGRAPHY

Italy is some 600 miles in length from the toe to the Alps, and about 100 miles—sometimes more and sometimes less—in width in the leg. The mountain spine of the Apennines runs all the way up the centre of the country from the south until, between Florence and Rimini, it swings to the west and there provides a formidable mountain barrier between the leg of Italy and, to the north of it, the broad fertile and industrial valley of the River Po that lies between the turn of the Apennines and the next mountain barrier to the north, along which lie the frontiers that divide Italy from France, Switzerland, Austria, and Yugoslavia.

The few good highways of Italy run in the main roughly parallel to either coast, and on the west all roads 'lead to Rome.' Even these arterial highways have many a twist and climb, while intermediary roads, particularly those that cross the Apennines or wind through the flanking hills, are mainly narrow and tortuous with many bridges, cuttings, culverts, and ravines. These roads are nearly all of poorer quality, becoming greatly more difficult during the Winter periods of rain and snow. The railways were so effectively destroyed by the Germans that they could play no part until rebuilt.

All the way up the leg from south to north the spurs from the Apennines that jut into the coastal areas, and the fast flowing rivers that run between them down to the sea on either flank, provide a host of strong defensive positions, difficult to assault, and usually easy to defend with a force of a strength a good deal inferior to that required by the attacker. In short, any purely land advance northwards was likely to entail a slow and costly advance across the grain of the country, with the need for carefully planned attacks against a series of admirable defensive positions, each success being quickly followed by the need for a new plan against a new obstacle. This, of course, was always assuming that the enemy had the strength and the desire to fight all the way up the leg rather than to make the best of a bad job, retire to the northern Apennines on the Pisa-Rimini line, and there hold us off with a far smaller number of troops than would be required to fight all the way up. By so doing he might be able to release considerable forces for other hard pressed theatres.

#### OUTLINE OF THE CAMPAIGN

It would require more space than is available here to describe in even approximate detail the bitter and difficult fighting that took place, or to enumerate the formations either in type or in strength that took part on either side. The general pattern, however, is divisible into more or less distinct phases and an early statement of these may make the subsequent description of them more clear. These phases were :—

*Autumn, 1943.* The initial landings and the sweep forward to the strong enemy defensive position known as the Gustav line which ran from the Gulf of Gaeta through Cassino to the Adriatic coast.

*Winter, 1943-44.* The Winter fighting on the Gustav line which included the successive battles of Cassino and the Anzio landing.

*Summer, 1944.* The break through the Gustav line followed by the capture of Rome and Florence.

*Winter, 1944-45.* The hard-fought struggle on the Gothic line which ran roughly from Massa on the western seaboard to Pesaro on the Adriatic.

*Spring, 1945.* The final break through into the Po valley which led to the ultimate German surrender.

The fact that during the description of the fighting only a few named German defence lines will be mentioned should not be allowed to obscure the fact that a great number of natural defensive positions, some mountain and some river, some with prepared defences and some without, were available to the enemy and were fully made use of.

The British Eighth Army, after its initial landings in the south, operated throughout on the eastern or Adriatic side of the Apennines and, in addition, spread to the western side during the Cassino fighting and until the fall of Florence. The American Fifth Army, which at nearly all times had under its command certain British or Commonwealth forces whose size and composition varied, operated up the western side of the leg of Italy and across the mountain barrier at the top.


Throughout most of the campaign the one factor of overall Allied strategy that remained constant was the intention, already accepted, to create a second front in northern France in 1944, and to make available for it all the immense resources in men, shipping, and material needed; though opinion might vary as to what the precise limitations of these needs might be.

#### THE OUTLINE PLAN

The final plan for the landings in Italy consisted of an early move by the Eighth Army across the narrow Straits of Messina into the toe of Italy, from where they would work northwards and eastwards in concert with a seaborne landing to be carried out a few days later by the American Fifth Army, with the object of seizing the town and port of Naples.

The original assault on Sicily had taken place on 10th July and by 6th August was going ahead so well that it was already possible for certain formations to be withdrawn from the fighting to prepare for the invasion of Italy. The campaign in Sicily ended on 16th August and on 3rd September the Eighth Army began its crossing, which was not unlike the crossing of a large river supported by artillery fire and with the use of tracers to enable the ferrying craft to maintain direction.

Kesselring calls this gap of two and a half weeks between the end of one campaign and the follow on to the next one a "gift to the Axis." He himself, however, had not waited until the last moment to withdraw his German formations to Italy, but had started to get them over to the mainland as early as he could so as to be ready. The Italian armistice had not yet taken place although it was in active preparation behind the scenes. The Italian troops, however problematical their will to fight, would not have yet had orders not to resist. Some of the Germans from Sicily were known to be in the south. We certainly could not plan, therefore, on the assumption



that there would be little or no resistance on the far side of the Straits. In addition, we were short of ferrying craft, and administrative arrangements had to be made so that our forces could be maintained when they got across. Nevertheless, administrative needs have so often been quoted as reasons for delay when other factors would seem to have urged that greater risks be taken, that there is at least food for thought in the fact that our own administrative standards throughout the Mediterranean campaigns, and indeed elsewhere as well, were nearly always very considerably in excess of those available to our opponents.

To get back to the fighting, the Eighth Army started across the Straits on 3rd September, even so a good deal earlier than had at one time been planned, and the advance spread out into the toe, impeded a good deal more by demolitions and physical difficulties, of which the enemy were quick to take advantage, than by any particularly severe fighting. As soon as the Italians had capitulated on 8th September, an immediate decision was made to take advantage of this at once by bringing the 1st British Airborne Division, for whom neither adequate air lift nor merchant shipping was available, across the Mediterranean in warships of the 12th Cruiser Squadron which landed them without opposition in the heel at Taranto.

The target for the American landing was the Gulf of Salerno, the vital factor being that this was as far north as fighter cover from airfields in Sicily could be provided. General Clark's original wish had been to make the landing north of Naples in the Gulf of Gaeta, but the question of fighter cover ruled it out. Nevertheless, efforts were made to persuade the Germans that that was where the landing would be made, and as a result some of the German forces north of Naples were slow in coming into the battle.

The Fifth Army had a number of difficulties at the last moment in the planning and execution of the landing which took place on the morning of 9th September. The Italian armistice had been announced by broadcast on 8th September. Though almost certainly expected by the Germans before long, its announcement spurred them on to extra precautions on the beaches at threatened spots. When our landings took place next morning the immediate casualties were heavy. On our side, the announcement seems to have had an unsettling effect on the troops aboard ship who were no longer clear what they were likely to be up against.

A more serious difficulty arose from the fact that, of the forces originally allotted, the American 82nd Airborne Division had been withdrawn so that, at Marshal Badoglio's request, it might drop and seize the Rome airfields as soon as the armistice was announced. In the event the Germans were there first and the American division was unable initially to take part in either operation. A few days later, however, a large part of it was dropped by parachute as reinforcements within our own lines in the Salerno bridgehead, an interesting example of reinforcement in time of stress by modern methods, which was so seldom used in the last war except in Burma.

The force at Salerno under General Mark Clark originally consisted of the British Xth Corps of two divisions on the left and the American VIth Corps of equal composition on the right. Supporting gunfire was given by the H.M. ships *Valiant* and *Warspite*, and this was of marked assistance in the difficult initial stages. The Americans were able to gain more ground than were the British, but the initial progress was less satisfactory than had been hoped, and the period between 12th and 14th September was critical, particularly in the centre where there was a weakness between the two corps. By 16th September, however, the Eighth Army, having been

urged on from the south, was already approaching and its patrols joined hands with the Fifth Army after an advance of something like 200 miles in 13 days. The battle of Salerno was won, but it had been a close run thing.

Kesselring, commanding the German Army Group opposing the landing, had an easier task than General Clark. He could concentrate his forces by land more rapidly than the Fifth Army could be reinforced by sea. He was able to disengage the more important of his forces facing the Eighth Army, leaving minimum forces and maximum demolitions to delay their advance. Nevertheless, he had his own troubles too. While he wanted to fight for every yard in Italy, Rommel, in command in northern Italy, favoured the evacuation of the south and centre so as to concentrate in strength in the north. Hitler, at the time, appeared to favour Rommel, and Kesselring did not get reinforcements as quickly as he wished.

#### THE ADVANCE TO THE GUSTAV LINE

Once the crisis at Salerno was passed the Allied advance pressed on against determined resistance. By 25th September the Eighth Army had gained the Foggia airfields, and before long these were to be of high value to both our tactical and long range bombing aircraft. A few days later a considerable success was achieved on this flank by an amphibious landing in brigade strength behind the German line of resistance at Termoli on the Adriatic coast. The German division sent to oppose this surprise attack was slow to react, and in the words of Kesselring "the incident was a lesson both for myself and for the troops themselves which, however, we showed later we had taken to heart at the time of the Anzio landings."<sup>1</sup>

On the west coast the Fifth Army occupied Naples on 1st October, and American engineers showed great skill in quickly getting the port into use in spite of a heavy scale of destruction.

All hopes, however, of a rapid break-through to the north soon faded. By November the Allies were beginning to come up against the Gustav line all along the front, and in December came the added difficulties of abominable weather, a new and unpleasant feature for troops who had so far done their Winter fighting in North Africa. Continuous pressure was maintained, but little progress was made. On the left flank the British Xth Corps achieved a small bridgehead over the River Garigliano which was to be of much value later, but the main fighting was to be in the centre against the key position of Cassino.

#### THE ANZIO BRIDGEHEAD

Before describing the Cassino fighting, however, it is necessary to examine what was in train further north as part of the overall strategical conception. Since the landings at Salerno, little use seems to have been made on the western coast of the opportunities presented by amphibious landings which, apart from overwhelming air superiority, was the one method of warfare available to us but denied to the enemy. It had particular advantages in this theatre of mountains, rivers, and defiles and seemed an obvious adjunct to the stagnation on the Gustav line which already appeared likely. Perhaps one of the reasons why more use was not made of landing craft for the seaborne assault, for which they had been specifically designed, was that they were found to be highly useful for maintenance purposes where ports were small or damaged or where a quick turn-round was wanted.

<sup>1</sup> *Memoirs of Field-Marshal Kesselring*, p. 188.

Be that as it may, by late October plans were being prepared for a landing south-west of Rome. Anzio was selected as being the place which presented the best prospects of tactical success by cutting both the main highways that led to Rome from the south. There were, however, two difficult and conflicting issues to be resolved. The correct tactical moment for such an operation was when the fighting further south had reached a line such as would ensure that there was a reasonable prospect of a break-through. The two operations could then be carried through in concert as one strategical thrust. On the other hand, the majority of the landing craft available in the Mediterranean for the purpose were already earmarked for return to the United Kingdom at the turn of the year, so that they could be got ready to play their part in "Overlord."

Telegrams passed back and forth to London and to Washington, and eventually it was decided that the necessary craft could be kept in the Mediterranean at least through January. Even so, there was little visible prospect of a break-through on the main front. The Prime Minister, critical of the continual battering at the Gustav line, pressed strongly for the landing on the enemy's flank to be pushed forward without delay. General Eisenhower in *Crusade in Europe* says, "I agreed to the general desirability of continuing the advance, but pointed out that the landing of two partially skeletonized divisions at Anzio, a 100 miles beyond the front lines as then situated, would not only be a risky affair but that the attack would not by itself compel the withdrawal of the German front." The operation however, unsound as it was at least in its timing, went ahead.

On 22nd January the landing was launched by the American VIth Corps, consisting of one American and one British division. Although the date had been largely dictated by the availability of craft, it was at first sight a fortunate one, or appeared to be so, since for reasons of reinforcement and relief the enemy were ill poised at the critical moment. When the assault went in, almost complete surprise was gained. Unfortunately, the Corps commander appeared more concerned with establishing his bridgehead than with seizing the fleeting opportunity presented of severing the German communications. Both he and his superior commander had been responsible for the operation at Salerno and their difficulties there seemed to dominate their thinking at Anzio.

By the time that the force was firmly established, the Germans, by far more rapid action, had collected together a motley collection of anything and everything that could be made available, and within 48 hours or so the Allied opportunity had gone and the bridgehead was sealed. It was so to remain for four months of attack and counter-attack, with the Allied force cooped up in their uncomfortable bridgehead with little cover and under constant artillery fire everywhere, while the Germans, in their determined but unsuccessful efforts to throw us back into the sea, sustained in the long run heavy losses that they could ill afford. Whether in fact the Anzio attack in spite of its basic unsoundness would, if it had been pushed forward with vigour, ever have been able to hold the ground gained, in view of the fact that no practical support whatever was likely to result from our actions at the same time at Cassino, must remain a moot point.

#### CASSINO

The town and the Monastery hill at Cassino completely blocked the essential gateway on the road to Rome; indeed, the one main highway ran directly under the hill. On the east were rugged mountains rising to heights of some 5,000 feet within three or four miles of the monastery. On the left, between Cassino and the sea, were

lesser but still formidable heights which blocked the entrance to the Liri valley. In the centre of the front was the strongly fortified town of Cassino itself with its narrow streets and strongly built stone buildings backed by the monastery which, with its neighbouring hills, gave an uninterrupted view over the approaches to the River Rapido. This river ran across the front of the whole Cassino position. Its approaches were heavily mined and were strengthened by pill boxes and emplacements. It ran through country that was flat and boggy and when wet, particularly in Winter, highly unsuitable for tanks.

It would need far more space than is available here to give anything approaching an adequate account of the four fiercely contested battles which were launched against this position, immensely strong in defence, and over country which presented the greatest difficulty to movement, even to infantry. In the hilly areas which comprised so large a portion of the position every rock and crevice provided a potential machine gun position for the defender, and in most places it was impossible for the attacker to dig any form of cover whatever.

The first attack on Cassino took place in January when the Americans attempted to force a bridgehead over the Rapido south of the town, and the French attacked through the mountainous country immediately to the north-east. Fighting was bitter and some small gains were made, but the position was too strong in its inner defences for such a close attack. Casualties were severe on both sides.

The second attack was made in mid-February by the New Zealand Corps which had been specially formed for the purpose, and which took over from the Americans such gains and footholds as they had achieved. The plan in brief was for the 4th Indian Division on the right to make a direct attack on the monastery from the north-east of the town and to drive down to the highway, while the New Zealand Division on the left was to cross the Rapido south of the town and advance to meet the Indian attack coming from the right flank. An essential feature on this occasion was that, rightly or wrongly, the monastery which held so dominating a position was to be bombed, and bombed it was. Thereafter the attack went in on much the same lines as its predecessor, but the difficulties of assaulting so strong a mountain position had still been underestimated and, though further small gains were made, all of which were to be useful later, the main position remained impregnable.

In spite of these failures it was still necessary to maintain the pressure so as to keep the Germans occupied, for there was now great anxiety regarding Anzio where a big German attack had gone in on 16th February. A third assault was therefore made in March. The plan this time was based on the bombing and seizing of the town of Cassino at the foot of the hill. From there a crossing was to be made over the Rapido to the south while the Indian Division again attacked from the north. The town was indeed destroyed as planned and most of it seized, but by the end of March deadlock reigned once more.

During these attacks some 11,000 tons of bombs and 20,000 rounds of artillery ammunition were used, but the enemy was still there. Quite apart from the wisdom or necessity of the highly controversial bombing of the monastery and later of the town itself, it became clear later that the destroyed buildings provided, after destruction, even better defensive positions for the enemy than before, and made our own movement in the area much more difficult. This question of the longer term results of air bombing attacks initiated for their short term dividends turned up again, among other places, at Caen in the Normandy fighting, and will become even more important when tactical atomic weapons are freely available.

The first Cassino attack was made with the purpose of breaking through at the same time as the Anzio landing. There is nothing to show that it ever had any prospect of achieving its purpose.

The second and third attacks were made because the Anzio bridgehead was in difficulties and it was hoped to draw German strength away from the critical engagements there taking place. There is no evidence that either of them had any appreciable effect at all on the bridgehead position which was saved by the courage and doggedness of the Allied troops on the spot.

The fourth Cassino battle was part of the general offensive after Winter had passed and must be described in its proper context.

#### ANZIO AGAIN


While all this was happening in front of the Gustav line, fierce fighting had been going on as well in the Anzio bridgehead. At first sight it might seem that the American VIth Corps, having failed to cut the enemy communications and having become sealed off in their bridgehead, were involved in a wasted effort. As circumstances turned out this was not the case. The Germans were clearly, and rightly, nervous of this sore on their flank. At the height of the February fighting the German commander, von Mackensen, had under his command nearly 10 divisions with good artillery and, at times, reasonable air support, and he failed to drive the VIth Corps back into the sea. The considerably smaller, though reinforced, Allied force had held its ground largely through strong and skilful artillery fire, magnificent air support, and above all by the dogged and determined resistance of its infantry. Had they not held, 10 enemy divisions would have been free to relieve and rest the increasingly hard pressed enemy troops in the Gustav line, or to be used as reinforcements for the Russian front or for France where everyone realized a major battle must start before long. Whatever its failures in conception or achievement the bridgehead certainly fulfilled the classical role of containing more enemy troops than it itself possessed.

#### THE SPRING OFFENSIVE, 1944

While the Allied forces were still held up on the Gustav line and in the bridgehead General Alexander was taking steps to achieve the regrouping necessary for the co-ordinated offensive which he planned should follow. On 5th May, he issued his orders "to destroy the right wing of the German Tenth Army; to drive what remains of it and of the Fourteenth Army north of Rome; and to pursue the enemy to the Pisa-Rimini line."

The American Fifth Army Headquarters was to be in control of the Anzio front and, with the French Expeditionary Corps under command, to operate on a front some 15 miles wide on the Allied left flank. The British Eighth Army, having side-stepped to the left, would have as its main task the assault on the Cassino position, using for the purpose the XIIIth and the Polish Corps, while the rest of the Army, with somewhat weaker forces, would continue to press an equally weak enemy on the Adriatic flank.

The deception plan for the Spring offensive was carried through with much thoroughness and included the concentration of shipping and the continuous use of bogus wireless messages. It was designed to lead the enemy to expect a new amphibious landing in the neighbourhood of Civitavecchia, north-west of Rome. There is little doubt that this cover plan had success in causing the Germans to bring their reserves into the main battle too late.



On the night of 11th May, the attack, preceded by a heavy artillery bombardment, went in all along the line. In the vital Cassino sector the XIIIth Corps, attacking over the Rapido on a broader front and in greater strength than in the earlier battles, made slow but satisfactory progress against a stubborn and determined enemy. The Poles on their right flank were attacking through the mountainous country north of Cassino. Though failing to achieve their target in their first attempt, they quickly mounted a new attack and on 16th May made satisfactory progress against a more tired but none the less extremely determined enemy. This time the attacks had been on the two flanks and were no longer made frontally against the keystone of the position. On 18th May the Poles and the British joined hands on the highway beyond the monastery and the last battle of Cassino had been won.

At the same time the French with their excellent mountain troops, profiting from the small bridgehead gained earlier over the River Garigliano, were attacking mainly over the highest hills in front of them. It was here that they were least expected and they got on extremely well.

By 18th May the Germans were trying to break contact on the whole front from Cassino to the sea and to fall back on their next line close in rear. The Allied forces surged forward though they still had a great deal of difficult country to encounter. On 23rd May the forces from Anzio launched their break-out attack. Good progress was made but, possibly as a result of trying to achieve too much in two directions at once, full success was at first gained in neither direction and the Germans were still able to hold their Caesar line covering Rome until their forces engaged further south could withdraw, either to pass through Rome or to by-pass it to the north-east.

On the evening of 4th June, the Allies entered Rome—an event without great military significance in itself, but one which sent a wave of enthusiasm through the Allied peoples, acted as a tonic to the troops in Italy, and all this on the very eve of the opening of the second front in Normandy.

#### THE ADVANCE TO THE GOTHIC LINE

It was at this critical stage, when the troops had at last achieved the success for which they had been fighting so grimly and so long, that General Alexander received confirmation that he was to lose no less than seven American and French divisions from his command. These were required to carry out Operation "Anvil," an attack on southern France in support of the hard fighting that was now taking place in the main Allied theatre in Normandy, and to provide extra ports for the large number of American divisions now becoming ready in the States, but for which it was thought that there might be inadequate means of entry in the Channel ports.

During the projected pursuit from Rome the preparation for the withdrawal and diversion of these French and American divisions to France, and the consequent lack of replacement of battle casualties in the American divisions that remained, was bound to have an unsettling effect. It probably lengthened the fighting in Italy by many months.

Be that as it may, the advance was pressed forward although the enemy got more of a breathing space than he had any right to expect. By 12th June the German decision to impose as much delay as he could began to be felt again, and at the end of June the first enemy co-ordinated defensive position on either side of Lake Trasimeno caused a temporary halt. Westwards the Americans continued to press on and in the centre the advance was soon resumed. Arezzo fell to the XIIIth Corps

on 6th July and by 19th July the Fifth Army was in Leghorn. On 4th August the leading elements of the XIIIth Corps passed through the city of Florence, undamaged by either side save for the destruction by the Germans of all the bridges except the historic Ponte Vecchio, where they destroyed the nearby buildings to block access to it.

During all this period the rest of the Eighth Army, east of the Apennines, had been out of the public eye, but was nevertheless making steady and useful progress on the Adriatic flank with its more extended forces. Ancona fell to it on 18th July, and by late August it had already made contact with the Gothic line at its eastern end.

#### WINTER 1944-45

It had long been realized that, whatever happened in southern and central Italy, the Germans were certain to fight with the utmost determination where the Apennines turned westwards and formed a mountain barrier between the leg of Italy and the wide and fertile expanses of the Po valley. Once this was passed the Allies could rapidly make progress towards the French frontier and, if Verona fell, close the Brenner Pass and join hands with the occupied countries in the Balkans. The Germans had therefore for long been preparing, though they never fully completed, the so-called Gothic line which ran from Pesaro on the Adriatic, along the heights of the Apennines, and then descended to the western coast in the neighbourhood of Massa. The attack on this line was the next problem for the Allies.

There were two possible courses of action. The first was to continue the central attack through the Apennines on to Bologna. The advantages were that the direction of movement ran with the grain of the country and provided the shortest route to the Po valley. The disadvantages, and they were powerful ones, were that the main German forces appeared to be on this part of the front, and that though the route ran with the country and not across the ridges it was always practically impossible to deploy more than a few guns, to park any transport, or to use tanks off the road. The alternative course was to put the weight of our attack into a flank movement through the less mountainous country on the Adriatic coast. The advantages of this would be that the terrain, though still difficult, seemed more suitable and the attack would be carried out by the Eighth Army the bulk of whose divisions were still relatively fresh. The disadvantages were that any attack must be across the succession of river lines, irrigation ditches, and canals which would lie across the route of advance and form such excellent obstacles and delaying features for the enemy's use. The decision that was taken was to put the main effort into an attack across the Apennines. A regrouping thereupon took place. The British XIIIth Corps, which had already had much heavy fighting from Cassino northwards, was put under the command of the American Fifth Army and the somewhat fresher Eighth Army was to be wholly east of the Apennines, ready to make a supplementary attack on the Adriatic front.

After the capture of Florence a certain slowing up of the Fifth Army's advance was almost inevitable if only because of the changes that had to be made as the French and American divisions due to go to the south of France were withdrawn. As a result of this the full fruits of the victory gained in June and July could not be exploited and indeed, at this critical juncture, Kesselring himself received reinforcement. At least, however, the Allies were still tying down the maximum German forces within Italy.

As soon as it was possible to do so, the advance was resumed into the difficult Apennine country which was bound to present the greatest difficulties to both movement and maintenance. Nevertheless, progress, though slow, was continuous. On 25th August the Eighth Army with a very successful surprise attack gained a first footing in the Gothic line near the Adriatic coast. In the third week in September both of the Allied armies attacked and useful gains were made, particularly by the Fifth Army which seized the Futa Pass and other important mountain gateways. Then came heavy rain. Rivers rose rapidly and, near the coast, canals were flooded. The climax of the fighting in the centre came in the third week of October when the Fifth Army, having now got to within 15 miles of Bologna and therefore well into the Gothic line, could get no further. The weather was vile, ammunition was getting short, and the enemy now based on the plains had less difficulty in switching his troops to each threatened spot.

While the Fifth Army was thus coming to a standstill, the British and Canadians on the Adriatic flank were still fighting their way forward and maintaining essential pressure on the enemy. Rimini fell on 22nd September and Forlì on 9th November, but on this flank, too, weather and water were providing obstacles to advance as formidable as the enemy.

#### PLANS FOR 1945

From December, 1944, and in the Winter months that followed, little geographical progress could be made. The troops themselves, however, exhausted in their gruelling battles in the mountains and on their succession of river lines, could at least now be given some rest and replenishment while plans went ahead for the final offensive which was to take the armies into the Po valley once Winter was over and Spring was on its way.

The Germans were still in possession of the Gothic line—more or less—on the western flank, but elsewhere they had already been pushed back from the crest of the Apennines to within a dozen miles of Bologna, from where their position now ran along the line of the River Senio to the southern end of the Comacchio Lake. Behind them lay the Po valley. Once the Allies broke into this, they would have much better opportunity of using their great mobility and powerful equipment, both of which had been so hamstrung in the many months of Winter and mountain fighting. Moreover, they possessed overwhelming air superiority which had already caused great damage to the enemy's communications and which would be such a powerful aid when once again targets were to be found in the open. To add to the discomfiture of the enemy, it was in northern Italy that the Italian partisans had always been most active.

While the Allied hope was that the next battle would bring them final victory the Germans were known to have the intention, if the worst came to the worst, of swinging back to a line from Comacchio to Verona and beyond so as to cover the exits to Austria, and behind that Bavaria, where it was still supposed that a final stand might be made. That part of the line which was opposite the Eighth Army on the Adriatic flank therefore appeared to be a vital hinge in the German plan.

General Mark Clark had by now taken command of the Fifteenth Army Group and General Alexander had become Supreme Commander in the Mediterranean.

General Clark's orders envisaged three stages for the final battle. In the first stage the Eighth Army was to force the various river lines that crossed its front while the Fifth Army, starting a few days later, was to capture Bologna and break

into the Po valley. Secondly, the Allied forces were to mop up all Germans south of the Po, over which most of the bridges had already largely been destroyed. Thirdly, the Po was to be crossed and Verona captured.

The main problem on the British front was the area that was known as the Argenta Gap, through which passed the highway from Ravenna to Ferrara. On its northern flank lay the Comacchio lake which had been extended southwards, practically up to the highway, by the copious floodings that the Germans had carried out. To the south of the highway much of the ground was marshy and water-logged. The Germans considered that the floods had made their extreme left flank unassailable. We, however, now possessed a new type of amphibious tracked vehicle known as a 'Fantail,' of which great things were hoped.

The German army commander on this front had apparently intended to retire just before the battle opened to his next and stronger river line. This would not only have given him a better defensive position but would also, in all probability, have caused the Eighth Army to have to revise their whole plan for the assault at the last moment. Hitler's Supreme Headquarters, however, would have none of it. They forbade the surrender of any territory whatsoever without fighting for it, with the result that, in the opening engagement, the Germans were holding a position that was not wholly suitable and in unnecessary strength and consequently suffered casualties heavier than they could usefully afford. It was yet another example of the German difficulties that were apt to arise as the result of interference by higher authority with the Army Commander on the spot.

The British attack went in on 9th April. It was opposed with vigour, but it started well. The 'Fantails,' though found unsuitable for the muddy bottom of the Comacchio lake, found the flooded areas to the south of it no obstacle. The Germans were completely taken by surprise by their appearance on what they had imagined to be a perfectly secure flank. By 18th April the Argenta Gap was in our possession, the last German line of defence between Comacchio and the Apennines had been reached, and the Eighth Army was ready to break out into the plains of the Po Valley.

The Americans made their first attacks on the extreme left near Massa at the same time as the Eighth Army was attacking in the east. The main attack in the centre, planned for 12th April, was delayed for 48 hours by unsuitable flying weather. Fierce fighting followed in the mountains, but by 19th April the Fifth Army had broken through and had cut the highway west of Bologna. The town of Bologna itself was first entered on 21st April by the Poles who were the left-hand corps of the Eighth Army, but American infantry riding on tanks joined them from the south a few hours later.

The last strong defensive line in Italy had now been broken. The Germans could no longer plug the gaps and signs of disintegration soon began to be apparent. On the British front, Ferrara was being threatened from either flank by the 24th. The Po was crossed and Padua occupied on the 29th. The Americans had also reached the Po on a 60-mile front on the 24th. Reggio, Parma, and Piacenza fell in quick succession. By 26th April the enemy forces had been split in two. There was no question of their being able to take up the next line as they had once intended. The Americans had already closed the road to the Brenner between Verona and Lake Garda. Genoa surrendered to partisans on the 26th and Turin on the 30th. Organized resistance had now ceased and General von Vietinghoff, who had been in command of all the German forces in recent months, signed the instrument of final surrender at Caserta on 2nd May, 1945.

Even in their final rout many of the better German units continued to fight bravely and stubbornly when met. Their difficulties, however, were overwhelming. Short of transport at all times, they suffered enormous losses of material and equipment as a result of the air attacks which could be launched on them unceasingly once they were found at last in open country.

On the Allied side the speed of advance in the final stages was remarkable, whether the enemy were still resisting or not. It was a fine tribute to the Allied transportation and maintenance services.

So ended the Italian campaign, a campaign which had begun with the first re-entry into the mainland of Europe by the Western Allies, that had included two separate Winters in the most difficult conditions of geography and weather, and which had involved almost continuous fighting in mountainous territory of one sort or another and from one end of Italy to the other.

The strategical thread that had run through the whole campaign was the need to tie down the maximum number of German forces and so to keep them away from either of the main fronts in Russia or in Western Europe. Except for a short period in the Spring of 1944, and until the final collapse, General Alexander at no time disposed of actual formations greater in number than the enemy opposing him, and that in spite of the fact that it was the Allies who were attacking and the enemy who were manning the strong defensive positions which nature had so liberally provided. It is true that the Allies possessed overwhelming air superiority and that the German formations became much below strength in some of the later stages. Some of their best divisions, and particularly their parachute formation at Cassino, fought with tremendous determination and doggedness against attacks in considerably greater strength. Nevertheless, there is little doubt that our strategical object was abundantly achieved and with great credit to the fighting soldiers who had endured so much. Whether that strategical object was wide enough in scope was quite another question.

In the matter of overall war strategy the Italian campaign lost much of its value on account of the removal, at a critical juncture, of the divisions which carried out Operation "Anvil" in southern France. This was an operation on which the American President and his advisers had set their hearts, and nothing would make them change. Though obviously of assistance to General Eisenhower, it must at least be arguable whether in fact it played any part of major importance. At the same time it wrecked the Italian campaign, prevented General Alexander from gathering the fruits of his early 1944 successes, prolonged the war in Italy, and removed any chance of a quick occupation of the whole country. It also prevented any subsequent penetration of the Balkans or Austria which a less limited overall strategical outlook might have provided for, and so handed over to the Russians vast areas in which the presence of the Western Allies would have had vital consequences to the future stability of Europe.

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## THE BRITISH OCCUPATION OF THE DIAMOND ROCK, 1804-1805—II

By COMMANDER W. B. ROWBOTHAM, R.N. (RETD.)

IN the beginning of April, 1805, the situation in the West Indies was that Admiral Missiessy had recently sailed from Fort Royal, presumably to return to France, though his immediate movements had not been confirmed. The British reinforcements about which he was so concerned were, in fact, not far behind him, for on 3rd April Rear-Admiral the Hon. Alexander Forester Cochrane arrived at Carlisle Bay, Barbados, and took over the command of the station from Sir Samuel Hood. He sailed two days later, with six ships of the line and four frigates,<sup>1</sup> for Santo Domingo in hot pursuit of Missiessy; but the Frenchman had too long a start and got clear away. On 11th April, Cochrane received a report<sup>2</sup> of strong rumours that Villeneuve was on his way out to effect a junction with Missiessy, when the combined force would attack Jamaica. The British squadron on the Jamaica Station, under Rear-Admiral James Richard Dacres, was, by itself, no match for the expected French force, so Cochrane temporarily left his own station to reinforce Dacres, picking up the Jamaica convoy just before it got in. By 25th April, however, the immediate danger of a major French attack had passed, and he then sailed to regain his position to windward.

It is now time to follow the movements of the other portion of the French expedition to the West Indies. After being held up by bad weather, Villeneuve eventually left Toulon on 30th March; evading for the second time Nelson, who still thought that Egypt was his destination; and after passing through Gibraltar Strait, where his presence was reported by Captain Sir Richard Strachan (*Renown*, 74), picked up five Spanish ships, under Admiral Don Federico Gravina, at Cadiz. He then vanished over the horizon. In the meantime, orders had been sent out to Missiessy to remain where he was and await the arrival of Villeneuve; but, as we have already seen, the former had sailed for France before these orders could reach him.

The Franco-Spanish fleet arrived at Martinique on 14th May, coming under fire from the Diamond Rock as it passed, and two days later a belated Spaniard—the *San Rafael*, 80 (Commodore Don Francisco de Montes), which had left Cadiz after the others—was enticed to within gunshot of the Rock by the age-old artifice of hoisting enemy colours. On the 17th, Captain Sir Francis Laforey (*Spartiate*, 80), who was the Senior Naval Officer at Barbados at the moment, received a report from Commander Maurice advising him of the arrival in Fort Royal Bay of the combined enemy fleet, comprising 11 French ships of the line, seven frigates, three brigs and one ship *armée en flûte*, together with five of the Spanish line and one frigate; but it could not be ascertained from the Rock whether they had troops on board or not. They also had with them one prize—the *Cyane*, 18 (Commander the Hon. George Cadogan)—which had been captured 50 leagues to windward of Barbados whilst cruising for the protection of trade. Napoleon's orders of 2nd March directed Villeneuve to remain out in the West Indies and await the arrival of Ganteaume,

<sup>1</sup> *St. George*, 98, *Atlas*, 74, *Centaure*, 74, *Eagle*, 74, *Northumberland*, 74 (flag), *Veteran*, 64, *Amelia*, 38, *Circe*, 32, *Galathea*, 32, *Unicorn*, 32.

<sup>2</sup> From Mr. James Farrance, midshipman, late of the *Racoon*, 16, who had just left Santo Domingo where he had been detained as a prisoner of war after being captured in a prize.

with the Brest squadron, but if the latter had not arrived within 40 days he was then to leave those waters and cruise off the Canary Islands to intercept the East Indiamen convoys.<sup>3</sup>

Villeneuve was immediately importuned by the French military authorities to attack the British islands, but in view of his explicit orders he was averse to becoming embroiled in combined operations. The nearest islands, Dominica and St. Lucia, were both on their guard after Missiessy's raid, and from the experience gained there it was certain that they could not be reduced by a *coup de main*. He did not wish to remain entirely inactive at Fort Royal, so, on 29th May, having detached three frigates to cruise against British commerce and pick up intelligence from local craft and other vessels arriving from Europe, he decided to make a serious attempt to capture that Frenchman's eyesore, the Diamond Rock. "The capture of this rock," according to the general report on Villeneuve's operations by Comte Decrès,<sup>4</sup> "so close to Martinique, was all the more important in that the enemy, by occupying it, thus intercepted all the shipping of this Colony."<sup>5</sup>

The operation was entrusted to Captain Cosmao (*Pluton*, 74), whose force comprised:—*Pluton*, 74 (Captain Cosmao), *Berwick*, 74 (Captain Camas), *Sirène* frigate (Captain Chabert), *Argus* brig (Lieutenant Taillard), and *La Fine* schooner (Lieutenant Meynard). In addition, there were four long-boats and four armed cutters, under Lieutenant Daudignon (1st of the *Bucentaure*, 80). The Spaniards contributed two long-boats and three cutters. Major Boyer, the Captain-General's A.D.C., was in command of the 200 (240) troops accompanying the expedition. Leaving Fort Royal in the evening of 29th May, the Franco-Spanish force found itself next morning swept to the southward as far as St. Lucia, and spent all that day in beating up again. By the time it had worked sufficiently far to windward it was too late to begin the attack that day, so, according to the French account, the squadron anchored for the night off Pointe Borgnesse.

On 1st June, Villeneuve received the Emperor's fresh orders, dated 14th April, duplicates of which had been brought out in advance by the *Didon* frigate in a passage of 26 days. These were to the effect that "if, 35 days after the arrival of Rear-Admiral Magon [from Rochefort], you have had no fresh news of Admiral Ganteaume, whom you may then consider to have been held up by stress of weather and the blockade of the enemy, you should make your way back immediately, and by the shortest route, to Ferrol."<sup>6</sup> It was assumed that Dominica and St. Lucia were already in French hands, and that some, at least, of the remaining British islands would suffer a like fate. History does not record Villeneuve's verbal reactions to this latest change of plan, but his comments on the vagaries of his master were probably more forcible than polite!

A few days before the French assault force sailed there occurred an event which was to have serious consequences on the ability of the garrison of the Rock to repel a determined attack. Lieutenant Wollocombe had been sent with despatches to Barbados and was returning in one of H.M. schooners. Calling at St. Lucia *en route*

<sup>3</sup> *Projets et Tentatives de Débarquement aux Iles Britanniques, 1793-1805*, Vol. IV, p. 366. Hereinafter referred to as *Projets*, IV. Dates in the original documents are according to the Republican Calendar: thus, "2nd March, 1805" is given as "le 11 ventôse an XIII," and so forth.

<sup>4</sup> Vice-Admiral Denis, Comte Decrès, Minister of Marine.

<sup>5</sup> *Projets*, IV, p. 538.

<sup>6</sup> *Projets*, IV, p. 513.

on 25th May, it was learned that the Rock was being closely blockaded, so the lieutenant in command of the schooner ordered Wollocombe to proceed with ten half-barrels of powder in a boat which was being got ready by Mr. Riordan, the purser, who was at Port Castries arranging for a further supply of fresh provisions. The usual squally gusts off the land were blowing at the time, and in coming alongside the schooner the boat's bowsprit was carried away. The schooner sailed immediately the powder had been transferred, and by this time it was dark. Wollocombe then went alongside a merchant ship, from which he obtained a new spar; by the time he was ready for sea it was 9 p.m. and blowing a gale, with heavy rain. He did not consider it safe to proceed in an undecked boat there and then, and he was also afraid of getting the powder wet, even when covered with the tarpaulin which he had managed to procure from somewhere; he therefore postponed his departure until four o'clock next morning, when the weather had moderated somewhat, though there was still a heavy swell running in which the boat was often nearly swamped.

All went well, however, and normal progress was made until 10 a.m., by which time they (Riordan was with him in the boat) had fetched about nine miles to windward of the Rock; an enemy brig was then discovered to leeward of them, standing to cut them off. Warning guns were fired from the Rock and the French ensign hoisted—the established signal that the boat was not to close the Rock; but there was no telescope in the boat and the flag was mistaken for the Danish jack—the signal to approach. Even then it was not too late, and if they had stood on a little farther on the starboard tack (i.e., more to the northward) they would then have been able to run in under cover of four more of the guns on the Diamond and so escape capture. As it was, they lost their heads and ran right down on the brig and were taken, although those guns on the Rock which would bear were throwing grape at the enemy.

The boat received 52 balls in her canvas and one in her mast before Wollocombe lowered his sails in token of surrender, but there is no doubt that she was badly handled and might very well have escaped if more seamanlike judgment had been displayed. As Wollocombe was apparently standing up by the mast all the time they were under fire from the brig, it would seem that the purser was actually sailing the boat; there also seems to have been some difference of opinion between them what their proper course of action should be. Both officers were taken prisoner and carried into Martinique, but before they surrendered the powder was thrown overboard, although this expedient had not been concurred in by Riordan. Commander Maurice was thus deprived of their services during the final attack, but what was of even more vital importance was the failure to replenish the stock of powder on the Rock. There does not appear to have been anyone else in this boat, which seems to have been a hired craft, and possibly the two officers were the only occupants. The whereabouts of the Rock's tender at this critical time is not known; she was evidently not in the immediate vicinity and no officer was away in her, for all the other officers are shown in the Muster Book as having been captured on the Rock. The exact description of the captured craft is not recorded (in the minutes of the subsequent court-martial it is referred to both as a boat and as a sloop), but it is unlikely that this vessel was the tender.

The account of the attack on, and subsequent capture of, the Diamond Rock can best be followed from the full details set forth in Commander Maurice's report to Admiral Cochrane. Writing from Barbados on 19th June, he says:—

"In my letter of the 14th inst.<sup>7</sup> to Sir Francis Laforey I informed him of the

<sup>7</sup> Maurice writes "inst." for "ult."—an obvious clerical error.

arrival of the enemy's combined squadron off the Rock and of our having had one hour's partial action with them as they passed it, their force consisting of sixteen ships of the line, eight frigates, three brigs, one ship *armée en flûte* and His Majesty's late sloop *Cyane*.

"On the 16th inst.,<sup>7</sup> at half past seven in the morning, I saw a large ship rounding Point Saline, and from her appearance I plainly saw she was a ship of the line, and from the cut of her sails an enemy. At eight, she hoisted a Spanish ensign and pendant; I immediately directed French colours to be hoisted as a decoy, which fully answered my wishes, for at twenty minutes before nine she had got under the lee of the Rock, at the distance of three-quarters of a mile, when I shifted the colours and opened a well-directed fire of round and grape from Fort Diamond, the first shot striking her under the fore channels; she directly put her helm up, and in the act of wearing returned one feeble shot. From the little winds she did not get out of range of shot until nine, but continued running before the wind until twelve. At two, an enemy's brig of war came out of Fort Royal and beat to windward of the Rock, where she continued to cruise. I was now fully satisfied in my own mind of the intention of the enemy to attack the Rock.

"From the 16th to the 29th the Rock was completely blockaded by frigates, brigs, schooners and small boats, sloop-rigged, which prevented any supplies to be thrown into me, for on the 25th<sup>8</sup> a sloop from St. Lucia, with my second lieutenant who had carried dispatches to Barbados and the purser who had gone over to complete the provisions to four months, was taken under my guns whilst endeavouring to throw in some barrels of powder, although we covered her with a spirited fire from Fort Diamond, the Centaur's Battery, and Maurice's Battery. On the 29th, at half past five in the evening, two ships of the line, one frigate and a schooner, with 11 gunboats in tow, stood out from Fort Royal under all sail. I now had not the smallest doubt that the squadron was intended for the attack of the Diamond. The Rock was put into the best state of defence it could as far as little ammunition and water would allow, but I was determined to defend it while I had any remaining. On the 30th, at sunrise, the enemy's squadron had fallen far to leeward, but the wind unfortunately veering very much to the southward (much farther than I had known it for some months) enabled them to fetch as high as St. Anne Bay, where they continued under easy sail for the night.

"On the morning of the 31st, at sunrise, they were still under easy sail far to windward; but from the number of signals they made, and having cast off their boats, I was convinced the attack would be made soon. At seven, the enemy bore up in a line for the Rock, the gunboats, etc., keeping within them, crowded with troops. Seeing the impossibility of defending the lower works against such a force, and the certainty of our being prevented from gaining the heights without considerable loss, and which could not be defended for any time without us, with the greatest reluctance I ordered the whole above the first lodgements, leaving a man at each gun to give the enemy their discharge, which they did, and joined me over the North Garden Pass, excepting the cook who was made a prisoner. What powder was left below we drowned and cut away the launch, that she might not be serviceable to the enemy. At ten minutes before eight we had every person up and the ladders secured, when the *Berwick* opened her fire within pistol shot, and at eight the whole of the enemy's squadron of ships and gunboats were in action, which was returned by Fort Diamond and Hood's Battery, the whole of the troops in the boats keeping

<sup>7</sup> Maurice writes "inst." for "ult."—an obvious clerical error.

<sup>8</sup> According to the evidence at the court-martial this date should be the 26th.

up a heavy fire of musketry. It was a fortunate circumstance we quitted the lower works when we did, as our own stones hove down by the enemy's shot would have killed and wounded the whole of us. I was now busily employed in placing the people on the different lodgements, with small arms, to harass the enemy as they landed and to cover themselves. I am happy to say that the execution done was considerable, for the fire of our men was so galling that the seamen left their boats, excepting three men in each who were shot dead, and three of the gunboats went adrift; two of them went on shore at Martinique and were beat to pieces, and the other went to sea. The whole of the enemy's squadron were constantly employed during the day bombarding the Rock as they could fetch in to windward of it. At night the whole of the men were posted on the different lodgements to harass the enemy as they threw in supplies and reinforcements.

"On the 1st, the enemy's squadron was employed constantly bombarding the Rock, the fire from the troops being much more spirited. On the 2nd, the enemy's squadron was bombarding as before, who had been reinforced with another brig; but the fire from the troops this day was very severe, as they had during the night got under the rocks in the surf and were covered by the overhanging cliffs, and as our men appeared they fired up. At four in the afternoon, on examining into our ammunition, I found we had but little powder left and not a sufficient quantity of ball cartridges to last until dark; and being firmly of opinion that the enemy meant to endeavour to carry the heights by assault that night, I thought it a duty I owed to those brave fellows who had so gallantly supported me during three days and two nights constant battle to offer terms of capitulation. Having consulted my first lieutenant, who was of the same opinion, at half past four, the unhappiest moment of my life, I threw out a flag of truce which returned at five with honourable terms for the garrison, and the next morning we were embarked on board the *Pluton* and *Berwick*, and on the 4th we were sent to Barbados in a cartel, agreeable to the Articles, except 14 men whom they forcibly detained unknown to me, getting men to swear they were French. I have written to Captain Kempt, Agent for Prisoners of War, stating the business, as well as their endeavouring to entice the whole of my crew to enter into their service; but, thank God! I trust no Englishman, let him be ever so bad, is base enough to do it.

"I beg leave to recommend in the strongest terms the able and gallant support I received from my first lieutenant, Wadham, and whose services at different times in carrying dispatches to Barbados relating to the enemy merit my warmest acknowledgements. I am also much indebted to Lieutenant Watson, of the Marines, for his active and able support. These, Sir, were the only officers I had, but I needed not more, for the conduct of the whole of my people was so active, orderly and gallant that I shall always reflect on it with pleasure to the latest day of my life. Indeed, when you observe that we had only two killed and one wounded, and the enemy lost 30 killed and 400 wounded, you will perceive that, had not my orders been put into execution with the greatest promptness and attention, we must have met with great loss; and had I let loose their valour I should have lost half my men. Their fatigue and hardships are beyond description, having only a pint of water during 24 hours under a vertical sun and not a moment's rest night or day, and several of them fainting for want of water and obliged to drink their own.

"A schooner had brought out 60 scaling ladders to attempt us that night under cover of the ships, and four more ships of the line were to have come against us the next day. Indeed, the whole of the combined squadron's launches were employed on the service, and not less than 3,000 men. The captain of the *Sirène* frigate was

wounded through the knee. My only consolation is that, although I unfortunately lost the Rock, I trust its defence was honourable and hope it will merit your approbation.

"N.B.—The force of the Rock above the lodgements was:—Fort Diamond—2 long 18-prs.; Hood's Battery—1 carronade, 32-pr.; No. of men on the day of attack—106."

There are three French accounts of the capture of the Diamond Rock, one each by Villeneuve, Boyer, and Cosmao. Villeneuve's report to Decrès is short and does not differ greatly from Maurice's in the essential facts. He says:—

"The ships appeared before the Rock on the morning of 31st May, and at the first broadside the lower battery was abandoned and the landing accomplished with the greatest order and courage. The enemy, who had withdrawn to the summit and into the caverns of the Rock, rained down a hail of stones and maintained a fusillade which killed and wounded a few men. The remainder, however, consolidated their position, but the heights could not be surmounted for want of scaling ladders. Next day the ships again bombarded the Rock, but as the enemy had concealed themselves in the caves the shot caused them no inconvenience. On 2nd June, by means of ropes, some sailors and grenadiers managed to climb up and take possession of a cave wherein was stored the garrison's provisions; immediately a flag of truce was thrown out and the garrison capitulated. It numbered 128 men. The *Didon* having brought out orders to rejoin, the field artillery and 600 men of the 84th<sup>9</sup> were re-embarked on the 3rd, and on the following day the ships which had been detached to the Diamond returned." [i.e., to Fort Royal.]<sup>10</sup>

Boyer, in his report to Villaret, expands his version of what happened to an extent which is far too long to reproduce here.<sup>11</sup> Much of his report is taken up with verbose details of the natural difficulties to be surmounted, and also of the personal exploits of many of the military officers. Captain Cosmao's report, which was enclosed with that of Boyer, mentions little else than what the ships did; this report, like that of Villeneuve, is as brief as the military report is long.

These French reports were published at the time in the *Martinique Gazette*, the editor of which is not at a loss for words to extol the magnitude of the feat of capturing the Rock. The whole of the foregoing was translated and published in the *Barbados Mercury*, the editorial comment on the florid details of the French being as follows:—

"To their bombast we do not look for Captain Maurice's panegyric, although we trace his valour in their difficulties and distress; from his own countrymen and brother officers, who best know how to discriminate the real hero, he has received the most honourable approval of his conduct, and on the close of the court-martial held on him for the surrender of the Rock the President expressed himself happy that it fell to his lot to return him his sword, which had been so honourably drawn in the cause of his country; and made no doubt, when his

<sup>9</sup> According to Boyer this regiment was the 82nd. The number of troops employed varies in the different reports. Villeneuve says 240, and also 600; Boyer says 200. The British estimate was approximately 1,500. The number of Spaniards engaged is not mentioned anywhere.

<sup>10</sup> *Projets*, IV, p. 541.

<sup>11</sup> The complete account can be read in the *Naval Chronicle*, Vol. XV, 1806, p. 128 *et seq.*

services were again called on, that they would be equally conspicuous. He then addressed the ship's company and commended their conduct in the highest terms of approbation, for gallantry and discipline; and was confident that it would be an example in His Majesty's Service."

And the editor of the *Naval Chronicle*, in referring to Commander Maurice, aptly sums up the foregoing with:—

"The man whose proceedings were sanctioned and applauded by so excellent a judge of merit as the late Lord Nelson will incur little danger of censure from his countrymen . . . and that though he was not able to *command* success, fully *deserved* it."

Maurice arrived at Barbados on 6th June and there found Nelson, who was the Senior Flag Officer on the spot. He had only time to write a very short report, because the latter was on the point of sailing, and all details had to be left over until he forwarded his full report to Admiral Cochrane (previously quoted). This letter, together with Nelson's acknowledgment of it, is given below.

"It is with the greatest sorrow I have to inform you of the loss of the Diamond Rock under my command, which was obliged to surrender on the 2nd inst. after three days' bombardment from a squadron of two ships of the line, one frigate, one brig, a schooner, eleven gunboats and, from the nearest calculation, 1,500 troops. The want of water and ammunition was the sole cause of its unfortunate loss. Although I shall never cease to regret the accident, yet it is some consolation to think so many valuable lives are saved to His Majesty's Service, having only two killed and one wounded. The enemy, from the nearest account I have been able to obtain, lost on shore thirty killed and forty wounded, independent of their ships and boats; they also lost three gunboats and two rowing boats. Allow me to speak in the highest terms of the officers and men under my command; and I trust, when the court-martial shall have taken place, that their hardships, fatigue and gallantry will merit your Lordship's approbation, they having been 19 nights under arms and some of them obliged to drink their own water. I beg leave to enclose the Articles of Capitulation.

"Ships employed against the Diamond:—*Pluton*, 74, Commodore Cosman [*sic*], *Berwick*, 74, *Sirène*, 40, *Argus*, 16, *La Fine*, 18 swivels. Number of men on the Rock, officers, men and boys—108.

"P.S.—I received last night from St. Lucia certain information that the enemy landed at Martinique 400 wounded.

#### "ARTICLES OF CAPITULATION

- "No. 1. That the garrison, with all its works, shall be delivered up entire.
- "No. 2. That the garrison shall be allowed to march with their arms to the Queen's Battery, with drums beating and colours flying, and there lay down their arms.
- "No. 3. That all private property shall be secured to the officers and men.
- "No. 4. That the garrison shall be sent to Barbados at the expense of the French nation, but not to serve until regularly exchanged.

"N.B. — That the garrison is capable of holding out a few days longer, and two hours will be given for an answer, when hostilities will recommence.

"All terms granted.

"J. W. MAURICE.

Captain, R.N., and Commandant of the garrison of the Diamond Rock.

"BOYARD. [*sic*]

Le Chef d'Escadron, Aide-de-Camp, Commandant L'Expédition."

Nelson's reply, dated *Victory*, at sea, 8th June, 1805, is as follows :—

"I have received your letter of the 6th inst., acquainting me with the surrender of the Diamond Rock, under your command, on the 2nd of this month, to a squadron of the enemy's ships and gunboats, therein mentioned, together with the terms of capitulation which accompanied your said letter ; in answer to which, while I regret the loss of the Diamond, I have no doubt that every exertion has been used by yourself and those under your command for its defence, and that its surrender has been occasioned from the circumstances you represent. It is particularly gratifying that so few lives were lost in the contest, and I have very fully to express my approbation of the terms of capitulation, as well as with your conduct personally, and that of the officers and men under your command, which I have to request you will be pleased to communicate to them."

Commander Maurice also forwarded a copy of his report on the loss of the Diamond Rock to the Secretary of the Admiralty, who was directed to "Acquaint him their Lordships are pleased to signify their approbation of his conduct and that of the party of men under his command." People in England, however, knew little or nothing about this occurrence at the time. The Rock had been taken possession of when undefended, and a minor event of that nature on a station abroad was not considered to be of sufficient interest or importance to merit notice ; the account of the loss of this post was therefore never published in *The London Gazette*.

We can now follow Nelson's movements during his pursuit of Villeneuve to the West Indies. Nelson, with the Mediterranean Fleet, had left Lagos Bay on 11th May and had arrived on 4th June at Barbados, where he found Cochrane with two ships of the line, thus bringing the strength of the British force in those waters up to 12 of the line. The day before he got in he had received positive assurance from two merchantmen of the presence in the West Indies of the Franco-Spanish fleet, which by then comprised 20 sail of the line—14 French and 6 Spanish ; and confirmation of this news was supplied by Major-General George Prevost, the Governor of Dominica, who stated that "as they are to blockade the Diamond and at the same time to pour in shells from the mortar batteries lately erected on the main, I fear Captain Maurice may not be able to maintain his post, however much may be done."

Immediately on his arrival Nelson, in his capacity of Senior Flag Officer present, issued the usual written orders on assuming command of the situation. The actual measures to be taken for the relief of the Diamond Rock he left to Cochrane, but, as we have just seen, the place had fallen two days before. What the enemy's objective was neither Nelson nor any of the local naval or military authorities knew, but the consensus of opinion was that Tobago or Trinidad were the most probable. Commander Maurice, on his arrival at Barbados, had communicated to him some

information he had obtained from the French Commodore about the alleged future intentions of the enemy, but Nelson placed no reliance on this news because he rightly considered it was intended by the French to deceive. The British intelligence at that time was faulty, and Nelson was led off on a wild-geese chase to the southward. After a week's search among the islands he left the West Indies and recrossed the Atlantic in fruitless pursuit, but Villeneuve had already sailed for home on 5th June and had too long a start. The only other French exploit after that was the capture of the Antigua convoy of 14 sail on the 8th. The two future antagonists at Trafalgar thus fade out from this narrative.

The actual information referred to above is contained in a letter, dated Barbados, 6th June, written by Maurice to Admiral Dacres, in which he says :—

"I beg leave to inform you of the unfortunate loss of the Diamond Rock, under my command, after three days' constant bombardment; the want of water and ammunition was the occasion of it. The French Commodore informed me that *La Furet* had just arrived from Gantheaume's [*sic*], who has escaped from Brest with 15 sail of the line, and that the Ferrol squadron had arrived that day, consisting of 6 sail of the line, French, and 8 Spanish. This is only their information, but from the spirits they appear in I am afraid it is true. He also informed me that there was an expedition to sail on the 4th, in the evening, against Grenada, and another against Dominica. That Jamaica was their chief object, but something else [remained] to be done here first. As Lord Seaforth<sup>12</sup> has informed me of his intention of sending to Jamaica this night, I have thought proper to give you the earliest information."

The customary court-martial was held on Commander Maurice, the officers, and ship's company of the *Diamond Rock* for having surrendered their 'ship' to the enemy. The minutes of the evidence have not been preserved, but there is still in existence the opening preamble to the court-martial, together with the finding. This runs as follows :—

"At a court-martial assembled on board His Majesty's Ship *Circe* at Carlisle Bay, Barbados, the 24th June, 1805, for the trial of James Wilkes Maurice, Esq., Commander, the officers and company of His Majesty's late sloop *Diamond Rock*, taken by a squadron of the enemy's ships on the 2nd inst. Present, Captains Jonas Rose, President, George Tobin, William Champain, Rob[er]t Henderson, Joseph Nourse.

"The Court being duly sworn according to Act of Parliament, in pursuance of an order from the Hon. Rear-Admiral Cochrane, commanding His Majesty's Ships and Vessels at Barbados, the Leeward Islands, &c., dated the 23rd June, 1805, directed to Jonas Rose, Esq., Captain of His Majesty's Ship *Circe*, and senior officer of His Majesty's Ships and Vessels at Barbados, which being read, the members and Judge Advocate then in open court, and before they proceeded to trial, the letter from James Wilkes Maurice, Esq., was read, and having heard what the said James Wilkes Maurice, Esq., Commander, the officers and company of the late sloop *Diamond Rock* had to offer in their defence, and maturely and deliberately considered the whole, the Court is of opinion that Captain James Wilkes Maurice, the officers and company of His Majesty's late sloop *Diamond Rock* did everything in their power to the very last in the defence of the Rock against a most superior force; and that Captain Maurice behaved with firm and determined resolution until he was unable

<sup>12</sup> Governor of Barbados.

to make further defence for want of water and ammunition. The Court do therefore honourably acquit Captain J. W. Maurice accordingly.

"The Court cannot dismiss Captain James Wilkes Maurice without expressing their admiration of his conduct in the whole of the occasion. And also they express the highest approbation of the support given by the officers and men under his command. A circumstance that does high honour to them, does no less credit and honour to the discipline maintained by Captain Maurice, and do therefore unanimously and honourably acquit the said officers and ship's company, and they are hereby unanimously and honourably acquitted accordingly.

"JONAS ROSE.

"WM. CHAMPAIN.

"GEORGE TOBIN.

"JOSEPH NOURSE.

"R. HENDERSON.

"THOMAS HORT, Deputy Judge Advocate on the above occasion."

On the following day Cochrane, who was at Barbados in his flagship, the *Northumberland*, 74 (Captain George Tobin), forwarded to the Admiralty the minutes of the court-martial, together with a long dispatch, the relevant extracts from which are as follows:—

"I separated from Vice-Admiral Lord Nelson on the 13th current, the squadron then at anchor in St. John's Road, Antigua. His Lordship proceeded with eleven sail of the line in quest of the combined fleet which had passed that island on the 8th, steering to the northward between Barbuda and St. Bartholomew. . . . Their Lordships will have been informed by Lord Nelson of the fall of the Diamond Rock after a most gallant defence. The enclosed sentence of the court-martial is highly honourable to Captain Maurice, the officers and crew. The gallant defence he made and the vigilance and ability with which his conduct has been marked since in command of the Diamond Rock merits my warmest praise, and I hope their Lordships will find him, as well as Lieutenant Wadham, deserving of their marked approbation."

From what we have already seen it would appear that the Rock was practically impregnable. The weak point in the defence, at the critical moment, was a shortage of ammunition and drinking water, and these two factors formed the primary cause of its fall. There was about one month's supply of water still left when the attack took place. It is not known whether any further supplies were obtained between 23rd March and 16th May, at which latter date the Rock was closely blockaded, because during most of that time Cochrane had taken all his ships to leeward in order to reinforce Dacres at Jamaica. Although in the ordinary way there may have been sufficient water to supply the needs of the garrison, if not being attacked, it is quite conceivable that in the circumstances, when the lower lodgements had been evacuated, part of this supply was lost; moreover, the necessary men were not available for distributing what water remained to the scattered garrison, since everyone was fully occupied in repelling the invaders. The shortage of ammunition, too, was a serious matter. The second lieutenant, in an open boat with ten half-barrels of powder, very nearly got back from St. Lucia with this fresh supply, but was snapped up by an enemy brig literally at the last moment, in spite of the covering fire from the Rock. How long the garrison could have held out if these supplies had not been so seriously depleted must remain a matter of conjecture, but at any rate they would have had a sporting chance, Nelson, with the Mediterranean Fleet, having arrived at Barbados on 4th June. In the event the dice were loaded against them.

The two courts-martial—on the second lieutenant and the purser—referred to earlier can now be examined. For reasons which will appear, the trial of these two officers did not take place until six months after the capture of the Rock, and so, owing to the accused having been held as prisoners of war and the dispersal of the witnesses immediately after this event, the courts-martial were held in England and not on the Leeward Islands Station.

The first active steps to bring those two officers to a court-martial were taken by Admiral Cochrane in a letter, dated 7th July, 1805, to the Secretary of the Admiralty (William Marsden, Esq.) :—

“ Lieutenant Roger Wollocombe and Mr. Riordan, Purser,<sup>13</sup> lately belonging to the *Diamond Rock*, arrived yesterday in a cartel from Martinico, and Captain Maurice having informed me that the above persons (for gentlemen I cannot call them) had behaved in a most disgraceful manner, and that it was his intentions to have tried them both by a court-martial had they arrived previous to his departure for England; and not being in possession of the evidence necessary to prove the accusations alleged against them, particularly when charged with a supply of ammunition from St. Lucia for the garrison, instead of proceeding with it at a time when it would have arrived safely, they went on board a transport where they got drunk, and in consequence of which delay they were afterwards taken by the enemy.

“ I have therefore judged it proper to send them both to England as prisoners with the *Proselyte* to await the pleasure of the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty.”

This was minuted on 9th November as follows: “ Send this to Capt. Morris [*sic*] and direct him to exhibit charges against these persons that their Lordships may ground their order for trying them by court-martial.”

The first Court, the members of which were: Sir Isaac Coffin, Bart., Rear-Admiral of the Red and second officer in the command of His Majesty's Ships and Vessels at Portsmouth and Spithead, President, Rear-Admiral Charles Stirling, Captains Robert Moorsom, William Shield, John Harvey, The Hon. Henry Blackwood, Robert Dudley Oliver, John Irwin, Henry Digby, James Athol Wood, William Cuming, Thomas Masterman Hardy, and John Seater, M[ose]s Greetham, junior, Deputy Judge Advocate of the Fleet, assembled on board the *Gladiator* at Portsmouth on 7th December, 1805, for the trial of Acting Lieutenant Roger Wollocombe of His Majesty's late sloop *Diamond Rock*,

(1). For having between January, 1805, and 25th May following acted in a fraudulent manner by receiving bills for the payment of men's wages at St. Lucia and which was not paid to them within the dates mentioned.

(2). For having acted unbecoming an officer and a gentleman in messing at the top of the Rock with a part of the ship's company of the said sloop.

(3). For having, in disobedience of orders between the dates above-mentioned, suffered Mr. Mortley Riordan, acting purser of the said sloop, to take the command of a sloop from him employed in bringing over provisions from

<sup>13</sup> In the minutes of the courts-martial the former officer's name is spelt Woollocombe, but his own signature in his statement of defence is spelt Wollocombe. Similarly, the purser's name is shown as Mortley (Morthy) Riordon; his signature in his statement of defence is smudged and is barely decipherable, but from the Muster Book there is no doubt that it was Mortley Riordan.

St. Lucia to the Rock, by which means between ten and twelve cwt. of soft bread was lost to H.M. Service.

(4). And also for neglect of duty in not sailing on the evening of 25th May from St. Lucia with dispatches and supplies for the Rock, which if he had done so, it would have arrived safe and in all probability prevented the Rock from being captured.

In the course of the evidence the following points arose :—

(1). The accused did not exert himself in any way to ensure that the men received the pay due to them.

(2). In extenuation of his unofficerlike conduct he pleaded that, while in his state of exile, he had been sick for part of the time and had no proper facilities for getting his food cooked, although there was an unoccupied cave which he might have appropriated to himself.

(3). It appeared to have been a regular practice for the purser, who had at one time served afloat as a seaman, to override Wollocombe when they were sent away together in the Rock's tender, or in a hired vessel, to obtain fresh provisions from St. Lucia. Repeated complaints on this subject had been made by Wollocombe, and Commander Maurice had reprimanded him for improper conduct in this respect and had given him a direct order that he was not to permit it in future. On the occasion in question the sloop had got set to leeward of the Rock for some days during the return trip, and by the time she got back all the bread had gone mouldy and a Board of Survey condemned every single loaf as unfit for human consumption.

(4). No evidence was produced in support of the charge.

The finding of the Court was that "the charge of having messed at the top of the Rock with a part of the ship's company is partly proved, but in consideration of the circumstances doth adjudge him to be only reprimanded and admonished to be more circumspect in his conduct in the future, and the said Mr. Roger Wollocombe is hereby reprimanded and admonished to be more circumspect in his conduct in future; and the Court is further of the opinion that the other charges have not been proved against the said Mr. Roger Wollocombe and doth adjudge him to be acquitted thereof, and he is hereby acquitted thereof accordingly."

The same Court assembled two days later to try Mr. Mortley Riordan, acting purser of His Majesty's late sloop *Diamond Rock*,

(1). For having acted in a fraudulent manner between January, 1805, and 25th May in assisting Mr. Roger Wollocombe, acting lieutenant of the said sloop, to withhold the payment of men's wages received by bill at St. Lucia, and which had not been paid within the dates mentioned.

(2). Also for having, in the months of December, 1804, or January, 1805, altered the dates of men's appearance and discharge on the ship's books of H.M. late sloop *Diamond Rock* for the sake of the victualling, and thereby defrauded the Service.

In the course of the evidence the following points arose :—

(1). No evidence was produced by the Prosecutor in support of the charge, the opinion of the Court having already been given at Wollocombe's trial.

(2). The only document saved after the capture of the Rock was the Complete Book, which contained certain of the alleged alterations; the old Complete Book (in modern parlance the Rough Ledger), in which it was stated

were other alterations in the Supernumerary List, had been lost. In consequence, only two specific cases were taken. One referred to the dates of discharge of four black men—one of whom was entered under the name of Sambo—and the other to the date of appearance (i.e., of joining) of Riordan himself. The clerk, Thomas Bradshaw, who had had little experience in the Service, had left the date of Riordan's appearance blank, and stated in evidence that the latter had filled it in with the date of his warrant, 1st September, although he did not actually join until 19th November. Riordan, in his defence, stated that when he joined the Rock he found the entries in the Muster Book were in a state of confusion, and that he had endeavoured to right the discrepancies to the best of his ability and had no intention of fraud.

*Finding.*—"The Court is of opinion that the charges have not been proved against the said Mr. Mortley Riordan and doth adjudge him to be acquitted, and the said Mr. Mortley Riordan is hereby acquitted accordingly."

It will be observed that the allegation that these two officers had been drunk whilst on duty was never brought up at the courts-martial, presumably from lack of witnesses to substantiate the charge.

From the Muster Book we get some interesting statistics.<sup>14</sup> The names of 23 officers in all are shown as having been borne on the books of the *Diamond Rock* at one time or another; some were discharged or 'ran' at various dates, and only about half this total number were present at the end. Eleven officers and warrant officers and 70 men were sent to Barbados under the terms arranged, one warrant officer and 11 men being detained by the French. The "Whither" column in the Muster Book is not completely entered up, and there are about 14 men unaccounted for; since the totals given in Maurice's reports do not tally, these figures can only be regarded as approximate. Excluding the two men killed in action, the total number of deaths during the commission was 34, viz.: died on board, 29; killed on board, 1; drowned, 2; drowned at St. Lucia, 1; prison, 1. Desertions amounted to 15. They include: from Barbados, 4; from St. Lucia, 5; from prison, 2; from on board (swam for it), 2; from *Eclair*, 1 midshipman; from tender at Barbados, 1 master's mate.

An analysis of the Muster Book shows that, omitting the two fatal casualties during the final attack, 30 men in all died 'on board' the Rock. The islet had a reputation for being an extremely healthy spot, and 30 deaths in 14 months—the first death occurred on 10th April, 1804—seems at first an unusually large number out of a complement of 121 men; but this abnormal death roll may be explained by the fact that the Rock was infested by that particularly venomous species of snake, the fer-de-lance, whose bite is fatal within a very few hours. Details of the funeral arrangements are lacking, and there is no indication to show whether the deceased were interred on the islet or buried in the sea on the steep-to side of the Rock.

One interment only has been recorded as having taken place on the Rock, and that was of the body of Commander Robert Carthew Reynolds of the *Curieux*. On 4th February, 1804, Lieutenant Reynolds, accompanied by Acting Lieutenant Bettsworth and Mr. Tracey (both of whom have been referred to before and who were slightly wounded on this occasion), with four boats of the *Centaur*, had cut out the French brig *Curieux*, 16 (Commander Joseph-Marie-Emmanuel Cordier), from under the guns of Fort Edouard in Fort Royal Bay. For his gallantry he had been

<sup>14</sup> See Appendix B.

promoted to Commander and given command of the prize, but the five severe wounds he received during the affair prevented him from immediately assuming command, and Bettsworth was given charge of her while he was on the sick list. Reynolds never really recovered. He died on board the *Centaur*, whither he had been removed for his health, on 13th September, 1804, from an imposthume breaking in his inside, and was buried on the Rock with full naval honours.

Maurice's further services may be briefly recapitulated. He arrived home on 3rd August, 1805, and immediately received an appointment to the *Savage* brig, which was then fitting out at Portsmouth. Whilst so employed, and while still waiting to obtain a crew, he had an interview with Lord Nelson, who greeted him as follows: "Captain Maurice, I am very happy to see you, and I lament that I did not arrive in the West Indies in time enough to save you; but don't let that make you uneasy, for I assure you there is no person who entertains a higher sense of your gallantry in the defence of the Rock than myself. I am sorry their Lordships have not given you post rank; however, you are placed under my orders, by my own particular request, and I will do everything in my power to serve you."

At the time of this interview Nelson was about to resume command of the Mediterranean Fleet, but the *Savage* could not be manned in time to accompany him, and so her commander's prospects of promotion in the immediate future were blighted. From December, 1805, to June, 1807, Maurice was employed chiefly on convoy duty in Home Waters, during which period he never lost a single one of his charges. He next went out again to the West Indies, at first under Rear-Admiral Dacres on the Jamaica Station, and then, in July, 1808, was transferred to the Leeward Islands Station, where he once more came under the orders of Sir Alexander Cochrane. On 1st October, he was appointed Governor of Marie Galante, which island had been captured early in the preceding March, and on 18th January, 1809, he obtained his commission as post captain. He remained in this post for slightly over a year and then was invalided home, suffering from the effects of the climate. Captain Maurice's next appointment was of a similar nature, although possibly he would have preferred the command of a frigate. This time it was as Governor of Anholt, an island in the Kattegat, which was garrisoned almost entirely by Royal Marines and a few Royal Marine Artillery. He remained there from August, 1810, until September, 1812, during which time he successfully repulsed a determined attack by the Danes on 27th March, 1811.

That was his last period of active service, and when peace came he, like many other officers then and at the conclusion of the last two wars, found that there were not enough jobs to go round. For many of these officers, and more particularly those of the time we are considering, a period of rest was possibly not unacceptable. With the exception of the short breathing space following the Treaty of Amiens, the Country had been continuously at war for 22 years. Maurice, himself, first 'smelled powder' in 1793; he had been wounded and also invalided from a foreign station owing to fever; a change of occupation may have been to his liking; he may even have been in the same frame of mind as a certain senior naval officer at the conclusion of the 1914-18 War, who, shortly after the Armistice, was heard to exclaim: "As soon as peace has been definitely concluded you won't see my arse for dust!" Maurice remained on half-pay until 1st October, 1846, when he retired as a 'yellow' admiral. He died at Stonehouse on 4th September, 1857, in his 83rd year.

The first lieutenant of the Rock, Robert Adams Wadham, was confirmed in the rank of lieutenant on 31st August, 1805; he also had a long period of half-pay and

eventually retired with the rank of commander on 17th January, 1838. His name appears for the last time in *The Navy List* for January, 1841, where he is included among those "Officers whose deaths have been officially reported since 20th September, 1840."

Owing to the unfortunate circumstances in which the British occupation of the Diamond Rock was terminated, practically all the official records, journals, etc., were lost. Much of the history of the interior economy on the Rock must remain in oblivion, and queries of how the time was spent, how many enemy vessels were brought to, and the hundred and one other items that spring to mind must remain unanswered. Enough has been written, it is hoped, to show that, as an example of what could be done in difficult and very often arduous circumstances and conditions of living, the British naval officers and men of that period were fully deserving of every whit of that approbation which was so frequently bestowed upon them by the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty.

Instances of island outposts being overwhelmed by the enemy before a relieving force was able to succour them have occurred at various times in our history. One such during the 1939-45 War may be recalled, since the circumstances were not dissimilar—the fatal time lag in this case being three days, against two in 1805.

In September, 1943, the island of Leros, which was almost totally lacking in air facilities, had been occupied by a weak British force; but after a gallant defence it was recaptured on 16th November by the Germans, whose air power in that area was virtually unopposed. It had been the intention to occupy Rhodes after the surrender of Italy on 8th September, and thus obtain the use of its airfields whilst denying them to the enemy; but three days later the Germans, whose strength in that island was numerically inferior to the Italians, seized the place before a strong raiding force which was being assembled at Alexandria could be despatched in destroyers to bolster up the Italian resistance. Our other commitments in North Africa and Sicily at that time prevented the mounting of a major assault force to take possession of Rhodes. In 1805, Nelson had arrived at Barbados too late to save the Diamond Rock by a matter of two days, and Cochrane had taken most of his ships to leeward in order to reinforce those at Jamaica.

#### APPENDIX B

The undermentioned officers and warrant officers were borne on the books of the *Diamond Rock* for the periods specified against their names. There were one or two others who were borne for victuals only for a few days, but these have been omitted.

Name	Rank	Joined	Discharged	Whither or for what reason
Maurice, James Wilkes...	Comdr.	3 Feb. 04	3 Jun. 05	Captured.
Westcott, Benjamin ...	Act. Lt.	1 Mar. 04	23 Jun. 04	Captured in <i>Fort Diamond</i> .
			28 Sep. 04	D. per sentence of a court-martial. <sup>1</sup>
Sutton, Robert ...	Act. Lt.	21 Mar. 04	6 Apl. 04	Superseded.
Wadham, Robert Adams	Act. Lt.	7 Apl. 04	3 Jun. 05	Captured.
Wollocombe, Roger ...	Act. Lt.	16 Nov. 04	3 Jun. 05 <sup>2</sup>	Captured and taken to Martinique.

Name	Rank	Joined	Discharged	Whither or for what reason
McLachlin, Arthur ...	Lt., R.M.	29 Mar. 04	31 May 04	D. <i>Centaur</i> (proper ship).
Willis, T. L. (Supnmy)...	Lt., R.M.	1 Jun. 04	14 Sep. 04	D. <i>Centaur</i> .
Watson, John Blackett...	Lt., R.M.	1 Sep. 04	3 Jun. 05	Captured.
Pickering, John ...	Master's Mate.	21 Dec. 04	9 Mar. 05	R.
McGill, William ...	Master's Mate.	11 Sep. 04	15 Nov. 04	D. <i>Centaur</i> .
Laffen (Laffer), Henry ...	Mid. (21)	21 Mar. 04	31 May 04	R.
McKenzie, Robert ...	Mid. (22)	1 Jun. 04	3 Jun. 05	Captured.
Harris, J. W. ...	Mid. (30)	1 Jun. 04		
	A.B.	17 Aug. 04		
	Master's Mate.	10 Mar. 05	3 Jun. 05	Captured.
Wyley, John ...	A.B.	21 Mar. 04		
	Mid. (22)	- Oct. 04	3 Jun. 05	Captured.
Douglas, John B. ...	Surgeon	1 Jun. 04	3 Jun. 05	Captured.
Arthur, John ...	Surgeon's Mate.	11 Sep. 04	3 Jun. 05	Captured.
Riordan, Mortley ...	Act. Purser	1 Sep. 04 <sup>3</sup>	25 <sup>4</sup> May 05	Captured and taken to Martinique.
Bradshaw, Thomas ...	Clerk	1 Jun. 04	3 Jun. 05	Captured.
Jennings, Richard ...	Act. Gr.	1 Mar. 04	15 Nov. 04	D. <i>Centaur</i> for <i>Curieux</i> .
Norris, John ...	Act. Gr.	17 Nov. 04	3 Jun. 05	Captured and detained.
Dean, Richard ...	Act. Bos'n.	1 Mar. 04	3 Jun. 05	Captured.
Hatherly, John ...	Act. Carp.	1 Mar. 04	15 Nov. 04	D. <i>Centaur</i> for <i>Curieux</i> .
Lawrence, Samuel ...	Carp. Crew	24 May 04		
	Act. Carp.	16 Nov. 04	3 Jun. 05	Captured.

<sup>1</sup> The date of the court-martial was 4th October, 1804.

<sup>2</sup> A clerical error; he was captured at the same time as the purser, on 26th May, when both of them were carried into Martinique.

<sup>3</sup> According to the evidence given at his court-martial, it would seem that this date was that of his warrant, and that he did not actually 'appear' until 19th November, 1804. This alteration of date formed one of the charges against him.

<sup>4</sup> He was captured on the 26th.

NOTE: (1) In the "Rank" column the number in brackets after "Mid." denotes the age of the officer.

(2) In the "Whither" column "Captured" denotes "Taken prisoner and sent to Barbados under the terms of the capitulation."

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## THE CORUNNA CAMPAIGN, 1808

By MAJOR E. W. SHEPPARD, O.B.E., M.C. (RETD.)


**T**HE Corunna campaign at the opening of the Peninsular War, and the character of Sir John Moore, the Commander of the British force which took part in it, have given rise to wide differences of opinion among military historians and critics.

In 1808, the Emperor Napoleon I of France, having defeated all his enemies in Europe, and having only Britain left to deal with, planned to reduce her to terms by closing all the ports of the Continent to her trade. In pursuance of this purpose French troops invaded and conquered Portugal, and he induced the incompetent and craven king of Spain to abdicate in favour of his brother Joseph Bonaparte, who ascended the throne with the support of a French army of occupation. This usurpation, however, caused an immediate and general uprising of the Spanish people. The invaders were vigorously attacked everywhere and suffered a series of checks and defeats which compelled them to retire to the line of the Ebro. A Central Junta assumed the government of Spain and sent to ask for the help of Britain, as the King of Portugal had already done. In August, 1808, a small force under the future Duke of Wellington landed near Lisbon, defeated the French general, Junot, at Vimiero, and compelled him to sign an armistice which secured the withdrawal of the invaders from Portugal.

New armies were rapidly raised by the Junta to complete the expulsion of the French from Spain, and by the end of September these totalled over 200,000 men. Unfortunately, they were as inferior in quality as they were formidable numerically. There was no united command and, indeed, no unified direction of the war, for the Central Junta at Madrid was not only incompetent but powerless to enforce its will on the independent provincial assemblies. All, however, were supremely confident in their ability to expel the French from their country and even to invade France. The British Government, sharing their delusions, promised to send an auxiliary force of 36,000 men, of whom 20,000 were to be sent from the army in Portugal and 16,000, under General Baird, to be despatched direct from England by sea to Corunna, a port in the north-west corner of Spain, General Sir John Moore being placed in command of the whole contingent.

He was at once faced with serious difficulties. It was important to move his army into Spain quickly, before the rains made the mountain roads across the frontier with Portugal impassable; but he had no transport, no supplies, no stores, and no money to purchase any of these things. As neither he nor anyone else knew whether the roads into Spain could stand up to the passage of artillery, he was compelled to send all his guns and cavalry, under General Hope, by the good but roundabout road from Elvas to the Tagus bridge at Almaraz. The main body from Portugal marched north-eastwards from Lisbon by three routes, converging at Ciudad Rodrigo. Enough, but only just enough, transport was eventually collected for this march, but the resulting delay led to the force being caught in the mountains by the rains. It reached Ciudad Rodrigo in mid-November, considerably the worse for wear, and moved on thence to Salamanca to await the arrival of Hope's and Baird's columns.

Here Moore was met by a budget of disheartening news. The British representatives at Madrid wrote to him of the inefficiency of the Central Junta, the weakness of the Spanish armies, the lack of any plan of campaign or central direction, and the



growing strength of the enemy. He also heard that the arrival of Baird's force in the concentration area of the army had been seriously delayed. Its disembarkation at Corunna had been forbidden by the local Junta until permission had been obtained from Madrid. There were no transport or supplies to be had except on payment of cash, which Baird had not got and could not get; and only the fortunate arrival of Mr. Frere, the newly-appointed British Minister to the Central Junta, who brought funds with him, enabled him to pay for his most urgent needs. The force had to move through the Galician mountains in small successive parties because of the dearth of supplies, so that when Baird's advanced guard reached Astorga, more than half way to Salamanca, on 13th November, his cavalry, the last to disembark, were still at Corunna.

Meanwhile, unknown to Moore, the situation on which his mission and his plan of operations had been based had completely altered for the worse. Napoleon, who knew that in the Spring of 1809 he would have a war with Austria on his hands, determined, while he yet had the time, to go to Spain in person at the head of a large army and restore the situation there. Two hundred thousand men, massed on the Ebro, burst through the centre of the widely-spread Spanish armies on the Burgos-Madrid road and, dealing fierce blows to either flank, shattered both their wings and hurtled forward upon the capital. The left wing Spanish army, under Blake and La Romana, with which Moore had planned to co-operate, was driven back and dispersed in the mountains west of Bilbao, so that instead of taking part, as he had been led to expect, in a victorious offensive, the British general found himself, with his army, isolated and widely scattered in front of an overwhelmingly superior enemy. He at once decided on a retreat, ordering Hope with the southern column, which had now reached the Escorial just west of Madrid, to join him at Salamanca by forced marches and Baird to take his troops back to Corunna and re-embark them there for Lisbon. Meanwhile his own main body would retire to Portugal as soon as Hope's detachment rejoined.

This decision proved highly unpopular. Officers and men murmured loudly at being deprived of any chance of battle; Frere from Madrid protested at the desertion of the Spaniards without any attempt to assist them; and Spanish emissaries promised that the capital would hold out against the French to the last and begged Moore to help. This weakened Moore's resolve; so that when he realized that the French were unaware of his army's presence so close at hand, and when the junction of Hope's force had brought its strength up to 20,000 men, he changed his mind, postponed the retreat into Portugal, and ordered Baird to halt at Benevente. His hope was that if the French continued in ignorance of the presence of his force on the flank of their line of advance on Madrid, there might be an opportunity for a telling thrust against their line of communications. Moreover, there were possibilities of assistance from Romana, who had rallied some of Blake's defeated Spanish army at Leon, on Baird's left.

On 5th December, he notified the British Government and Frere that he felt that he must support the Spaniards, despite the risks involved, and moved his force forward to Mayorga. Then, on 13th December, the capture of a despatch from Napoleon's headquarters to Marshal Soult, commanding the French 2nd Corps around Carrion, revealed to Moore that the main French army was around Madrid preparing to move westwards into Portugal, whither Napoleon supposed the British to be retiring, and that Soult's Corps, with less than half his own strength, lay exposed to his attack. Moore at once decided to seize the opportunity, and ordered the army northwards on Carrion.

But the battle never took place. A brilliant British cavalry success at Sahagun warned Soult in ample time to prepare for battle; and Napoleon in Madrid was informed by some British deserters of his 2nd Corps' danger. He at once led out 50,000 men to cut the communications of the British with Portugal while they were engaged with Soult's Corps in their front, and had high hopes of enveloping and destroying them. But as he believed them to be at Valladolid, instead of 50 miles farther to the north-west, as they actually were, the task proved too much for his troops. Moore heard of the threat to his rear on the morning of 23rd December just as, after 24 hours' delay, his army was preparing to attack the French at Carrion, and to their disappointment ordered an immediate retreat by Benevente to Astorga. The British reached Benevente on 26th December; the cavalry leading Napoleon's intercepting force did not come up till the next day, by which time the British had crossed the Esla and thus evaded the net which Napoleon had hoped to throw around it. The French cavalry, attempting to press the British rearguard, was smartly repulsed, and the army continued its retreat to Astorga, where it arrived unmolested on 30th December.

Here Moore met La Romana and his troops, who were in such a deplorable state that it was clear that no help was to be had from them. He had hoped to make a stand at Astorga to cover Galicia, but he found himself short of supplies and of transport, while his officers and troops, disappointed of their battle and bewildered and wearied by apparently pointless marches and counter-marches, were in an ominous state of sullen indiscipline. He felt himself compelled therefore to continue the retreat to the coast and get his army out of Spain with all possible speed. The rearguard left Astorga on New Year's Day, 1809; and Napoleon, riding in with his advanced cavalry, found that his prey had escaped him. Disquieting reports now reached Napoleon of a conspiracy being hatched in Paris against him and of intensified preparations for war by Austria. He therefore departed for Paris, leaving Soult's Corps, with Ney's in support, to see the British out of Spain.

The rest of the story may be quickly told. Moore's army all but disintegrated on the 150 miles of mountainous road between Astorga and Corunna. The sufferings of the troops, urged on at a needlessly rapid pace by their leader and increased by lack of food and poor clothing, and the incumbrance of women, children, and other non-combatants, were extreme; discipline, except in the rearguard which was kept to its duty by the constant threat of the pursuing enemy, vanished completely. Drunkenness, plundering, and crime of every kind added to the disorder of the rapid retreat. A portion of the force, detached at La Baneza to embark at Vigo, though it suffered no less than the main body, retained its cohesion to the end; but the bulk of Moore's troops found the trials and temptations of the long and painful retreat too much for them, and he wrote sadly home that their conduct had been "infamous beyond belief."

Fortunately, the French, too, suffered sorely from the rigours of weather and country and could not press the pursuit vigorously; but they so hustled the retreat of the British as to leave them no time either to distribute or destroy the considerable depots of stores and supplies which Baird had set up on his advance. Moore's men dissolved into a mob, and it was only when they reached the coastal plain, where the weather was less severe, that some semblance of order could be restored and they began once more to look like an army.

Moore had hoped to re-embark his command unmolested, but the shipping allotted for this purpose was weather-bound and could not reach Corunna till

16th January. Soult, however, needed several days to bring up all his Corps, and most of Moore's guns and cavalry had already been put aboard before he could attack. The battle, fought only to give time for the British to get clear away, was indecisive; all the French attacks were held or repulsed, owing partly to the fact that the British had the advantage of new arms and ammunition drawn from the large stores in Corunna, whereas the French weapons were rusty and in many cases unserviceable. Moore was mortally wounded in the course of the battle and was buried in an improvised grave in the ramparts as the last of the British transports were about to sail. Had he not fallen when he did, it is possible that a more clear-cut victory might have been won; but it could have had no strategic importance, for the army was unfit for further service until it had been rested and refitted. It had lost 7,000 out of its original 33,000 of all ranks, and was in the last stages of exhaustion and destitution.

Comment on this campaign must be confined to two points. Was it well conducted? Was it successful?

As regards its conduct, full account must be taken of the great difficulties under which Moore had to labour. His army was not a good one; it was hastily put together and poorly staffed, the regimental officers were often not up to their work, and the men, though good fighters, were in every other respect indifferent soldiers. He had to contend with heart-breaking administrative difficulties. He was constantly subjected to interference from the British representatives in Spain urging him to impossible and perilous military action. His Spanish Allies gave him boasts and promises in plenty, but no co-operation or assistance. It was a combination of all these adverse factors which dogged Moore's plans and actions, and made him appear hesitating and vacillating, whereas in fact he showed a degree of firmness, courage, and insight highly to be commended under all the circumstances. But though he was primarily a trainer of troops, and as such left an enduring mark on the British Army, he was not a great, or even a very good, general, if we are to judge him by his conduct of this campaign. His hesitation at Salamanca after he had got his army in hand and ready for use, his vacillation between the alternatives of precipitate retreat and overventuresome attack, the delay in launching the attack at Carrion, and the speed at which he urged on the retreat of his army which needlessly added to the strain upon its inadequate strength and cohesion, all these were matters for which Moore can fairly be criticized and in which he must be held to have fallen below the highest standards of generalship.

Considered in isolation, the Corunna campaign was, of course, a failure and not a particularly creditable one. Moore's army, which had been sent to the help of Spain, had failed to be of any assistance to her, retreated almost without firing a shot and at full speed, reached the coast exhausted and disorganized, and fought a battle only to secure its own re-embarkation. The evacuation was successful, but wars, as Sir Winston Churchill reminded us at the time of Dunkirk, are not won by evacuations.

The justification usually put forward for the campaign is that it disorganized Napoleon's plan to conquer Spain and drive the British out of Portugal, and secured for the Spaniards an invaluable breathing space in which to reorganize their shattered armies. It is true that the French attack on Portugal was never delivered, though it is doubtful whether it could in any case have been launched in the depth of Winter; and it is true that three months' respite were gained for the Spaniards to rally and renew their resistance. But this respite proved in fact to be of little

value, because of the poor use which the Spaniards made of it. By the Spring of 1809, all but the extreme north-east and south of the country was in the hands of the French, their possession being disturbed only by guerilla bands which never had more than a nuisance value. And so the position remained for three years, such Spanish armies as were raised proving quite unfit to meet the French in the open field. It was only when the occupying forces were heavily drawn upon by Napoleon for his Russian campaign in 1812 that the British could venture out of Portugal to come to the effective aid of their helpless Allies in Spain. Indeed, it is highly debatable whether the so-called "Spanish ulcer," which, as the well-known epigram avows, destroyed Napoleon, was more than a minor factor in the ultimate fall of his empire.

It is in view of these considerations that we must measure such statements as that of General Maurice, the editor of Moore's diaries, that his hero's threat to the French communications in this campaign was "the boldest, the most successful, and the most brilliant stroke of war of all time," and that the doom of Napoleon, whose predominance in Europe was at its zenith in the Summer of 1812, was sealed by his failure to prevent the escape of 25,000 British soldiers in a corner of Europe three years earlier. There is in fact little reason to suppose that the result of the war in Spain, or the course of European history, would have been affected if Moore's Corunna campaign had never taken place, and if he and his troops had never left Portugal to embark upon it.

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## MORAL PROBLEMS OF WAR AND VICTORY

By SQUADRON LEADER G. C. T. RICHARDS, R.A.F.

"Everyone admits how praiseworthy it is in a prince to keep faith, and to live with integrity and not with craft. Nevertheless our experience has been that those princes who have done great things have held good faith of little account, and have known how to circumvent the intellect of men by craft, and in the end have overcome those who have relied on their word. . . .

"Therefore it is unnecessary for a prince to have all the good qualities I have enumerated, but it is very necessary to appear to have them. And I shall dare to say this also, that to have them and always to observe them is injurious, and that to appear to have them is useful; to appear merciful, humane, religious, upright, and to be so, but with a mind so framed that should you require not to be so, you may be able and know how to change to the opposite."—NICCOLÒ MACHIAVELLI.

THE above quotation from *The Prince* is the classic exposition of the old statesmanship which, though history has shown it to be wrong, is still in common currency. It is true that such princes won wars and built empires: it is also true that their peaces were evanescent and their empires transitory.

The world can no longer afford statesmanship which affords peace merely as the interstices of war. Peace, after any future war, must be permanent. Even that may be too late.

This essay is concerned, then, not with the military problem of winning a nuclear war, but with the subsequent problem of making a lasting peace.

### THE ARGUMENT

That the motives of men are mixed beyond unravelling few would dispute. And if this is true of the motives that lead an individual to a single action, how much more is it true of the motives that lead a whole nation to the complex act of war. Nevertheless, the historian who can stand back from the contemporary and see it in perspective may distinguish a dominant in the emotions that drive a nation to war; and he may observe a shift of emphasis, a deepening intensity, in the war motives of Great Britain which has quickened in the past half-century.

The last war in which acquisitiveness was mixed in with Great Britain's motives ended 53 years ago with the honourable Treaty of Vereeniging. Since then Britain has fought two major wars. On each occasion the *casus belli* was German aggression; nevertheless, there was a difference in the quality of the motives for the two world wars. In both, of course, there was the urge to self-preservation; in both was the classic concept of the balance of power. But these are the motives of governments rather than of individual soldiers, and it was in the minds of individuals that the difference lay. In 1914, the Kaiser started an aggressive war by violating a treaty. Further, he anticipated modern power politics by describing that treaty as a "scrap of paper." The British people, of whose support in a war against Germany the Government had until that moment been by no means certain, sprang to arms in defence both of a violated neutral and of the principles of honour in international relationships. "Now God be thanked Who has matched us with His hour," cried Rupert Brooke: and he voiced the spirit of 1914. And if the armour rusted and men

recognized that there was little left of glory in warfare, if the clear-eyed vision of Rupert Brooke gave way to the bitter revelation of Sitwell, the motives remained unchanged, the soldier continued to fight for the same beliefs for which he had started. Only he added a new aim : this was to be the war to end war.

These aims were good and worthy, and deep enough to counter the evils of the Kaiser's Germany. For these evils were explicable—arrogance and rapaciousness springing from a raw nationalism. But in 1939 the situation was more desperate. By now real evil stalked in Germany. For years it had been known that under the Nazis there was a recrudescence of mediaeval superstition and brutality intolerable in a more enlightened age. Indeed, it is not greatly to our credit that the war was postponed until 1939 or that we waited for Germany to start it. When war came it was accepted without illusions. It produced neither the poets nor even the marching songs of the previous war, for this time it was grimmer. There was everything to lose and apparently nothing to gain. An evil thing was ready for destruction, and England approached the task with distaste but with determination. For this was more than a war to end war, more than a defence of a political system, more even than a fight to retain the freedom of man ; it was a war waged by a nation within whose laws virtue could flourish against a nation within whose philosophy it could not. It was a war to keep " the good life " possible for such as chose it.

Now these are worthy motives—perhaps the only worthy motives—to impel a civilized nation to war. And they remain the keynote of our foreign policy. We believe that under democracy virtue may thrive, and that under communism it cannot. For virtue is individual. The State can neither order it nor cultivate it : it can merely give it freedom to grow. For this reason, not because democracy is necessarily the best form of government in itself, but because democracy allows individual virtue to develop independent of government, we are prepared to defend it, by warfare if necessary, against communism.

But twice already we have won the war and lost the victory, and it appears that after a thermo-nuclear war the problems of victory are likely to be even more intransigent. Yet unless these problems can be solved at the end of any future war, or unless a solution can be found soon which shall cancel the errors of the last 10 years, the series of world wars must be expected to continue. And, as discipline must tighten in constant preparation for war, so freedom itself must dissolve in the very measures adopted to defend it.

I submit, therefore, the following proposition :—

Physical victory is only the first stage in winning a war. The subsequent morality of the victors consummates or destroys that victory.

But the more violent the physical means employed to gain the victory the more the victor's moral sensibilities tend to be blunted. The thermo-nuclear weapon has such a vast destructive power that the victor of a thermo-nuclear war would risk grave damage to his morality.

Therefore, thermo-nuclear bombs may be used with safety only by a religious nation, and dropped with safety only by saints.

The proposition assumes that the use of thermo-nuclear bombs may, in certain circumstances, be justified. Since this contention is disputed, not only by the special pleading of Russia but also by many intelligent and disinterested men, arguments must be advanced to support it.

If Great Britain fights it will not be for material gain ; indeed she would enter a war well knowing that the outcome must mean immense material loss. Her motives, as we have seen, would be good ; for she would be fighting for good against evil. Nor is this, as many would plead, a subjective view. To argue that though we believe that we are right the enemy also believes that he is right and that, therefore, the struggle is not between morality and immorality but merely between conflicting interpretations of morality, is to argue that morality has no absolutes. Such argument is unacceptable because it is chaotic. There must be fixed points in any philosophy, and indeed in all benevolent philosophies. The blue pole of the moral compass points in a constant direction throughout history. Those who believe that it swings with fashion, climate, or any other variable, are steering not by the compass at all but by the barometer.

One of the absolutes is this : " Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy mind. This is the first and great commandment. And the second is like unto it, ' Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself.' On these two commandments hang all the law and the prophets." Now it is not claimed that these two commandments are widely obeyed in democratic countries. What is claimed is that our citizens may obey them if they wish ; and indeed the closer the people got to the attainment of this ideal the better the democratic form of government would work. Under communism, on the other hand, God is denied and the neighbour is sacrificed to the State. Further, the obedience of the people to the two great commandments would cause the communist States, as at present constituted, to fly to pieces.

If this can be accepted it follows that we should be right in principle to defend democracy against communism. The communist countries outnumber us in both men and conventional weapons. We could not hope for victory in a war of the 1939-1945 pattern. But our possession of the thermo-nuclear weapon is a retaliatory threat that no potential aggressor can ignore. Indeed, it is widely believed that the threat alone will be enough to prevent war. But a threat is effective only if it is appreciated that it will be carried out. And the moral position of a nation fully determined to use the thermo-nuclear bomb is precisely the same as that of a nation which has used it. Therefore the hope that we shall never need to use the bomb offers no line of escape from the judgment on its morality.

In quality the thermo-nuclear bomb differs from conventional weapons in three ways. First, it destroys not only man and his works but also, temporarily at least, the very ground itself. Second, it may have profound effects not only on the bodies of those within range but on the bodies of generations of children springing from affected stock. Third, it may be that the increase in radiation caused by the bombs could destroy all living things, and perhaps the world itself.

Should Russia therefore decide to follow the Stalinist policy of world conquest there would be two courses open to us ; either to submit, and give the world into the dominion of evil men ; or to resist, and thereby certainly destroy a great part of civilization and possibly destroy all mankind. The choice between such alternatives is not an easy one. With the whole world under communist dominion the spiritual development of man might be put into reverse for centuries—perhaps even for ever. Man, it is true, might revolt, but revolt against ruthless men equipped with modern communications and weapons is not likely to succeed. Further, the dictatorships have demonstrated that it is easier to train children to evil than to good. Thus the chance of successful revolt would steadily diminish. On the other hand, the destruc-

tion of civilization offers a prospect little more attractive. It is, of course, probable that pockets of civilization would remain to build again. There might be much more than this. But the destruction might be complete.

Faced with such a choice one is driven back on to a fundamental philosophical problem; what is the purpose of man? There is no room in this essay for a discussion of this problem; but for two and a half thousand years the world's greatest men have been patiently explaining that the goal of humanity is not prosperity, not efficiency, but what Plato called "the good life." In most civilizations this truth has been recognized: communism denies it. Now it seems to me that it would be better for the remnants of man to start again after a devastating war than for all mankind to avoid war by accepting perversion of the aim. Indeed, if that perversion should prove to be permanent there is no point in prolonging the existence of man at all. I believe, then, that if we are sure that, however feebly, we represent good we cannot submit to what we know to be evil; and if the only means by which submission may be avoided is the use of the thermo-nuclear bomb, then we may, granted the conditions that I shall later discuss, use that weapon in faith.

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Victory in the 1914-18 War went to the side which had regarded the struggle as a 'war to end war.' Yet the 1939-45 War started 20 years later. At least two of the great Powers who were victorious in the 1939-45 War desired peace. Yet world tension has not decreased nor, so far as one can judge, are our ex-enemies convinced that our cause was just. In both the great wars the victory of arms was complete: but nevertheless the aim was not attained. It follows therefore that something went awry after the last shots had been fired. I submit that it went awry on two levels; the political and the individual.

Much has been written about the Treaty of Versailles and the events which led up to it. It is worth while to quote Trevelyan's apology for the peace-makers:—

"When . . . victory came with unexpected suddenness in November, 1918, England and France were called upon in an instant to switch their minds from the fierce mood of war to the prudence, foresight, and generosity that peace-making requires. It took long years before France could think sanely, but in a year or two England had recovered her usual good nature but scarcely her good sense; unfortunately the peace had to be made in the first six months, while the war passions were aflame in every land. Nor was Lloyd George the man to risk his great popularity and spend his immense influence in a struggle against the passions of the hour, . . ."<sup>1</sup>

For politics in a democracy are dictated by the passions of the people. When the war ended and the tensions of fear and anxiety were loosed, many other necessary human tensions—morality, mercy, self-control—were loosed with them. The people of Britain, led by certain popular journals, demanded that Germany should be "squeezed until the pips squeaked." It is little wonder that Germany burned for revenge.

The victory of 1945 found Britain more adult. Although Allied statesmen had made the coming task more difficult by their demand for unconditional surrender, there was a widespread and genuine desire that the peace should be just. The situation, however, was more complex. For this time the victory had been won not merely over an aggressor but over an aggressor with a record of revolting crime. Thus

<sup>1</sup> *History of England* (3rd edition), p. 728.

the Allies were faced with two utterly unrelated tasks; to make peace with the German people, and to punish the German criminals for crimes so immense that there was no existing law to cover them. The difficulty was to make it clear that the trials of these men, many of whom were military figures, were nothing to do with war or peace, victory or defeat, but were a normal function of human justice into which no touch of vengeance, triumph, or assumption of superiority entered. On the whole, although our legal forms were different from those of the Germans and seemed sometimes unfair to them, I believe that most Germans were convinced of the purity of our intentions. The making of peace was also approached in a spirit of justice. The reparations demanded were not harsh, and it was the intention that when Germany had recovered she should again take her place in world affairs. Politically at least 1945 was a remarkable advance on 1919. On the personal level perhaps it was not.

One may read histories of wars, one may study the political attempts at peace-making, one may read psychological studies of the reactions of the fighting man in the field, one may analyse the war-time memoirs of two prime ministers; yet nowhere can one find a study of the behaviour of victorious troops in conquered territory. Yet this is an overriding factor in the consummation of victory. The victor has already demonstrated his military superiority. If, by his behaviour in victory, he can demonstrate that his faith, his morality, and his political system are also superior; if, in short, he can earn the respect of his enemy he has a fair chance of winning him over to friendship. Thus, a combination of wise statesmanship and a high standard of morality amongst the victorious troops is capable of bringing conqueror and conquered together on a basis of mutual regard. Only once in recent history has a war ended with an approximation to this combination—the Boer War. In 1919 we lacked the statesmanship, in 1945 the statesmanship was better, but some of our troops lacked the morality.

For the fighting man the moment of victory is a division between two entirely different ways of life, a division as clear-cut as the safety-curtain in a theatre. Until that moment he has lived from day to day, for indeed sudden death has always been close. He has lived hard and under stress. He has been subject to authority both close and remote, and he has grown familiar with the stomach-wrenching reception of an order which places him in sudden peril. But above all he has been dedicated to a cause, and dedication to a good enough cause can make something very like saints out of ordinary men.

Suddenly all this is changed. The likelihood of death recedes and the surprised soldier sees that many years remain to him, and he soon begins to suspect that many of those years will be very humdrum. Further, he has achieved his cause; and the effect of this is profound. A man's reach, as Browning pointed out, should exceed his grasp; and when a man suddenly discovers that the two coincide it is disconcerting. He feels, as it were, that he has got past the end; and, as a man who dedicates his life to a task feels lost when that task is done, so for the victorious soldier life is suddenly emptied of purpose. Sir Galahad, had he lived, would have found Camelot drab after he had achieved the Sangreal.

I do not suggest that all soldiers are so fine-drawn as to be unwaveringly conscious of their cause or their dedication. But, however sluggish the sensibilities, they are unstrung like a bow after the battle. As a result the soldier finds himself in an hiatus of responsibility. His job as a soldier is done, he cannot at once return to the tasks of peace. Thus, emptied of purpose, temporarily irresponsible, set in an environment uncritical of his morality, he finds himself, after hardship and obedience,

able to command the persons and possessions of his late enemies. In these circumstances one may regret but one cannot be surprised that the soldier seeks bodily comfort. The enemy's women, wine, and food were the traditional loot of the victor. It was traditional, too, that the victor should seize pieces of personal property from the vanquished.

The XXth Century soldier knows this sort of behaviour to be wrong. And indeed the Allied soldiery in Germany in 1945 were conspicuously unbrutal and unlicentious. Nevertheless, though only a small minority of troops were concerned to make personal profit out of the situation, and though the means they employed were more sophisticated than those of earlier centuries, there can be no doubt that the Germans observed, and doubtless exaggerated what they saw.

But this moral failure of a few Allied troops was caused as much by psychological adaptation for war as by psychological reaction to victory. It is difficult to retain normal values in the abnormal circumstances of war. For war is a vast, squandering destruction. The soldier destroys property both in the enemy's land and in his own. He destroys, as at Caen or Cassino or Dresden, the precious living witness of history. And he achieves this destruction with a fantastic uneconomy of material. As a result he loses his respect for material things, he loses his carefulness. Now this sounds as if he had reached a high degree of Christianity through a back door. But, as T. S. Eliot points out,

"The last temptation is the greatest treason :  
To do the right deed for the wrong reason."<sup>2</sup>

Christ was careless of material things because they were irrelevant to salvation. The soldier is careless, in a different sense, because he has abused them. He has not risen above material things but, in such massive destruction and consumption, his habits of carefulness, of regard for property, even of reverence for man, are swamped. Thus a soldier may reach the state where he can loot from the enemy, and even from his own side, without experiencing any feeling of guilt. But the enemy, who has little enough left, does not forget.

The fighting man also inflicts death. In doing this the ordinary man assumes a most extraordinary prerogative to which he must somehow adjust his outlook. Death is usually inflicted intimately on a small scale, or remotely on a large scale. On the moral, sensitive killer—and throughout this essay I am postulating that unless the killers are moral and sensitive the war is useless—the effects are probably similar ; for what the small-scale killer loses in numbers he makes up in the detailed and long-remembered pictures imprinted on his memory. And these effects are two-fold. First, there is the intoxication of power ; and this affects chiefly the large-scale killer. One man, or one bomber crew, has at its fingertips a 10-ton bomb—enough high explosive to destroy a factory, a sizeable piece of a town, a skilfully constructed dam. Once in the air that bomber crew is wielding that weapon on its own responsibility. And the crew consists of men who are unaccustomed to constructive power. They possess—and this they know—the power to destroy but not the power to build. Lord Acton pointed out that power corrupts. If this is true of all power how much more is it true of totally negative power.

Second is the effect of the sight of death that one has oneself inflicted. In the heat of action the pictures are merely recorded. They are not seen until they are repeated in the memory. The pictures are then seen to be squalid and undignified; for the

<sup>2</sup> *Murder in the Cathedral* (3rd edition), p. 44.

victim is always seen to be helpless, and the shapes of death are grotesque. John Donne wrote for a wider public than he could have foreseen when he wrote, "Any man's death diminishes me, because I am involved in mankind."

But the war is not over in one operation. The killer must continue to kill even after he has seen the squalor of his task. A realistic French bomber pilot has written a book about his operations in the last war. In his preface he uses the interesting phrase, "while I was in the exterminating trade." The phrase is interesting because it spotlights one of the two defensive attitudes adopted by bomber crews. This is the attitude of realism gone sour. For reality is hard to bear: only by giving it a cynical twist can one live with it. For if one can assume that the world is mad and that one is inescapably caught up in its insanity, then one can shed any feeling of personal responsibility.

The other defensive attitude, and perhaps the more common one, puts its subject in blinkers. Killing in war is a highly technical business. The mathematics of navigation, the interpretation of radar signals, the art of evasion, the delight of the skilful handling of aircraft; all this and more is involved in getting an aircraft to the right place. Interesting technicalities are involved, too, in the delivery of the missile. The fighter pilot is concerned to hit a moving target from a moving platform. He may easily become absorbed in the technique of deflection shooting. Perhaps the reader noticed that the pilot is concerned to hit a 'target'—an unemotional and totally impersonal word, a 'blinkers' word. The bomber pilot, concerned with accurate bombing of the target and steering a straight and level course through flak—the blessed salve of personal danger—is fully occupied with the problems of accurate delivery. How easy then to stop the imagination at that point. If your shells or bombs hit the 'target' the exercise was a success. The effect of the impact is none of your business; for you are a simple fighting man, not a politician.

Fighting men, therefore, in the attempt to retain normality in the abnormal circumstances of war, tend to divide into two categories; those who will not visualize what they are doing, and those who, having seen their task, drive through the distasteful vision into cynicism. There is in fact a third category, that of the natural killers who enjoy their task. But since they are a very small minority, though often extremely successful, they may be ignored in any general analysis. Thus at the end of the war the mind is adjusted to war; that is to say it has adopted the comfortable fiction of regarding the enemy not as a man but as a target, or it has accepted the despairing view that the world is incurably mad. Further, all means to win the war have been adopted. In propaganda the dangerous expedient has been adopted of assigning personal attributes to a whole nation—"the only good Hun is a dead one." This sort of nonsense is, of course, easily and readily swallowed, but afterwards it takes time to work it out of the system. To quote Trevelyan again, "In a year or two England had recovered her usual good nature, but scarcely her good sense; unfortunately the peace had to be made in the first six months."

It seems then that the means adopted to win wars have gone far to make impossible the consummation of victory. The civilian will to win has been stimulated by a propaganda which destroys the sweet reasonableness necessary at the moment of victory, while the fighting man, corrupted by power, cocooned defensively against the responsibility of his own acts, or seeking refuge in cynicism, is wholly unfitted for the delicate task of occupying the enemy's country. If this has been true of the two XXth Century world wars, how much more would it be true of a third? A free, and on the whole amiable, civilian population will require a great deal of stimulation to

back the devastation caused by thermo-nuclear bombs. The men who drop the bombs may find that no cocoon is thick enough, and that only an absolute cynicism is deep enough, to protect from a sense of guilt. And Lord Acton said not only that "power corrupts," but that "absolute power tends to corrupt absolutely." The power contained in a thermo-nuclear bomb is much more nearly absolute than that contained in a block-buster. Thus a third world war fought in the moral climate of the second can solve nothing. For both sides must be materially crippled, and both sides must lack the moral plumb-line necessary for a sound reconstruction.

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We have fought in this century against a nation whose ambition had got out of hand and again against the same nation when she allowed evil to rule her. Our motives have matched the cause; a desire to preserve the principle of fair play in 1914; a will to destroy evil in 1939. The challenge is now deeper and consequently requires a higher motive.

Now the faith—for it is a faith—of communism presents a good *prima facie* case. Born of poverty, misery, and injustice, it rightly maintains that man should not, and indeed need not, live in these conditions. Thus it calls on its followers to live, work, fight, and die rigorously in the present that unborn generations might live the full life. So far this is a challenge that a saint might joyfully accept. But it is at this point that the faith twists and plunges into evil. For man is the creation of God and, as St. Augustine explains, the principle of his existence lies not in himself but in God. This is a profound metaphysical truth, and it was the attempt to escape from its implications that led to the Fall of Man. Thus communism, in denying God and in believing that man is the supreme being capable of creating his own good, re-enacts and perpetuates on a grand scale the sin of Adam.

The results of the practice of such a faith are both interesting and distressing. The Communist goes to the Devil fast. He must believe, or his whole philosophy collapses, that anything is good which by the logical process of dialectical materialism is shown to be likely to further the party's ends. He soon finds that truth does not always fall within that category. He is therefore led to the conclusion—a conclusion that no previous world civilization could have accepted—that truth and deceit are both neutral and possess virtue or evil only in so far as they serve or hinder the party's plan. From here it is a short step to the falsification of history and current events; so that the education of children becomes, not a leading of them to truth, but a conditioning of their minds comparable with Pavlov's conditioning of the salivary glands of his dogs. Now some man, or group of men, must make the decisions. Someone must lay down the content of education, must decide how history shall be re-written, must decide at every fork in the road which turning is 'correct.' Someone, in short, must determine the party line.

The effect of national obeisance to a human or party mind is this; education ceases to be the cultivation of a living plant and becomes the moulding of a lump of clay; the adult mind ceases to see of itself and becomes a reflecting mirror exercising its ingenuity only in the attempt to reflect accurately. If the mirror distorts, whether by accident or design, it is agreed by the party, and often by the owner himself, that it is of no further value and must be destroyed. Hence the party takes unto itself the powers of life and death, not in the interests of justice but in the interests of expediency. Thus the party has reduced the Russian people to the status of Pavlov's dogs; for if the Absolute Master be God, man can be man; if the Absolute Master

be man, man can only be animal. "It is a communist maxim that the end justifies the means. The Communist, for all his dialectics, is oddly blind to the fact that in communism the means makes the end unattainable; for in seeking to save man it first destroys him.

#### CONCLUSION

"May the great God whom I worship grant to my country, and for the benefit of Europe in general, a great and glorious victory: and may no misconduct in anyone tarnish it."—NELSON.

This then is the enemy. It is a living faith and can be countered only by a living faith. A woolly benevolence is no shield against the rapier of belief. Now communism is both the means and the end. It cannot be countered by a belief in democracy; for democracy is only a means, a means by which man might find his true end. It cannot be countered by a belief in freedom; for communism also professes to believe in freedom as the end. It can be countered only at its foundation; the denial of God can be fought only by a belief in God.

It may be that large-scale world wars are ended. At least it is improbable that there can be more than one to come in the next century. If it does come it will be the West's last chance. It must first be won and then consummated. Mankind cannot afford to fail at either of these stages. Without faith we are unlikely to win it. I believe that an equal good will always defeat an equal evil. But what if the evil is more evil than the good is good? What if the evil man is more convinced of his rightness than is the good man of his? And even if we should win in a lukewarm belief, the victory would be fruitless. For such a belief could hardly defend us from the perils of victory, nor could it offer foundations for reconstruction.

At the present time the Western world stands between Satan and mankind. This is perhaps the greatest challenge that man has ever faced. "Now God be thanked Who has matched us with His hour." But this war, if it comes, must be a war of a new quality. Our civilian population must be stimulated by the truth and not by psychological propaganda. Our fighting men must destroy in pity and not in hate. They must understand that there can be no refuge in cynicism, no sloughing of personal responsibility in blinkers. They must bomb with open eyes, knowing what they do and why. And they must bomb in penitence as well as in faith; for the Devil in the East was born of the Mammon in the West. And over it all, the war and the victory, must preside a clear spiritual faith and a conscious personal integrity; for he betrays mankind who uses war for gain.

This is a hard task, but it is one that we have set ourselves. The stage was set by the folly and the lack of integrity of the victors of earlier wars. If the task seems too hard, both the prize of success and the penalty of failure should be considered. Success gives mankind the chance of finding the meaning and purpose of man; failure means that the men of two world wars—and perhaps Jesus Christ himself—have died in vain.

"It is for us to be here dedicated . . . that the nation shall, under God, have a new birth of freedom, and that the government of the people, by the people, and for the people, shall not perish from the earth."

## TRENCH GASCOIGNE FIRST PRIZE ESSAY, 1955

By MAJOR-GENERAL B. T. WILSON, C.B., D.S.O.

“ ‘Air Power is Indivisible’ (Field-Marshal Montgomery—October, 1954).

Discuss this statement.”

**M**EN of great genius sometimes interpret the changing world to the satisfaction of all. When they do so, they use language which has the truth and clearness of a consummate work of art and impinges on the mind of the hearer like a conviction of his own creation. Such gift of revelation is rare, since the truth is elusive and its expression is difficult.

Great issues, therefore, usually cause great controversy. Generations of historians wrangle about the past and seldom agree. Politicians, discussing the present with much acrimony and the future with great diversity, agree even less. Military men, disciplined by regulations about public utterances, argue amongst themselves about modern war. Judging from the official pronouncements on the subject, which differ each year, they probably do not agree with each other any more than historians or politicians do in their difficult arts.

### THE IDIOM OF THE DAY

All these gropers after the truth present their views in the idiom of the day, which has to appeal to all classes of an educated democracy. The resulting language is a rich mixture of learning, metaphor, and aphorism. The learning attracts the devotees of culture, which is comparatively new in this Country although it has long been the vogue in Germany, where it is spelt with a ‘K.’ The metaphors, similes, and analogies are taken from every conceivable human activity to help in the explanation of propositions which are difficult to understand. The aphorisms are perhaps the most interesting feature of modern diction. They are often of distinguished origin and come into current use like bright new coins. It pleases the multitude to say, knowingly, that “the Greeks had a word for it,” that “all power corrupts, etc.,” or that “never was so much owed by so many to so few.” With a little ingenuity well-known sayings of this kind can be twisted into meanings which are quite different from those of their original contexts. In this way they can be made applicable to almost any problem. This practice adds an element of surprise which is very stimulating. Although the peculiarities thus described seem to enrich the speech and writing of the day, frequent repetition of well-worn expressions is apt to oversimplify or over-emphasize the complicated issues about which they are used.

The power to simplify the conduct of war has always been a characteristic of great military leaders—particularly on the battlefield. Yet the technique of destruction goes ahead today with such leaps and bounds that organization for war is becoming more and more difficult to simplify without exaggeration. Emphasis is, of course, a valuable and often necessary figure of speech, useful for attacking lethargy and for advocating reforms. Over-emphasis, on the other hand, defeats its purpose and may obscure rather than reveal the truth.

Shorn of its context, the ruling “air power is indivisible” seems both to oversimplify and to over-emphasize. In the first place the term ‘air power’ is at present too vague and ill-defined to stand by itself. No protagonist of genius has, as yet, fixed the relation of air power to military power in the way that Captain Mahan has done for the power of the sea. The tremendous and various developments of the aeroplane,

both in peace and war, have taken place so quickly that they seem to elude tidy classification and ease of control. Sea power had operated for centuries before Mahan made its real significance apparent. Small wonder that this sudden power of the third dimension, which can reach out to the uttermost ends of the earth to succour or destroy, is not yet intelligible in two short words.

In the second place the attribute 'indivisible' has lately become fashionable in the idiom of the day. Hardly a day passes without a statement that this and that are indivisible, which is usually untrue or gross exaggeration.<sup>1</sup> Moreover 'indivisible' is suspect as a word, since nothing in the universe is indivisible—even the once inviolate atom. Thus to describe air power as indivisible is to qualify air power with a high-powered word, which smacks of over-emphasis. The Field-Marshal clearly intended to be provocatively emphatic and his remark requires close examination.

What then are the present-day characteristics of air power, how can it be defined, and what relation does it bear to military power on the sea and land?

#### NUCLEAR FISSION

Since 1945, science has immensely increased the importance of air power by the invention of the nuclear bomb, for the delivery of which on the target the aeroplane is at present the best medium. Nuclear projectiles and suitable aircraft for their delivery are now the *ultima ratio* of the military power, which has always conditioned the national policies of great States. To what extent these new missiles would devastate a well-built, modern city cannot be known to the ordinary individual. Yet it can be assumed with some confidence that the havoc that they are said to create will be greatly exaggerated by their inventors. This has always happened with every engine of destruction since the time of Archimedes and his giant catapults. Nuclear bombs will probably be no exception. The gloomy prophets of doom before the 1939-45 War alarmed themselves unnecessarily and another generation of them may be doing the same now.

Supposing, however, that the nuclear bomb is really as deadly as its inventors claim it to be, does not its very deadliness constitute a great dilemma? Imagine that an aggressor began another war with conventional military forces and every respect for The Hague rules, although well provided with a stockpile of nuclear bombs *en cas de besoin*. Would the defender not be sorely tempted to see how he himself got on with conventional forces too, before he let loose the universal havoc of nuclear destruction? To any thinking person, this very deadliness is a great dilemma. It may be better "to bear those ills we have than fly to others that we know not of." High authorities can often 'talk daggers' at each other with great profit. Using them is another matter. The advocate of the dagger might be the first to receive a thrust in his heart. Surely such a desperate remedy, as the nuclear bomb seems to be, would more probably be used for the relief of a desperate situation or for the *coup de grâce* at an appropriate moment, like the atom bombs dropped on Japan? The recent talk of graduated deterrents seems to show the suggested dilemma is not mere fancy.

Whether it is so or not, the existence of nuclear bombs leads most certainly to two conclusions. The first is that any State which considers itself great must have them and be able to deliver them expeditiously on appropriate targets. The other conclusion is that it would be folly to rely only upon nuclear weapons for defence

<sup>1</sup> E.g. "The reunification of Germany and the security of Europe are indivisible."

against aggression. To do so would be to live even more at the mercy of a sudden aggressor than ever before. No one can be certain that air power, even with nuclear bombs, can hold up a modern army. An aggressor armed with nuclear bombs, as well as having powerful conventional forces, might at last achieve the quick and decisive result which twice in this century has so nearly been the reward of aggression. Nuclear defence is beset with too many unknowns to be a reliable shield and buckler. Conventional forces, sufficient to be formidable in quality and quantity to those of the possible enemy, are still essential for security. Air power, therefore, must be studied on that assumption.

#### THE POWER OF THE AIR

Even before the first use of the atom bomb in 1945, air power had already become a dominating factor in the war. It played many parts. The Battle of Britain, the air attack of Germany, the 'bombing carpet' at El Alamein, the Battle of the Atlantic, the Mediterranean Sea, the Battle of Normandy, and the final defeat of Japan in the Pacific all illustrate its astonishing diversity. They are, moreover, only a selection from its lists of triumphs. The Battle of Britain, as a decisive battle in the air, was a unique encounter, of which the whole course of the war produced no real counterpart. Considered now after the lapse of 15 years, it has a look of the future about it as the prototype on a small scale of the air battles which seem certain to take place at the beginning of any future global war. In a less important way, the Battle of Cambrai in 1917 had a similar look which others missed but the Germans caught and remembered in their use of armour in the grand manner in 1940. The decisive air battle is assuredly an important characteristic of air power.

The bombing of Germany, which laid waste over 60 towns in three to four years at the cost of the lives of tens of thousands of airmen, is particularly significant today, because it is said that it could now be done with about 60 nuclear bombs inside a week. To the inhabitants of a small, densely populated island like Great Britain, this increased efficiency of air power is a specially important consideration.

The Battle of Normandy is an endpiece in the war development of air power, which well illustrates the advantages of gaining almost complete command of the air. At the same time it is a reminder that this same command of the air, which had taken years to establish, did not prevent the hard-pressed and war-weary Germans from reinforcing the battle in a very formidable manner. The close in-fighting of Normandy also prompts some doubts on the feasibility of using atomic missiles effectively when armies are at grips in an Allied country in the confusion which always attends the beginning of a war. Nevertheless, the great assistance which air power can give to armies is one of its important characteristics.

In the Battle of the Atlantic the number of long-range, shore-based aircraft available in Coastal Command for extended air/sea operations, was, at the outbreak of war, very limited. At the same time aircraft carriers and cruisers provided with aircraft could not remain at sea except on short tasks with a definite purpose. Air successes were thus few at first. The initial resounding triumph came with the destruction of the *Bismarck*, which, had it not been for air power, would have escaped. As it fell out, Catalina aircraft of Coastal Command found her again, when her trail had been lost, whereupon Swordfish of the *Ark Royal*, with a crippling strike, made the sinking of the great ship easy a few hours later. Towards the end of the war the aircraft of Coastal Command played a vital part in ending the long struggle with German submarines. The submarine is more than ever a key ship in sea warfare, so that air power will still have a prominent part to play against it.

The Mediterranean exemplified the domination which air power can exert over narrow seas, which become almost impassable without command of the air.

In the Far East the loss of the *Prince of Wales* and the *Repulse* revealed the helplessness of capital ships without air cover to protect them. Yet the most signal instances of the power of the air at sea came from the war of the U.S.A. against Japan in the Pacific. In this theatre on several occasions carrier-borne aircraft decided the issue by themselves before capital ships had been engaged, notably, for the first time in history, at the battle for Midway Island in 1942. The great fleet carriers of the U.S. Navy, in fact, probably played a greater part in winning command of the sea in the Pacific than any other single agency. At the Midway battle Japan lost most of her carriers. Thereafter her defeat was planned as an air/sea operation by way of the islands of the central Pacific. The plan was pushed through with remarkable speed to its victorious conclusion and was topped off with the two famous atomic bomb attacks on the Japanese homeland.

The whole Pacific war was a modern demonstration of air/sea power—cheap in men's lives, prodigal in material, decisive in result. At the end of it all Japan had been so strangled by the pressure of air/sea power that she barely disposed of the means of subsistence, much less the essentials for a continuance of the war. Having thus briefly and imperfectly described some of the immense advantages which air power confers, some of its disadvantages, which are less apparent, must also be examined.

#### LIMITATIONS OF AIR POWER

Airmen cannot as yet live in the air like sailors do in ships at sea or like soldiers on land. Nor can aircraft watch, guard, or occupy stretches of air, sea, or land as effectively as navies and armies in their particular elements. Indeed the air shield in the defence is full of gaps and Mr. Baldwin had every justification for believing that "the bomber will always get through." The structure of air power makes the attack by far the strongest form of air warfare. When command of the air is momentarily in jeopardy and air bases are threatened by the enemy, defending air action may suddenly become ragged and disjointed. Under such conditions the wear and tear of air battle is as severe as that of a retreating army, and air power is apt to run down very fast. Bad weather and darkness reduce the efficacy of air power so considerably that they are constantly made use of by the older Services for evading enemy air action. Low clouds and mist are frequent, and the darkness of the night is always only a few hours away. Even under the best conditions, a well-trained army is extremely difficult to locate by air reconnaissance. This is specially so at the beginning of a war, when great movements are being made both by armies and by civilians. The confusion everywhere may be so immense as to make effective air action almost impossible at a moment which is only less decisive than the moment of final victory.

Airfields for modern aircraft are now very large and very conspicuous targets, where formerly they were mere fields. Presumably one nuclear bomb will put an airfield out of action, and rehabilitation will be difficult and lengthy. In the field the logistics of air power are formidable and make heavy demands on the supply services. Every aircraft requires a proportion of skilled mechanics to keep it in the air. A large administrative tail thus detracts much from the supposed flexibility of air power which so often crops up as a talking point in discussions about the air. The aircraft themselves, the crews, and a certain amount of gear can be diverted in a few hours to a very distant base and will at once function there, always provided that their logistical needs can be met.

The aircraft carrier, however, shares the real flexibility of sea power, since the carrier takes the whole installation with her under her capacious decks. Although extremely costly to build and extremely vulnerable to any kind of heavy attack, the aircraft carrier is specially important *vis-à-vis* nuclear warfare. The power to disappear into the immense stretches of the great oceans of the world and to reappear as required may be a very great advantage. Moreover, the effects of nuclear explosions may be less deadly at sea than they are on land. Nor is a ship easy to hit with a high-level bomb. All these considerations make the aircraft carrier of particular importance in any review of air power.

The above tally of the characteristics of air power gives an account of their practical use in different kinds of action in the air, and over land and sea. The most important items relate to the nuclear bomb dilemma in the future air battle, and to the indispensability of air support in every kind of warfare. The disadvantages of air power are noteworthy. So are the remarks on the flexibility of air power and the special advantage in this respect of the aircraft carrier.

#### A DEFINITION OF AIR POWER

All these rough data about air power can now be welded into an attempt at a definition, from which it may be easier to decide whether air power is divisible or indivisible.

Air power can be defined as the use of air forces and their adjuncts to achieve the following objects.

- (1) To carry the strongest kind of air war to the heart of the enemy at the earliest appropriate moment.
- (2) To secure and maintain, as required, sufficient command of the air to cover national or allied air, sea, and land operations and to prevent enemy air action from interfering effectively with national or allied war structures, installations, bases, and communications.
- (3) To control all kinds of air transport and air communications.
- (4) Directly to support operations on sea and land.

Of these four objects the first three can be attained by the independent action of air forces and their adjuncts, so that where these objects are concerned air power can be said to be indivisible. How the fourth object can be attained is not so simple, since it involves navies and armies and all the activities of war which take place on sea and land. This particular object is, in fact, the crux of the whole question. An examination of the development of air power, both in relation to military power as a whole and to the two older Services, will help in the finding of the answer.

#### AIR POWER IN RELATION TO THE SEA AND LAND

Military power has its roots in the land, where men have their habitation. It has many facets other than air forces, navies, and armies. History and geography play their part in its genesis. So do industrial power, size of population, and aptitude for war. The fighting Services are all based on the land; without these firm bases and sources of supply their power would soon fade to nothing. The ultimate control of the fighting Services is also exercised from the land. In war-time this is done from offices deep underground, interconnected with telecommunications. The same kind of communications connect these offices with the high commands of the three Services. If the ultimate control of one Service passed to another, it could be easily effected.

It would simply mean that a small team of officers with life-long experience of their Service would hand over control in their underground office to another small team of officers without such experience, who would assume their burden in an adjacent underground office. Whether such a change would be worthwhile under modern conditions of control seems to be highly problematical, to say the least of it.

The ideal procedure for success in war is for the nation concerned, or a group of nations, to wage it as far as possible with the singleness of purpose of one individual. In that respect military power is, ideally, indivisible and telecommunications make it more possible than ever before. But like the vast business which it is, military power is split up for its better development into interrelated subsidiaries, which in their several domains enjoy considerable independence. In effect military power is indivisible at the top, yet divides into independent components below the line of supreme control. In their turn these components are further decentralized, so as to spread the responsibility and increase the usefulness of all concerned in working or fighting for victory. The only alternative to this essential principle of organization is the strange folly of the system by which Hitler, when he was the ruler of Germany, attempted personally to regulate the smallest details of the great business of war. His jealousy for power set all at loggerheads and wrecked the German war effort.

#### RELATIONS OF LAND AND SEA POWER

For centuries armies were the only outward and visible sign of military power. When control of armies was divided, they usually fared badly. Thus 'land power' could be said to work best when it was 'indivisible.' For a long time land power remained so, even when armies were embarked on ships to fight at sea. When sailing ships and the art of navigation reached an excellence that permitted fleets to remain at sea for long periods, sea fighting and the exercise of sea power became the almost exclusive activity of navies. In other words sea power also became 'indivisible,' so much so that the high water mark on the quay side was for over a century the recognized boundary between the respective responsibilities of the Navy and the Army.

#### AIR POWER SUPERVENES

The conquest of the air disturbed these idyllic relations. The Navy and the Army soon had their own air services, to whom high water marks and quay sides meant very little. As air operations grew in size and complexity, the novel problem of the dual control in a new element led to great confusion. Moreover, the two older Services competed fiercely with each other in the procurement of aircraft, which in the early days were difficult to get made. With the emergence in 1918 of the independent air force for bombing Germany, confusion of control reached its height. The establishment of the R.A.F. cured many, yet not all, of these growing pains of air power. The special air requirements of the Navy and the Army were stumbling blocks which have remained right up to the present day.

The Army, now only the third line of defence, usually waited with patience, amounting at times almost to indifference, for innovations in the air. The Navy was not so accommodating. Holding on stoutly to the view that for an island country sea power was perhaps still indivisible, it resisted to the utmost the substitution of the R.A.F. for its own air service. Although forced by the Government of the day to accept the new organization, the Navy never took kindly to dual control by sailors and airmen in ships at sea, especially in aircraft carriers, which between the wars had acquired the importance of capital ships. The dual control compromise worked

uneasily for a few years, after which the Navy won recognition for its claims and resumed complete control of aircraft in ships of war. Shore-based aircraft for air/sea operations, such as those of Coastal Command, came under the R.A.F. from the beginning. Good co-operation between the Navy and Coastal Command made the system work satisfactorily, although, as has been mentioned, a shortage of long-range, shore-based aircraft at the beginning of the war was a great handicap.

The flying branch of the Navy did notable service during the war and has recently resumed its old name of the Fleet Air Arm. It is now handling modern, high-speed aircraft from up-to-date aircraft carriers with technical improvements, such as angled decks and new methods of launching aircraft, which seem to show that the Fleet Air Arm is keeping itself abreast of the times.

This brief account of the development of air power in support of the Navy and Army shows that both the older Services rely partly or wholly on the R.A.F. for their air requirements. In the Navy the existing set-up is a compromise by which the aircraft both of carriers and ships and also of Coastal Command are concerned in air/sea operations. In the Army almost entire dependence on the R.A.F. for its air needs has sometimes delayed the introduction of newer and better forms of air support. Nevertheless, the existing system has stood the test of the most gruelling war in which Great Britain has ever been engaged.

If air power is to be 'indivisible' in the narrow sense that every war aeroplane must be completely controlled by the R.A.F., then the Fleet Air Arm would have to return to a system which has already proved unsatisfactory and has been discarded. This would surely be great folly.

To allow the Navy and the Army to have their own air forces again, with a return to the high water mark boundary and with the R.A.F. superimposed over both, would lead to precisely the same confusion that prompted the creation of the R.A.F. To use another high-powered expression, the irresistible conclusion is that the existing system should be maintained.

The regulation of air power is not easy. On the whole Great Britain is fortunate in the possession of a system which is tolerably clear cut and has, without doubt, been improved by experience in war.

#### AIR POWER IN THE U.S.A.

The solution of the problem in the U.S.A. is by no means clear and seems much more complicated. Thus U.S. Air Force bombers can deliver nuclear missiles from their shore bases. Their equivalent of our Coastal Command, which comes under the U.S. Navy, can also deliver nuclear bombs. Nor is this all, since their Fleet Air Arm can also handle the supreme weapon of air power. As in Great Britain, the Army relies on the U.S. Air Force for most of its air support, yet disposes of many kinds of its own special aircraft. The unique U.S. Corps of Marines even has an entire air service of its own, complete with light bomber, reconnaissance, close support, and even transport aircraft. As is to be expected from this set-up, the Corps of Marines can lay an air/ground support which is in a class apart.

America, however, is a vast country and far richer in wealth and industrial resources than Great Britain. Her thousands of miles of coast, which face on to two great oceans of the world, may require a decentralization of air power which is unnecessary in the United Kingdom. No doubt American prodigality with aircraft offends against the principle of economy of force, and, perhaps, from time to time, is

the cause of unholy rows in high places. Nevertheless its implication that aircraft are just a means of transport, almost as common as ships, is very refreshing. It is fast becoming parochial and pompous to treat them in any other way.

Thus although air power is so nearly indivisible and should be wielded in Great Britain by the Royal Air Force, it should not be construed too narrowly. The Navy, for instance, does not reserve to itself a monopoly in the design and ownership of all the ships that serve it in time of war. Many kinds of aircraft, either in use or in course of development, have more to do with transport problems than actual warfare. These should be viewed in a liberal spirit, and not too harshly subjected to a rigid principle which cannot in practice be universally applied.

#### CONTROL OF AIR POWER

In time of war, all aircraft, like all ships, must come under general control, no matter what purpose or what agency they serve. The earlier short study of military power showed how readily it can be controlled at the top. The aircraft and mechanism of air power may not be exclusively in the hands of the R.A.F., but the general control of it should be. Surely this is the real answer? It is really only a question for agreement at the top. The true statement of the situation would then be, "Air power is in several hands but control of it should be absolute." How else could the American system work?

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## MISSION TO RUSSIA, 1799

By LIEUT.-COLONEL M. E. S. LAWS, O.B.E., M.C., R.A. (RETD.), F.R.HIST.S.

**I**N the Spring of 1799 the British Government, relieved for the moment of anxiety as to danger of invasion from across the Channel and heartened by the collapse of the rebellion in Ireland, was considering the possibility of itself initiating offensive operations on the Continent. Unfortunately, the Regular Army was in no condition to provide an effective striking force for such a venture, since the infantry battalions were mere skeleton units and recruiting was at a low ebb.

It was under these conditions that a plan was put forward—almost certainly by Captain Home Riggs Popham, R.N.—by which Holland was to be liberated by a seaborne invasion of an Anglo-Russian army, assisted perhaps by Prussian intervention. The plan was based on the quite unjustified assumption that on the appearance of the Allied troops the Dutch would spring to arms and rise to a man to drive the French across their frontiers. The invaders would therefore merely need to seize simultaneously the islands of Ameland, Goeree and Walcheren, and there establish depots of arms and rallying points for the Dutch patriots, who were expected themselves to overwhelm the French forces in occupation of the country. Mr. Dundas, Secretary of State, was persuaded to accept this plan and on 17th May, 1799, Captain Popham set sail from Yarmouth for St. Petersburg charged with a two-fold mission—to persuade the Tsar to fall in with the scheme and to arrange and supervise the despatch of the Russian contingent to the North Sea.

On arrival at Cronstadt on 1st June, Captain Popham met his first difficulty, when, despite his possession of a special passport issued by the Russian Ambassador in London, he was detained two days until permission had been obtained for his onward journey to the capital. Six days later he was presented to the Emperor by Sir Charles Whitworth, the British Ambassador, and explained the proposed plan of campaign. As he had served afloat in support of the Duke of York's army on the Continent in 1793-95 and with Sir Eyre Coote in the raid on Ostend in 1798, Captain Popham claimed considerable local knowledge of the Low Countries and spoke with enthusiasm of the certainty of complete success and of the assured co-operation of the Dutch patriots. The Emperor appeared to be favourably impressed and promised to arrange for another meeting after he had considered the matter.

The second interview took place a week later. The plan was then discussed in considerable detail, the Emperor being chiefly concerned at the means of withdrawal available for his troops in the event of failure. Once his doubts on this point had been set at rest by Captain Popham's eloquence, the Tsar agreed to supply 19,000 Russian and 8,000 Swedish troops for the expedition. A final conference to settle details—including the question of the British subsidy—was arranged for the following day, and Popham returned to the Embassy to write a glowing report on the success of his efforts and of the Emperor's affability.

The settlement of the details, however, was not so simple. Popham was brought down to earth by the Ambassador, who warned him that in his negotiations with the Russians he must observe two essential rules—first, he must refuse no wish expressed by the Emperor, and secondly, he must on no account "suffer him to be impressed with an idea of bargaining." Failure to observe these rules would probably

result in the Emperor taking offence and refusing all assistance. It speaks well for Popham's tact and patience that despite these harassing conditions an agreement was eventually reached after a lengthy interview.

Captain Popham's plan had been for the troops to be embarked on board the large fleet of Russian galleys maintained for local defence in the Baltic and to be conveyed through the Holstein canal into the North Sea. This the Emperor would not hear of, on the grounds that the vessels were unseaworthy and were unsuitable for the accommodation of troops. Popham, who had already inspected some of the galleys, believed this to be untrue, but he finally persuaded the Emperor to permit 12 Russian warships—six sail of the line, four frigates, and two store ships—to be partially disarmed and to be specially fitted for the transport of the 1st Division of troops. The 2nd Division was to be embarked on board British armed troopships sent from England, while the third (including the Swedes) was to be embarked at Gothenburg on board chartered merchant ships locally obtained under British arrangements. The idea of using the Holstein canal was abandoned, and all transports were to sail via the Sound.

As for the subsidy, Britain would pay £70,000 in advance and would be responsible for rationing all Russian soldiers and sailors from the date of embarkation until their return. Popham managed to obtain some reduction in cost by basing the calculation on a charge of 27s. per ton per month for the use of the Russian ships. At the last moment the Emperor decided that embarkation should take place at Revel instead of Riga and that the soldiers should be rationed on the same scale as the sailors, instead of the normal two-thirds allowance as was the British custom, in order "to prevent jealousy." As the Russian sailor's ration cost only the equivalent of 5d. a day, this concession was not a serious item.

Having successfully accomplished the first part of his mission, Captain Popham set about the task of despatching the Russian troops, who had been ordered to reach Revel for embarkation by 20th July. The fitting out of the Russian warships to act as transports was not viewed with any enthusiasm by the naval authorities at Cronstadt, who put every obstacle in the way. Popham hired carpenters and supervised the work himself, but came up against unexpected difficulties. He found the ships cluttered up with an extraordinary accumulation of assorted stores of all sorts, and there seemed the greatest reluctance to land any of this junk to make way for troops and baggage. Eventually, it dawned on him that the captains made a handsome profit by the sale of 'surplus' stores and he had to make them a special allowance "as the only means of obviating all this difficulty and interesting them to a zealous and active co-operation." Nevertheless, it was only on the personal intervention of the Emperor himself that the difficulties at Cronstadt were overcome, and as Popham informed the Secretary of State "it was scarce to be credited how all ranks and descriptions of people exert themselves to carry my orders into execution" once the Emperor's backing had been obtained.

Despite a succession of infuriating delays, Popham managed to get the 1st Division of about 7,300 troops embarked at Revel on board the Russian warships by 27th July. When all was ready the Russian Admiral announced that his ships had insufficient provisions, and Popham had to supply him with more bread and meat. Then when the troops arrived, Popham was horrified to find that they expected to load 300 waggons "infamously made, tacked together with nails, and without a screw in them." The fact that such vehicles, even if they survived the voyage, would be quite useless in the Low Countries made no difference to the Russians.

Eventually, after threatening to go to the Emperor, Popham compromised by agreeing to load their tentage and only a few of the less decrepit vehicles. By 28th July the 1st Division was at sea bound for Elsinore, where orders from England awaited them.

Having despatched the 1st Division of troops, Popham returned to St. Petersburg to find that the Swedes had demanded such preposterously high terms for the hire of their troops that their services had been refused. The Emperor seemed agreeably surprised that the 1st Division had been embarked and despatched so quickly, but Popham had no illusions about Russian naval efficiency. "The fact is," he wrote to Mr. Dundas, "the Emperor has been most generously humbugged about his Navy and now he sees what can be done. His sailors are the best disposed men in the world, but his officers—they are *per nomine sed praeterea nihil*. These Russian sailors don't like the sea."

Popham was most anxious to get the 2nd and 3rd Divisions away to sea as early as possible for he was beginning to realize that "there were so many intrigues in this Court that we are never safe." He had discovered that the Russian liaison officer placed at his disposal was merely a spy on behalf of the Admiralty and that the naval authorities were intensely hostile to the projected expedition. Fortunately, the Emperor was still enthusiastic about the plan for the Anglo-Russian invasion of Holland and it was only by his support that Popham had been able to get even limited and grudging co-operation from the Russian naval authorities. Popham reported to Mr. Dundas that "the Emperor in his present temper will do anything for me—if you want 10,000 more men I dare say if I ask him he will grant them. He does not like the Stadtholder, he detests the King of Prussia, and execrates the Duke of Brunswick." The trouble was that the Emperor's temper was quite unpredictable and without his personal support nothing could be done.

When, therefore, on 1st August he returned to Revel, Popham was delighted to find that nine British armed troopships had arrived to embark the 2nd Division of troops and that eight more were expected in a few days time. But there were still difficulties to be overcome. Three of the Russian warships carrying the 1st Division of troops returned to Revel damaged by heavy weather; Popham managed to refit two of them and send them to sea, but the third was beyond local repair and her troops had to be transferred to a British troopship. Then the merchant vessels, which had been chartered, arrived without having been victualled as promised by the Russian Admiralty, and Popham had to collect provisions at the last moment to prepare them for sea.

At last, on 17th August, the 2nd and 3rd Divisions were embarked and sailed for Elsinore, where they were due to receive further orders from England. Popham returned to St. Petersburg to find that the Emperor had suddenly got it into his head that the transports might be attacked by the Danes in the Sound. Asked for his advice on the action to be taken in such an eventuality, Popham suggested that the troops should immediately land and storm Copenhagen! The Emperor appeared satisfied at this solution of the problem, but requested Popham personally to accompany the convoy through the Sound so as to be in a position to put his plan into execution if necessary. Popham had kept back a small lugger in which he intended to embark and to overtake the convoy at sea.

The embarkation had been completed just in time, for Popham reported on 17th August that "the time is past for asking for more troops: the Emperor is all on fire about Prussia." Though he had begun to lose interest in the expedition to

Holland, the Emperor showed his appreciation of Captain Popham's work by making him a Knight of the Order of St. John of Jerusalem, a distinction which the recipient provisionally accepted while submitting the matter to London for approval. He evidently realized that this honour might have been conferred on him for a political purpose, since the Emperor was anxious to gain acceptance of his claim to the Grand Mastership of the Order. Popham suggested that the British Government's approval of the bestowal of this distinction should be published in *The London Gazette*, and also asked that certain trophies taken by the French at Malta and later captured by H.M.S. *Sensible* while on their way to France should be presented to the Emperor, since this "would please him beyond calculation." In the end, Popham was permitted to accept the honour, but without the publicity suggested.

Popham, having accompanied the second division of transports until it was clear of Russian waters, went on ahead to Copenhagen where he found the Danes friendly and helpful. The Russian transports had reached Elsinore safely, and, after watering, had sailed for Harwich. Popham only then realized that the detailed embarkation returns submitted by the Russians were largely fictitious, and he warned Mr. Dundas that at the first opportunity the troops should be mustered by British officers "to prevent any chicanery on the part of the colonels." He reported that when the Russians finally landed in Holland the Duke of York "seemed pleased with their soldierlike and hardy appearance, and their appearance is the worst feature in their character." A few weeks later, however, he wrote as follows: "I am sorry when the Emperor proposed to make me an admiral, I did not ask to be a general, in which case I would have tried some of the malcontents and hung [Major-General] Arbenieff without a trial. If [Major-General] Essen is not superceded before he gets to Guernsey, the islands will be ruined, his army is in such a state of disorganization. I kept my temper with him till yesterday when I was obliged to turn him out of my quarters and think now I have him completely at a distance. Essen is a most ignorant dog."

Nevertheless, the Russian troops did reach the coast of Holland in time to take part with the British in the unfortunate expedition under the Duke of York. Captain Popham had reached St. Petersburg on 3rd June, and within a period of two and a half months had arranged for the co-operation of Russian naval and military forces and had embarked, provisioned, and despatched some 17,000 troops. It was a truly remarkable feat in the circumstances and was in no way lessened either by the futility of the operational plan or by the feebleness of its execution. The episode also gives some indication of the difficulties experienced in co-operating with Russia: more recent experience does not suggest that a century and a half of progress from a Tsarist autocracy has radically altered the apparently inherent characteristics of suspicion and intrigue which so hampered Captain Popham's mission to Russia in 1799.

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## SEA POWER AND THE DARDANELLES

By CAPTAIN I. L. M. MCGEOCH, D.S.O., D.S.C., R.N.

THERE appeared in the R.U.S.I. JOURNAL of February, 1956, an article entitled "1915—The End of an Epoch," the burden of which was that the failure of the Dardanelles campaign "meant a failure of sea power itself." The author, Mr. J. A. Terraine, referred to 1915 as "the guilty year" and indicted the Navy as accessory before the fact.

Truth is many-sided and facts may, without intent to mislead, be interpreted in different ways; but an historical judgment based upon what might have happened is open to doubt, to say the least. Nor is confidence in its author restored if, when sketching in his background, he tends towards a subjective rather than a detached view of the events of the past.

For example, the statement that in 1915 "everything went wrong" (with European civilization) and "has been going wrong ever since" puts the reader on his guard. His knowledge of history inclines him towards a less dogmatic and perhaps a less emotional standpoint. Things had been going wrong in Europe, he seems to remember, long before 1915; and he is conscious of important gains which Europe has made in the last half-century to set against the disasters she has suffered.

Mr. Terraine attaches great significance to the fact that on Christmas Day, 1914, Tommy played football with Fritz in between the front lines, whereas a year later the fighting continued unabated. He deduces from this that had the Dardanelles campaign been successful the 1914-18 War could have been nipped in the bud, and the *status quo ante bellum*, which he thinks was stable and satisfactory, would have been restored.

Such a view would no doubt be a just reflection of the war literature of the period. One might contrast the chivalry of Julian Grenfell with the cynicism of Siegfried Sassoon, and the gulf between the enthusiasm of Rupert Brooke and the disenchantment of C. E. Montague is cosmic. Yet the reactions of these men of heightened perception and sensibility to the impact of the war are not necessarily a good guide to its origins. For that we must rely upon the political and social history of the pre-1914 era.

The war which broke out in 1914 was not just war between governments, or even between peoples, or groups of peoples. It was not simply a case of "the continuation of policy by other means," to be called off after a campaign or two when the rulers of the warring nations deemed it politic to accept some minor revision of frontiers as a just reflection of the balance of military advantage. European civilization had reached the limit of its development along certain lines and war, once embarked upon, was bound to be bitter, world-wide, and prolonged.

Sir Edward Grey, when he said on the eve of war, "the lamps are going out all over Europe; we shall not see them re-lit in our lifetime," evidently sensed that the stresses to which our civilization was being subjected had become intolerable. The crisis of the west, indeed of the world, had arrived.

The lamps of Europe belonged to an age already overtaken by the resolute march of progress. They burned with a lurid glare and cast dark shadows in which those

who cared, or dared, to look could discern the angry faces of the mob. Communism, international socialism, syndicalism, and anarchy were rife. "So long as all the increased wealth which modern progress brings goes but to build up great fortunes, to increase luxury, and to make sharper the contrast between the House of Have and the House of Want, progress is not real and cannot be maintained."<sup>1</sup> This was the problem which, in default of a political solution, was about to be settled by revolution under the slogan, 'workers of the world unite!' At the same time, the rise of nationalism in Europe in the XIXth Century had strained to breaking-point the shrewd but outdated settlement of the Congress of Vienna. The break-up of the Austro-Hungarian Empire was inevitable, and statesmanship had failed to provide a peaceful mode of transition to a new international order. Force alone could decide the issue.

Overseas, the orderly rule imposed by European governments upon Asian, African, and other subject peoples had created the conditions in which these peoples, learning quickly from their masters, began to desire to govern themselves. Yet there seemed to the rulers of Germany still enough to be gained from colonial enterprise to reinforce their determination, already fixed by social and international pressures, to set upon and plunder their neighbours. Germany's aggression was the outward and visible sign of Europe's inward and spiritual torment; and thus it happened that the crisis of civilization, already beyond political control, was to be resolved by war and not by revolution. For almost everywhere the spirit of patriotism proved stronger than the international solidarity of the working class, and the war seemed at first to differ little in character from former wars. Few realized in 1914 that the fighting, though heavy, was only the smoke, the crackling, and the glimpse of flame which call attention to the blazing inferno within the building. In 1956 it is possible to know what underlay the 1914-18 War, and knowing, it is difficult to agree with Mr. Terraine that "everything went wrong" in 1915. Is it even an honest view of the trend of events after 1915 (for that, we are told, was the "guilty" year) to say that everything "has been going wrong ever since"? Have both our hard-won victories been Pyrrhic? Are we deluding ourselves in believing that twice in this century, as she did at the beginning of the last, "England has saved herself by her exertions, and Europe by her example"? Surely we are justified in thinking that, despite the appalling destruction and the carnage, the 'frightfulness' and the blundering, European civilization survived the 1914-18 War? In 1918, while Lord Grey had still many years to live, the lamps were relit. Unhappily the light they cast, gleaming hopefully at first, soon became dim and fitful. Once again, in 1939, Europe was plunged into darkness.

Yet in that uneasy period between the wars, the position was held. Men were taking stock. The outlines of a new order could be discerned. New nations were born. With the end of the war in 1945, European civilization re-emerged from the darkness, chastened, self-critical, yet essentially whole and not, as Mr. Terraine would have us believe, "reduced to the status of an outwork." Indeed, buttressed as they are now by the United States, "the citadels of civilization," still in Europe have so far proved strong enough to withstand the new threat from communism, represented by the massive military strength of Soviet Russia. Western Europe remains free. Her institutions are intact. There is food on the table. Stability is in the air. The organs of government developed of necessity to meet the demands of total war, together with the national unity borne of common sacrifice, are enabling

<sup>1</sup> Henry George, *Progress and Poverty; the Problem*.

the peoples of Europe, in orderly fashion, to demolish the House of Want and make the House of Have big enough for all. To say that since 1915 "everything has gone wrong" is to mistake for death-throes the growing-pains of a comparatively young civilization still in search of the ideal combination of freedom with order.

The decline of the British Empire, which Mr. Terraine assures us began to take place in 1915, is an event which the envy of our competitors has consistently willed, and the ignorance of many Englishmen confidently assumed, for almost as long as the Empire has been recognized as existing. Indeed, the impression gained by King George V, when, as Prince of Wales in 1901, he made a tour of the Empire, was such that on his return, in a speech at the Guildhall, he declared, "Wake up, England!" No doubt the very rapidity with which the British Empire has evolved, and continues to evolve, into an association of autonomous nations equal in status but united under the Crown—into the Commonwealth, in fact—accounts for the view that the Empire is in decline. Besides, generations of children passing through our state schools have been taught very little about the Empire except, perhaps, that it is something to be ashamed of. As it happens, the Empire received its greatest impulse to develop into an entirely original and dynamic political force within a year or so of the moment from which Mr. Terraine dates its decline. "Some striking new figures appeared upon the British scene during the same month of March (1917). These were the Prime Ministers of the British Empire Dominions. By the end of 1916, these countries together had raised a million men for service. Now, Lloyd George held it was high time that they should raise their voices in the Councils of the War Cabinet."<sup>2</sup>

Accordingly, the Dominions Prime Ministers were invited, and the meeting of minds that took place laid the seed which much later flowered into the Statute of Westminster. Leaving aside the Commonwealth, there are still millions of Africans and others under British rule for whom the British Empire is, and must for long remain, the source of order and justice and the hope of eventual nationhood; and there are communities of mixed races where the problems of self-government are still too intractable to offer a reasonable alternative to British rule. To assert that the British Empire is in decline is to mistake change for decay, and can only tend to bring about such decline, an eventuality which would at once deprive Britain of her influence and the world of its greatest single stabilizing factor.

Associated with Mr. Terraine's gloomy but questionable appraisal of the state of Europe and the British Empire is his notion that "1915 which saw . . . the fall of the Liberal Government, marked the close of our Golden Age." In fact the feverish prosperity which this Country was enjoying before the 1914-18 War in common with the rest of Europe had, as we have seen, brought its own acute problems; the start which we had gained in the steam and steel era was rapidly being lost as other countries learned and developed the new industrial techniques; competition for the world's markets was fierce. As a sample of the "Golden Age" the following will serve:—"For several weeks past, South Wales had been in the grip of a violent mining dispute . . . At 4 a.m. on a November morning the strikers formed a cordon round the valley pit-heads . . . That night rioting broke out . . . The police were stoned and shops looted . . . The soldiers had to be sent for . . . The struggle in the coalfield was true drama, prologue of fire and thunder to the mighty play of industrial strife about to be presented in Britain, 1911-1914."<sup>3</sup> The hundred

<sup>2</sup> Frank Owen, *Tempestuous Journey*, p. 368.

<sup>3</sup> Frank Owen, *op. cit.*, p. 214.

years or so before the 1914-18 War was certainly the period of Britain's most spectacular expansion so far, in almost every field, but, as with Europe in general, the internal stresses were rapidly becoming insupportable. To lay at the door of the unfortunate year 1915 the guilt of marking the close of our "Golden Age" is surely a miscarriage of justice. The gold had become tarnished long before then.

We come now to the assumption which lies nearest the heart of Mr. Terraine's matter. "Victory at Gallipoli" he says, "would have transformed the war; victory at Jutland had no effect at all." Sir Winston Churchill, when not writing history, may subscribe to the first of these assertions; but as a historian he has said of the second, that "Jellicoe was the only man who could have lost the war in an afternoon." In order to win a war it is necessary not to lose it, and victories which contribute to this holding-on phase make their due contribution to final victory. Of Gallipoli the most that can fairly be said is that 'nothing succeeds like success' and therefore to have put Turkey out of the war in 1915 would have improved the military position of the Allies and weakened that of the Central Powers *pro rata*. Let us remember the high hopes that were formed in 1943 when Italy was forced to make peace. Italy, 'the soft under-belly' of the Axis, became the scene of a most bitter and prolonged campaign. But Mr. Terraine himself provides the most convincing argument against his own view of the possibilities offered by a victory at Gallipoli. "Wars are not won by diversions" he says, and adds "it was not in the limitless wastes of Russia nor on the periphery of her swollen sphere of influence that Germany had to seek for true victory—it was against her chief enemies and where her main strength lay." On the Western Front, against Britain and France, in other words. If Germany could win the war only on the Western Front, the same applied to the Allies. The art of war is the art of combination; to bring to bear at the decisive time and place the full might of the nation or the alliance; that is the problem. There it is that the will to win must be exerted and the will of the foe overcome. To claim that victory at Gallipoli would have transformed the war is to magnify what was never more than a sound and potentially fruitful strategic concept into the grand design for a series of shattering blows at the Central Powers, culminating in the defeat of the German Armies in Flanders, which alone could bring ultimate victory to the Allies.

Let us turn now from considerations of 'what might have happened' to what actually did happen. On two points we can agree with Mr. Terraine. It is true that the Royal Navy was the main expression of the Pax Britannica; it is true that the Grand Fleet came to be the symbol of Britain's power and might, and that the growth of the High Seas Fleet focused the attention of the British nation upon the aspirations of Germany. What is patently open to doubt, however, is the suggestion, indeed the assertion, that suddenly, in 1915, this situation was transformed. The failure of the Dardanelles campaign, we are told, "meant a failure of sea-power itself, a failure to solve the new problem posed to it."

What is the truth of this matter? In the first place it can be shown that dependence upon the unique power of the Grand Fleet for the defence of the Realm had ceased to be realistic long before 1915. In a speech at Lewes on 26th February, 1896, Mr. Goschen, First Lord of the Admiralty, said, "we have stood alone in that which is called isolation—our splendid isolation as one of our colonial friends was good enough to call it." Note the past tense even in 1896. Already statesmen were beginning to see that dependence on the Navy, with a small Regular army and no alliances, would not do.

By 1902, the Fleet could no longer match the growing power of Russia in the Far East, while maintaining a two-power standard in Europe. An Anglo-Japanese Treaty was therefore concluded, by which the Japanese fleet would be added to the British if a general war broke out. Thus, although an alliance was formed, "it was only a little one," and if Britain's isolation was no longer complete, she still relied primarily upon overwhelming naval force for defence.

Our statesmen, continuing to seek an alternative to isolation, refused to re-engage in Bismarckian 'log-rolling,' euphemistically known as the balance of power, which they conceived to be both ignoble and dangerous. This combination of shrewdness with idealism bore fruit in the Entente Cordiale, established with France in 1904. Both parties to this agreement affirmed that their aim was to act in concert to preserve peace, in the general context of European politics, rather than to combine against any particular power or combination. But after 1907, when Sir Eyre Crowe's lapidary memorandum on the ambitions of Germany was circulated, the Entente began to acquire the character of a military alliance against a specific threat. Thenceforward, it was recognized that the defence of vital British interests might involve fighting on the continent of Europe. No longer could the Royal Navy, on its own, or even in conjunction with other navies, isolate and insulate the British Empire from the dangers which threatened it.

By 1911, Lloyd George was writing to Churchill, his Cabinet colleague, "here is another position we ought to reconnoitre. What about Belgium? 150,000 British troops supporting the Belgian Army on the German flank would be a much more formidable proposition. . . . The Anglo-Belgian Army numbering 400,000 men would pivot on the great fort at Antwerp. The command of the sea would make that position impregnable."<sup>4</sup> Mr. Haldane was already organizing a Territorial Army to provide reinforcements for the British Expeditionary Force, which he knew might sooner or later become involved in continental war on a massive scale. From 'the other side of the hill' we have the evidence given by Alan Moorehead in his new book on Gallipoli, that the Germans had already discounted the effect of Britain's sea power in their plans. Von Wangenheim, the German Ambassador to Turkey in 1914, told Enver that, "The British might control the seas but this was to be a land battle."<sup>5</sup> This misjudgment of the nature of sea power was to be Germany's undoing. "The British Army," Lord Fisher once said, "is a missile to be fired by the British Navy."

It is therefore incorrect to assert that Britain's policy of isolation, relying solely on the Navy, persisted until 1915, when "the keystone was knocked out of the British Empire in a very particular way"—that is to say by the failure of the Navy to force the Dardanelles. What, in fact, did this failure amount to? We failed to pass a fleet through a channel 40 miles long, and so narrow that at every point in its length the ships could be brought under direct fire from the shore at point-blank range; at the Narrows, 14 miles from the entrance, the Dardanelles are not more than 1,600 yards wide. It is not justifiable even to say that this was a new problem of sea-power. A squadron under Admiral Duckworth appeared before Constantinople in 1807; its inward passage was unopposed, but it had a rough time on the way out, and there is no doubt that then, as in 1915, professional opinion was right in pressing the need for soldiers to seize the forts before the passage of the Fleet could be assured.

<sup>4</sup> Frank Owen, *op. cit.*, p. 212.

<sup>5</sup> Alan Moorehead, *Gallipoli*, p. 22.

"It would have been well," Sir John (Moore) wrote after the ships (Duckworth's) had sailed, "to have sent 7,000 or 8,000 men with the fleet to Constantinople, which would have secured their passage through the Dardanelles. . . ."<sup>6</sup> That was a soldier's view. A sailor's view was more emphatic—"The Dardanelles," he (Fisher) cried in a note to Lloyd George, "futile, without soldiers!"<sup>7</sup> So far, therefore, the crucial factor in forcing these potentially impassable Straits has been the inclination of the Turk at the moment, and in 1915 this was a mystery which our limited understanding of the Turkish mentality failed to solve. The Turks, skilfully stiffened by the Germans and inspired by revolutionary leaders at a critical juncture in Turkish history, reacted with all the toughness reserved for defying the infidel, and it was enough to defeat the Navy's attempt, under strong political pressure, to 'go it alone.' To call this episode "a failure of sea power itself," invites reference to what was actually achieved.

The sea power of Britain and her Allies enabled them to bring nearly a quarter of a million men to the Dardanelles, with few losses in transit, and to sustain them there for several months. When at last failure on land had to be accepted, the land force was removed without the loss of a single man. Offensively, our sea power was demonstrated by the submarine campaign in the Sea of Marmara, which succeeded in virtually denying the use of that sea for the support of the Turks who were opposing our soldiers. Failure to exploit this situation was not the fault of the Navy. It was not any defect in sea power itself, therefore, that caused our defeat at Gallipoli. It was the misunderstanding of its nature—of its possibilities and limitations—which inhibited the War Cabinet from launching an effective combined operation at the outset when the defences of the Dardanelles were thinly manned and Turkey herself weak and undecided.

In the 1939-45 War, as in the earlier one, the ability of Britain and her Allies to use the sea, and to deny its use to the enemy, proved to be an indispensable condition of victory. The disappearance of the Grand Fleet as a covering force, under the protection of which our seaborne operations had continued, did not alter the nature of our grand strategy. Our Expeditionary Force was taken by sea to the continent, and *in extremis* brought home again. Our armoured divisions were transported to the Middle East and sustained there. The Allied Armies were landed in North Africa, in Sicily, in Italy, and finally in Normandy. Seaborne raids, such as Vaagso, on *Festung Europa* kept the German defences strung out over a thousand miles of coastline or more. The Battle of the Atlantic was won and Japan was forced out of her conquests—all this by the pressure of sea power, now called maritime power in recognition of the important part played in its exercise by shore-based aircraft.

Maritime power consists not simply of warships and maritime aircraft. It is a combination of geographical circumstance—coastlines, harbours, even climate, with shipping, industrial power, and the military force designed to harmonise with all these. The Army and the Air Force play their part in maintaining maritime power as much as the Navy. What Smuts called the "sea centrality" of Britain immutably fixes her character, as the seas and oceans which separate the members of the Commonwealth and the corners of the Empire inevitably determine the maritime nature of their being.

<sup>6</sup> Alan Moorehead, *op. cit.*, p. 37.

<sup>7</sup> Alan Moorehead, *op. cit.*, p. 79.

Thanks to our leadership, and sustained by the United States, Europe is beginning to emerge from the crisis of its civilization. The British Commonwealth is dynamic and powerful far beyond the individual capacity of any of its members. In these developments sea power has played, and will continue to play, its vital part. The Grand Fleet of the Royal Navy has sired the squadrons and flotillas of the Navies of the Commonwealth, as the threats to its sea communications have changed their direction and character, and the individual and local predominance of the United Kingdom in the scheme of things becomes less in relation to the whole. The thermo-nuclear stalemate must never be allowed to divert our attention from where our cardinal interest lies. Political arrangements can change overnight. New combinations of Powers can arise suddenly. How could we hope to control our destiny as a Commonwealth if we were no longer able to use freely the seas by which we are united?

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## THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION<sup>1</sup>

By A. K. CHESTERTON, M.C.

### EUROPE

#### MOVES TOWARDS FEDERATION

**A**LTHOUGH during the last quarter public attention has been focused almost exclusively on the Suez dispute, much more important developments have been taking place nearer home. One such development is the open bid by the French Government to secure the adherence of Great Britain to Euratom, the European 'leg' of the long-projected World Atomic Energy Authority. If this move succeeds, the British nation will surrender to international control power over its own atomic energy programmes. It is, with submission, a consummation devoutly not to be wished. If atomic energy be the key to the future, then those who control that energy will control the future. There is no more potent threat to national sovereignty than this functional approach to federalism.

Another development aimed at the same objective is the proposal next year to lay cables under the Channel to enable British electricity to be supplied to French consumers, and French electricity to be supplied to British consumers. It is claimed for this scheme that it will make users in the south of England independent of suppliers in the north of England. That it is preferable for the south to be dependent upon the north rather than upon France is not the kind of argument which carries much weight these days.

#### COMMON MARKET

The campaign to associate Great Britain with the proposed European "common market" has also been waged with great intensity during recent weeks. Not only has the West German Government joined the French Government as a proponent of the idea, but the British Chancellor of the Exchequer and the President of the Board of Trade, while attending the World Bank meeting at Washington, are reported to have placed before the Commonwealth Finance Ministers definite plans for this association. As the British and Western European economies are not so much complementary as competitive, the benefits to Britain likely to accrue from her adherence to a "free trade area" are not immediately apparent.

The disadvantages, however, are plain for all to see. If Britain were to join Europe's "common market" she would renounce her special position in the Commonwealth and Empire markets, which would be thrown open to all her European associates. This would bring to an end the possibility of the emergence of a revitalized British world as the "third force" in international affairs and would mean in the long run her absorption by the Western European federation now in process of creation.

#### FEDERAL STRUCTURE

Dr. Adenauer has now become a declared champion of Federal Europe. He bases his argument on the gigantic strength of the United States and the Soviet Union, asserting that only through federation can Western Europe hold its own in the world and become independent of American power and patronage. The point he seems to overlook is that the wielders of American power, through their official agents, have long been advocates in the same cause. Successive administrators of American aid and successive Supreme Allied Commanders of N.A.T.O., doubtless under Govern-

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<sup>1</sup> As deduced from reports up to 8th October.

mental instruction, have done their utmost to bulldoze the Western European nations into various functional and administrative unions, which is distinctly curious if the purpose of these unions is to achieve independence for Europe. Those who wield power are never remarkable for any very great willingness to lay it aside. It is a fair assumption, therefore, that a United States of Europe would be even more dependent upon the United States of America than are the Western European nations as separate entities.

The objectives of Dr. Adenauer could much more easily be gained by a system of alliances between proud and sovereign States than by the unwieldy contraption which Federal Europe could not fail to be. In the eyes of many people, including the present writer, it would be madness to reject all possibility of the British world's being built up into the "third force" in favour of a European integration which would depend for its success upon the blending of the disparate French and German elements. There is reason to think that the establishment of an essentially synthetic European State would be more likely to destroy Europe than to save her.

#### U.S.S.R. AND JUGOSLAVIA

The exchange of visits between Marshal Tito and Mr. Khrushchev probably has an importance far beyond that attached to it by most Western commentators. When Stalinism was replaced by the present policy of "peaceful co-existence" Yugoslavia was restored to the comity of Communist nations. At the same time the fiction of the independence of the various national Communist Parties was established, but it was clear that the Kremlin did not intend the fiction to be taken seriously by its own satellites. Marshal Tito, having tasted independence, together with the sweets of American aid, is certain to be in no mood to accept directives as the price to be paid for the restoration of friendly relations with the Soviet Union. Hence the bargaining with Khrushchev.

Tito has a strong hand. The Communist bid to play a leading part in Middle Eastern affairs can never be fully effective without direct access to the scene. Turkey guards one of the two possible approaches and would relinquish that guard only after defeat in war. The other approach is commanded by Yugoslavia. If the whole-hearted co-operation of Marshal Tito can be secured communism in a few years may control the whole of the Middle East.

#### EASTERN SATELLITES

The withdrawal of Russian troops from Hungary and Rumania does not indicate a general retreat. On the contrary it is a sign of Moscow's confidence that the adherence of these satellites no longer requires military enforcement, but may henceforward be secured by politico-economic means alone. If this confidence is not misplaced the Soviet Union will greatly improve its position, because nothing is more resented by countries with a tradition of independence than the presence of occupying forces. It will now be much easier for Moscow to pose as the protector, instead of being hated as the oppressor, of the Eastern European nations. The technique, although new to the Communist Empire, is not unknown to the West, as Latin American countries are able to attest. Foreign troops and foreign administrations are unnecessary when political and economic pressure is all that is needed to secure the acquiescence of Governments.

What is more, by appearing to pull out of Eastern Europe the Soviet Union is able to reassure the West that it is genuinely non-aggressive and whole-heartedly devoted to the cause of peaceful co-existence. Both Moscow and Peking at the present time are playing their cards with great skill.

## MIDDLE EAST

## SUEZ

Great Britain would never have maintained troops in the Suez zone had it not been for the belief that effective control of the Canal was contingent upon military occupation. The validity of that belief was demonstrated the moment our occupation was brought to an end. Colonel Nasser at once asserted his own control. The outcry throughout the Western world might have served a better purpose had it come when the British Government first made known that it contemplated pulling out from Suez. Not very much perspicience was required to predict what the result of our evacuation would be.

The course of action taken by the West in response to the Nasser challenge has been a not very formidable show of strength masking a policy of downright weakness. There was brought into being, on the initiative of the United States, a Canal Users' Association, which was presented to the world as an organization that would assert, by whatever means considered necessary, the determination of its members to secure a passage for their shipping. However, the United States Secretary of State watered down the concept by declaring that if American ships were impeded by the Egyptian authorities they would be re-routed round the Cape. The other members of the Association then appear to have lost heart, for they let it be known that their ships, if necessary, would also use the Cape route. No sooner was this announcement made than certain of the members discovered that such a course would be highly inconvenient, if not quite impracticable, for their own shipping, whereupon the Canal Users' Association lost whatever coherence and meaning it may have had at the start. At the time of writing the dispute has been referred to the Security Council, where the Soviet veto is certain to be used to prevent any attempt to force Colonel Nasser's hand. No doubt sooner or later a face-saving formula will be found for a settlement which, in the absence of military control, will leave matters very much where they are now.

## ARAB UNITY

The Suez dispute led to an impressive—at any rate to a superficially impressive—show of Arab unity. Iraq demonstrated that she had travelled a sufficient distance from the British orbit to enable her to send Colonel Nasser a telegram of congratulation on his nationalization of the Canal. Reports from Jordan indicate that the removal of British influence has enabled Egypt to secure a firm grip on her policies. There has also been a meeting between King Feisal of Iraq and King Saud of Saudi Arabia, in addition to which Colonel Nasser has entered into direct personal negotiations with the Saudi Arabian Government. Mr. Nehru's visit to Riyadh was obviously timed to demonstrate India's encouragement of the line-up of the Arab States against the West, while the attitude of Pakistan has been no less calculated to put heart into the Arab world.

Although these various moves may be interpreted as aspects of the Afro-Asian revolution, it is improbable that the problem of Suez looms as largely in the Arab mind as it does in the Western mind. The Arab obsession is Israel. Goings and comings in the Arabian world may appear to be for the purpose of strengthening Colonel Nasser's hand, but their real purpose beyond doubt is to build up a common front against the Zionist State and what are believed to be Zionist expansionist ambitions. Meanwhile Israel, by carrying out ruthless raids in reprisal for sporadic sniping across her frontiers, keeps Arab animosity at boiling point.

## FRENCH NORTH AFRICA

The French in North Africa have discovered, as we have discovered after the evacuation from Suez, that a retreat from responsibility in any area is no guarantee that good-will is left behind. Morocco, granted independence, demonstrates that continued loyalty to France will not be tolerated in any section of the community. Hence the expulsion of 60 Frenchmen on the ground that they were members of the settlers' organization, *Présence Française*. French police remaining in Morocco refused to make night arrests—which are contrary to French law—and were suspended. The French Ambassador vigorously intervened, but succeeded only in establishing the principle that arrests should be made during the hours of daylight.

There is reason to think that the North African pattern will repeat that of Indo-China. Certainly the Moroccan leaders have had their hands strengthened by the willingness of the United States to negotiate on subjects such as military bases and the provision of dollar aid. Internal political difficulties to some extent have impeded the flow of dollars, but once these have been overcome the deluge will follow. If the only problem involved was the exchanging of American for French influence in Morocco, the French would be aggrieved but not necessarily enraged. What they do find infuriating is the developing role of a dollar-backed Morocco as the chief propaganda and military base for the ultimate conquest of Algeria.

## THE FAR EAST

## VIET-NAM

Although July has come and gone, the elections in Viet-Nam which were to have been held in that month at the latest are as far off as ever. The Powers which reached this agreement at Geneva seem not to be unduly perturbed. The only direct reference to the breach of the agreement appears to have been made by Mr. Krushchev, who said: "In Viet-Nam time has passed but no elections have been held. Why? Because a so-called democratic state has firmly entrenched itself." That the Communist leader should be content with a verbal 'crack' suggests that the Communist Empire has more important fish to fry at the present time. It would clearly be most unwise to place in hazard the many advantages accruing to the Soviet Union from the policy of "peaceful co-existence."

The Western Powers for their part can scarcely blame Mr. Ngo Dinh Diem, president of South Viet-Nam, for refusing to expose his country to the risk of elections which would certainly be jerrymandered by the North Viet-Nam leaders. Otherwise there is little in this part of the world which calls for comment—except, perhaps, that as patrons the French are definitely 'out' of South Viet-Nam and the Americans as definitely 'in.'

## INDONESIA

To make up for its present inactivity over Indo-China, the Soviet Union has been exceedingly busy in other spheres, not least in Indonesia. Moscow has negotiated an agreement in Jakarta whereby it will provide machinery, manufactured goods, and technical assistance as part of the "struggle against colonialism" to which the two Governments declare themselves to be committed. President Sukarno, during his good-will visit to the U.S.S.R., revealed the ideological bent of his mind when he told a huge gathering that "the only people in the world who do not want peace are those who stand for imperialism, capitalism, and fascism."

Linked with its successes already achieved in India, Burma, and Afghanistan, the Soviet Union's treaty with the Jakarta Government shows that its political

and economic penetration of South Asia has become a formidable challenge to the West. Nature abhors a vacuum in politics as in physics. As the British rapidly withdraw, their successors conceal their features behind only a very thin gauze of commercial treaty-making.

#### SINGAPORE

The lull in the Singapore storm which followed the resignation of Mr. David Marshall did not last long. Admittedly the 'token' strike organized as a protest against the banishment of six trade union officials was very badly managed, but the reaction to the Singapore Government's order dissolving the Chinese Middle Schools Students' Union was much more dramatic. Communist pupils seized control of six high schools, held the teachers as prisoners, and barricaded themselves in for the night. Pigtailed girls in gym slips are said to have screamed abuse at police and education officials, while relentless pressure was brought to bear on children unwilling to flout the authority of the teachers.

#### MALAYA

Nor is the prospect for law and order much brighter in Malaya. About 200 of the 250 European assistant and deputy superintendents of police have applied for transfer to other territories because of the proclaimed Malayanization policy in the police force. Most of the others are likely to follow their example when the full details of the policy are announced in November.

Tengku Abdul Rahman, who is negotiating for a large British loan, has promised the British Government the use of military bases after independence is achieved, but he is also committed to the raising of a Malayan Army whose purpose, presumably, will be to supplant the United Kingdom and Commonwealth Forces now keeping the Communists at bay. Whatever the Tengku's personal intention, the presence of British troops is certain to become a Party issue in the Malayan political game, and if precedent is followed the troops will sooner rather than later be withdrawn. The resultant anarchy will give communism a chance it is unlikely to miss.

#### CHINA AND THE COMMONWEALTH FORMULA

Mr. Chou En-lai, the Chinese Prime Minister, expounded a very subtle policy when he told Chinese members of the Singapore and Malayan delegations to China that it was wrong for them to have dual nationality. Their first duty, he declared, must be to the country of domicile. The Chinese Premier even brought himself to say that Singapore's best friends were the British, and that the "best thing" for both Singapore and Malaya would be "independence within the Commonwealth on the same basis as for India and Ceylon." There can be no doubt that Chou En-lai knows the precise value to be attached to that formula.

Even so, superficialists in Great Britain as in South-East Asia will rejoice at this sign of Red China's "change of heart." They will not understand that Chou En-lai makes use of the formula as an established means of bringing British power and influence to an end. Once that has been achieved communism can take over at its leisure, whereas any forcing of the Communist issue before the British have gone could only result in complications and delay.

## CORRESPONDENCE

*(Correspondence is invited on subjects which have been dealt with in the JOURNAL, or which are of general interest to the Services. Correspondents are requested to put their views as concisely as possible, but publication of letters will be dependent on the space available in each number of the JOURNAL.—EDITOR.)*

### THE ORGANIZATION OF THE DIVISION IN A NUCLEAR WAR

To the Editor of the R.U.S.I. JOURNAL.

SIR,—In his article in the May issue of the JOURNAL<sup>1</sup> Lieut.-Colonel Short not only illustrates clearly the organizational riddle which has bedevilled the Army of the Rhine during the past five years but also unconsciously reveals why the answer still eludes us.

He tells us that a division must be capable of undertaking any normal operation of war with its own organic resources, and assumes that the techniques of demanding and authorizing atomic missiles will eventually be simplified to the point where the whole process takes only a few hours. These two contentions summarize exactly the policy which has guided the recent trials and indicate what little forward thinking there has been.

The whole pattern of present thought is stultified by the assumption that atomic missiles must be controlled at a high level and that divisions will therefore continue to fight the tactical battle with their conventional weapons and all their attendant trappings as of old. It is true that certain tactical concessions have been made to the advent of atomic missiles. In defence, units are now deployed to an extent which, though atomically secure, is tactically unsound. In the attack, hitherto impossibly bold advances are now the vogue. Apart from this the tactics of the infantry and armoured units have changed but little from the familiar formulas of 1945, and the armoured divisions still rumble complacently across the Westphalian plain each consuming a steady 2,000 gallons of petrol per mile. Nor indeed can we find anything new in the organizations which are being tried. All the various blends of infantry and armour were used, with varying degrees of success, between the years 1939-1945.

The first decade of the atomic era has then had little effect on military organization and tactical thought. The second decade, however, will see the introduction of the low yield atomic missile capable of being fired from the equivalent of the present self-propelled field gun. Recent press reports indicate that the Americans are already far advanced with the introduction of some such weapon into a divisional organization. In the British Army the prospect of such a weapon is regarded as so remote as to be unworthy of consideration. Yet, as Lieut.-Colonel Short points out, the answer to the present trials may well govern our organizations for the next 20 years.

May I suggest, therefore, that we cease our efforts to superimpose existing atomic weapons on our standard organizations and, instead, look to the day when the small atomic missile is under the direct control of the fighting unit commander? The tactical and organizational possibilities of such an innovation are immense, involving, as it will, tactical domination of the battlefield by the shell rather than by the machine-gun or the tank.

Is it too much to hope that we may soon see a trials exercise in which one side consists of a force of say one armoured car regiment, one regiment of six 'atomic' field guns, and two motorized battalions? Organized into three mobile battle groups each of one squadron, one two-gun battery, and two companies, such a force, operating on a 15-mile frontage and supported in depth by a 'Corporal' battery, would be more than a match for any combination of conventional formations so long as the latter have to rely on Corps or Army for their atomic support.

<sup>1</sup> Page 263.

Only the lack of a substantial quantity of small atomic shells and the equipments from which to fire them prevents the immediate realization of this concept. Is there anyone so bold as to say that it is impossible to produce such weapons within the next 10 years?

J. H. P. CURTIS,

20th June, 1956.

Major.

### THE CAMPAIGN IN BURMA, 1943-45, AND SPECIAL FORCES

SIR,—I. Now that Brigadier Roberts's *The Campaign in Burma, 1943-45*<sup>2</sup>, and Field-Marshal Sir William Slim's *Defeat into Victory* have been published, it is possible to evaluate the stand at Sanjshak, in March, 1944, of the 50th Indian Parachute Brigade. Despite this stand, the Japanese advancing down the Ukhrul road were only halted within 14 miles of their objective. How nearly the Japanese succeeded will be realized when it is remembered that for the period between 18th-26th March, the 50th Parachute Brigade held them at Sanjshak.

"On how fine a margin the success or failure of these decisions depended," writes Sir William Slim, "can be seen from the history of the Japanese thrust from the east. On 19th March, part of the enemy 31st Division surged against the Indian Parachute Brigade and one battalion of the 23rd Division dug in to cover Ukhrul." We also know now that the main axis of advance of the Japanese 15th Division was Myothit-Sanjshak-Litan, so that approximately one-third of the total Japanese forces surging on Imphal came this way.

Opposed to them were (i) the 152nd Indian Parachute Battalion, lying south-east of Ukhrul at Sheldon's Corner, who took for two days the initial shock of this unexpected flank attack; (ii) the main body, at Sanjshak, of the 4th/5th Mahratta Light Infantry together with the 15th Mountain Battery I.A. and the 582nd Jungle Field (Mortar) Battery, R.A., all of whom were the rear party of 49th Indian Brigade of 23rd Division, then withdrawing on to the Imphal plain; and (iii) the 153rd Gurkha Parachute Battalion. 153 had travelled down the previous day from east of Kohima to the support of their sister battalion and, after reaching Imphal, were only allotted sufficient Dodge's to move battalion headquarters, their three rifle companies, and a platoon of mortars into the Naga hills. Sir William Slim continues, "almost without water, it was impossible to hold out any longer and, after dark on the 26th March, what was left of the brigade was ordered to break out and make for Imphal. The 10 days delay and the heavy casualties this small force and the R.A.F. who supported them had inflicted on the enemy were of inestimable value at this critical stage of the battle." Yet, it was not until December, 1944, that it was released to the Press that Indian paratroops had been in action at all.

2. In his "Afterthoughts," Sir William Slim writes, "The main objection to special forces is that large numbers of picked troops are waiting for long periods to be used for short periods, or eventually being employed for something quite different from that for which they have for so long and laboriously trained." The history of the 50th Indian Parachute Brigade well exemplifies this last category. In four years of war-time parachute training, they never did a formation drop on operations. This in spite of being allotted, from the meagre air resources in India, aircraft ranging from a flight, in 1941, of Vickers Valentias, built in the 1920's, to a wing, in 1944, of Dakotas, built in the 1940's. There was a parachute drop on Elephant Point in May, 1945, carried out by a composite battalion. This battalion had to be hastily integrated from personnel in the brigade as, at that time, most I.O.R.s and G.O.R.s were on long leave in India and practically all senior British I.A. officers were on leave in the U.K., their first after some six to eight years of continuous overseas service.

F. G. NEILD, Major R.A.M.C.

24th July, 1956.

Late R.M.O., 153rd Gurkha Parachute Battalion.

<sup>2</sup> See JOURNALS for May, 1956, p. 235, and August, 1956, p. 412.

SIR,—As an officer who spent many years in Assam, may I, in the interests of accuracy, venture to correct a small error which appears more than once in the article, *The Campaign in Burma*, 1943-45, in the JOURNAL for May last?

There are several references to "Silchar in East Bengal." Silchar is the headquarters town of the Cachar District of Assam and, until Partition in 1947, was separated by the western part of Cachar and the whole of the very large district of Sylhet (also part of Assam) from the nearest point in East Bengal. Even after Partition, although much of Sylhet District was transferred to East Bengal (Pakistan), the greater part of the Karimganj Subdivision of that district remained in Assam (India) and became administratively part of the Cachar District.

It is, of course, true that the population is mainly Bengali-speaking, and differs considerably from the true Assamese of the Assam Valley, but nevertheless Silchar is, and ever since the formation of the Province of Assam in 1874 has always been, in Assam.

J. E. REID,  
Lieut.-Colonel.

2nd October, 1956.

### THE VICTORIA CROSS

SIR,—For the sake of historical accuracy would you care to record in the JOURNAL that the youngest winner of the Victoria Cross was Hospital Apprentice A. FitzGibbon of the Bengal Medical Department. Born 13th May, 1845: Cross won before Taku Forts, China, 21st August, 1860. To a month he was exactly one year younger than Boy J. T. Cornwell, V.C., R.N., being 15 years of age.

The *London Gazette*, 13th August, 1861, gives his name as Arthur and his corps the Indian Medical Establishment. The Bengal Army lists show his name to be Andrew and his corps Bengal Medical Department.

There was no Indian Medical Department or Establishment in those days any more than there was an Indian Army, which came into being on the amalgamation of the Presidency Armies of Bengal, Bombay, and Madras in 1895.

DONOVAN JACKSON,  
Lieut.-Colonel.

11th August, 1956.

### ADMIRAL OF THE FLEET'S BATON

SIR,—I write to ask if any of your readers could say when and why the Admiral of the Fleet's baton was discontinued?

When the Earl of St. Vincent was promoted to Admiral of the Fleet, the King instructed Sir Benjamin Blomfield to present him with a baton in His Majesty's name. The actual presentation was made by a deputation of the Lords of the Admiralty.

The baton, as a symbol of rank, seems to have disappeared in the middle of the XIXth Century as it does not appear in portraits of Admirals of the Fleet who held that rank in the last half of the Century.

W. M. JAMES,  
Admiral.

14th August, 1956.

### SOME ASPECTS OF THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR, 1861-65

SIR,—I read with great interest your article by "Athos" on the American Civil War,<sup>3</sup> but there are certain points which call for comment.

The first is that he states that the Confederacy comprised 13 States. I believe that I have strong support for saying that there were only 11, these being, in order of date of secession, South Carolina, Mississippi, Alabama, Georgia, Florida, Louisiana, Texas, Virginia, Arkansas, North Carolina, and Tennessee. The error, for such in my opinion it is, is probably caused by the claim the Confederate Government made to two other

<sup>3</sup> See JOURNAL for August, 1956, p. 387.

slave-States, and I have found that very often in this Country the same belief is founded on the fact that the best-known Confederate battle-flag (the second designed) has 13 stars, a form of wishful thinking rather similar to the title of King of France held until about 1820 by the English monarchy. The two States concerned were Missouri and Kentucky and an extract from the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* (American edition) should suffice: "... Kentucky formally declared its allegiance to the Union. From September, 1861, to the fall of Ft. Donelson in February, 1862, that part of Kentucky which is south and west of the Green river was occupied by the Confederate army under General A. S. Johnston, and at Russellville... a so-called sovereignty convention was set up. This body... passed an ordinance of secession." And in Missouri, "When the question of secession was submitted to the people in February, 1861, they elected a convention which voted 80 to 1 against... the convention reassembled in 1861, ousted Governor Jackson and the legislature, and elected Hamilton Gamble as provisional governor. Until his death in 1864 he maintained a loyal State Government...."

The second point which I think "Athos" misinterprets is embodied in his statement, "Lincoln had no knowledge of war and held a low opinion of professional soldiers. He interfered and worried his generals with plans and suggestions as others have done since." With all due respect to "Athos," I think a study of *Lincoln and His Generals* by T. Harry Williams, Hamish Hamilton (1952), would convince him that Lincoln behaved throughout the war with a consideration for his commanders not often met. The story of McClellan's snub is, in my opinion, sufficient. One evening Lincoln called on McClellan who was out. The President of the United States thereupon sat down to wait, and when McClellan was told on arriving home an hour later that the President was waiting for him, he merely said that he was busy at the moment, and forthwith went to bed. Lincoln waited another hour and then left saying only, "I would hold General McClellan's horse if he would only win victories"! This of a commander who had command at that time of twice as many troops as his opponent. And as to Lincoln's strategy, a close inspection will show that in every instance his ideas were not only practicable but if they had been obeyed it is as certain as these things can be that the war would have come to a halt in the eastern theatre at least, by 1863. His dismissal of McClellan has caused much controversy as indeed it does today, but what steps would be taken today towards a commander who defeats an enemy in battle, then allows him to retreat with 30,000 men across a river in one night, and on being ordered to follow him does not send the first of his 60,000 men across the same river for 21 days? And what can a nation expect from that same general when they find that it takes 30 days for his army to cross the river that his opponent forded in one night? Lincoln gave his commanders enough rope not only to hang themselves but on occasion to take their country with them.

The third objection I would like to put forward is based on the sentence "So well did Johnston delay the advance that Sherman did not reach the vicinity of the town [Atlanta] until July and could not drive the Confederates out until early September."

On this point "Athos" would seem to agree with Lieut.-Colonel A. H. Burne who stated in your columns in the May issue, "there was nothing finer or more instructive in the whole war than the campaign in which Thomas Hood drove back the much vaunted Sherman from Atlanta. It was a campaign replete with sparkle and lessons."<sup>4</sup> It is with the utmost trepidation that I venture to disagree with these two gentlemen, especially with such an eminent military historian as Colonel Burne, but I believe I am correct in saying that Sherman's march, at West Point at least, is taught as an exercise in the advance. This is not the place for a detailed description of Sherman's advance but the barest facts should be given. He left Chattanooga for Atlanta, the core of the Confederate territory in morale and wealth, which lay approximately 110 miles away. His army numbered 98,000 men as against 71,000 commanded by Joseph Johnston, and along the route lay the towns of Dalton, Resaca Adairsville, Cassville Allatoona. Put quite simply, Sherman flanked his opponent at each town and when needed he could move quickly.

<sup>4</sup> Page 276.

Mr. Fletcher Pratt gives a good example of this in *Ordeal by Fire*, "the rebels tore up the railroad in retreat, twisted the rails, burned the ties, and blew out the bridges; that would detain the gross of the Union army while Polk and Hood were to turn and demolish Schofield. Hardly had the rebels got into position, however, when their astonished ears caught the 'tweet-weet' of a locomotive whistle and Hardee (Confederate) came tumbling in on the main body, with the horizon from west to east behind him a-shimmer with Union bayonets. Sherman's railroaders had actually rebuilt that line as fast as the troops marched." And I submit that Hood's attack on Sherman was not the example that Colonel Burne claims it to be. Three times Hood flanked Sherman's army and three times they were beaten back while the final victory was won by a Union movement which was as unorthodox as it was sound. Atlanta was covered from outside help on the west, north, and east, and the south approach was well defended against whatever troops Sherman could afford to send round there, or so Hood thought. He could not visualize that Sherman would leave his line of supply completely and cheerfully take the entire army on a 20-mile circuit to the south, and when that occurred all Hood could do was to refuse to believe that such a thing could happen, send one corps to deal with it, and evacuate the city when he found that Sherman had flanked him. Hood had been insistent that where Johnston had retreated, he would be victorious, and he had received Johnston's command on his promise to Jefferson Davis, "he [Johnston] cannot stop the devil from by-passing him. I will stop him and send him scurrying back to Chattanooga."

It was Hood who hurried off to the north-west and was not just "badly defeated" at Nashville, but totally so in the only complete victory of the war. After Nashville, Hood had 9,000 men left from 55,000 of three days before, and as Fletcher Pratt puts it, "... the war in the West was ended. The Confederate government had been and was not; there were policemen in blue at every post office and Jefferson Davis was President of only three States."

#### FIRST USE OF AIR OBSERVATION OF ARTILLERY FIRE

In answer to Mr. Nimmo-Smith's query as to the availability of *Aeronautics in the Union and Confederate Armies* by F. Stansbury Haydon,<sup>5</sup> it is listed in the War Office Library List 246(I), 2nd issue, November, 1952, on page 2.

N. T. P. MURPHY, *Lieut.*,

10th September, 1956.

*The Green Howards, T.A.*

SIR,—In *Some Aspects of the American Civil War, 1861-65*, by "Athos" appearing in the August issue of the JOURNAL, a mistake has been made in the article's first sentence.

The Southern Confederacy consisted of only 11 States, viz., Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Louisiana, Alabama, Mississippi, Texas, Arkansas, and Tennessee.

True the Confederate Battle Flag has 13 stars on its St. Andrew's cross, but that is only because the Confederate States always thought that Maryland and Missouri, the Border States, were a part of the Confederacy. Maryland and Missouri both sent men into the Confederate Army but the States themselves never seceded from the Union.

Possibly one of the incidents of the Confederate War that pointed out most vividly the horror of a civil war occurred at Front Royal, Virginia. It was here that the First Maryland, U.S.A., ran head on into the First Maryland, C.S.A.

Incidentally the article itself was first rate. I enjoyed it a great deal.

KENNETH P. STUART,

Carson Long Institute, Pennsylvania.

*Lieutenant.*

13th October, 1956.

<sup>5</sup> See JOURNAL for August, 1956, p. 455.

## DETERRING AGGRESSION

SIR,—In the August, 1956, number Admiral Sir R. P. Ernle-Erle-Drax has asked me to say "Yes" or "No" to certain questions which he has posed.<sup>6</sup> Unfortunately, the form in which they have been stated does not permit of such simple treatment. Instead, I have set out below a series of propositions, which I hope are sufficiently clear to enable the Admiral to ascertain what I believe to be the answers to his questions.

(i) The power of a nuclear explosion is so great and the chances of defence against it are at the moment so small, that a deliberately provoked major war between East and West is outside normal calculations. That is why the British and United States defence programmes are based on a policy of deterrence, the argument for which has been fully set out in recent Defence White Papers.

(ii) There remains the possibility of limited wars fought for local or limited objectives in various parts of the world.

(iii) Except in the case of minor police actions which might be met by airborne forces, the West can only intervene militarily in such wars by sending a combined expedition with full naval and air support or, alternatively, by air action unsupported by troops. In the case of the military expedition, it has to disembark together with its supplies and it has got to be maintained for the duration of the campaign. The Korean war has shown clearly that this is a major logistics operation.

(iv) Should the Western Forces use atomic or nuclear weapons as a means of furthering their campaign it would seem reasonable to expect the enemy to retaliate in kind. In this event it would be impossible to ensure the security of the base or bases, and consequently the maintenance of the forces ashore, *e.g.*, consider the Korean campaign if the base ports had been subject to atom let alone nuclear attack.

(v) If, on the other hand, the Western reply to aggression is based on air action, and this is limited, as the Admiral suggests, to the enemy forces in the area which is being overrun, then there is no evidence to justify a belief that such action alone could prevent a properly organized force from advancing and taking over the country, although it could undoubtedly slow down the rate of advance.

(vi) On the other hand, threat of air action against the country planning the aggression might well prevent it, or if it had started action could force a withdrawal. That would be militarily practicable, but the political implications would clearly call for very careful study.

In short, the nuclear weapon, while it at present ensures against the deliberate major war, and may indeed act as a deterrent even in a small war, prohibits the landing of an overseas expeditionary force.

Whilst the foregoing propositions are broadly true there are bound to be instances where political groupings, geographical circumstances, or other special conditions, blur their strict application, but I can see no prospect of achieving the results expected by the Admiral from a policy of "graduated deterrents" based on the suggestion that 'A' and 'H' bombs can by themselves hold up an advancing army of the Korean scale. But they can and are preventing major war, and subject to political considerations might prevent or win minor wars through the threat of attack, or the attack of the aggressor in his own country.

R. A. COCHRANE,  
*Air Chief Marshal (Retd.).*

25th September, 1956.

## V.L.R. AIRCRAFT—A MATTER OF FACT

SIR,—I believe that the true aim of the historian, or, to narrow the field, of the historian of maritime warfare, is to seek for the causes of things and events. It is this, not the mere narration of events and developments, that makes, or should make, his

<sup>6</sup> Pages 455-6.

researches worth the serious attention of students of war, professional as well as lay. But in history as in science study of the causes of things must be preceded by study of things caused. I have so far considered the question of the provision of V.L.R. aircraft only as a 'thing caused.' Nor do I propose in this letter to probe to the heart of the matter, namely, to examine why, when the writing on the wall in 1918 was plain, there ever was a V.L.R. problem a quarter of a century later. Like Group Captain Whiteley I do not subscribe to the view that it was caused by "Air Ministry indifference" and I trust that none of your readers supposed I do. The cause was far more profound and in its manifestations far more complex. Be that as it may, my immediate task is to convince Group Captain Whiteley, whose letter of 19th May, 1956, you published in the August issue of this JOURNAL under the title, *V.L.R. Aircraft and the Battle of the Atlantic*,<sup>7</sup> and readers whose confidence in my paper has been shaken by it, that my facts are facts and are not, as he so forcefully puts it, "anything but facts."

I must admit to a feeling of disappointment that, in so far as my paper related to shore-based maritime aircraft I failed to make it crystal clear that it was concerned with their provision for very long range (V.L.R.) convoy work and not with their provision for what may be termed maritime and anti-submarine work in general. As a result Group Captain Whiteley's long and interesting letter serves rather to confuse than clarify the point at issue, namely, the provision of maritime V.L.R. aircraft. Perhaps I should re-state the problem in the simplest terms that I find possible.

In the First World War it was found by widespread and protracted experience that aircraft working in intimate co-operation with surface warships operated on the scientific system of warfare termed convoy :—

(i) preserved from loss and ensured the highest practicable delivery rate of the largest number of ships under threat of attack with the least effort, *i.e.*, with the greatest economy of force in terms of numbers of warships and aircraft, steaming and flying hours, expenditure of weapons, etc. ;

(ii) enabled the threatening forces to be repulsed or destroyed with the least effort, *i.e.*, with the greatest economy of force in terms of numbers of ships and aircraft, steaming and flying hours, expenditure of weapons, etc.

This experience is susceptible to analysis and to proof in quantitative terms, *i.e.*, can be (and in part was) demonstrated mathematically as a law of maritime warfare ; in other words, the truth of Richard Morysine's dictum, of 1539, that "witte with small force, by bestowing strokes at a right place, and at a right time, oft times worketh wonders where exceeding great strength cannot avail," is demonstrable scientifically.

When the First World War ended the outstanding maritime air need (I omit surface vessel needs only because aircraft only are under discussion) was for aircraft capable of operating in defence of shipping and for offence against enemy forces in the oceans, where the U-boats had already been operating against shipping for some months unopposed by aircraft.

When the Second World War began British maritime shore-based aircraft including flying-boats were supplied, administered, and operated by the R.A.F. as an integral part of that Service, the principal Command concerned being known as Coastal Command. As its name implied the aircraft it operated were essentially coastal in performance. Furthermore, with the exception of the flying-boats the aircraft, *i.e.*, the land-based aircraft, were all aircraft of general purpose or specialized land-warfare design, modified for maritime operations. During the war Coastal Command was supplied with no land-based aircraft specifically designed for maritime operations. All supplied had to be modified for maritime work.

As the war progressed, it became apparent that the 'Achilles heel' of our ocean convoy system, upon which our war effort and therefore our survival depended, lay in the

<sup>7</sup> Pages 452-4.

susceptibility of our convoys to attack by U-boats if aircraft did not form a part of the escort forces. Or put in another way, it lay in our inability to use aircraft to fight the U-boats in those waters where the U-boats were attacking our convoys because they were beyond the range of the existing maritime aircraft. As, for reasons already sufficiently discussed, the deficiency could not be made good by ship-borne aircraft in time to avert disaster there was one, and only one, practicable solution. This was to convert land-based aircraft, whether already converted for maritime work or not, into maritime aircraft capable of operating at ranges, not only exceeding those of which existing maritime aircraft were capable, but ranges which would ensure that from the bases available these aircraft could attack U-boats wherever they threatened our Atlantic convoys.

Thus conversion to the maritime role was one thing, conversion to the V.L.R. role another. Conversion to the maritime role is discussed at some length by Group Captain Whiteley, though not by me. I took it that the reader, in the light of my observation at the start of my paper, namely, that shore-based aircraft designed specifically for maritime duties were not brought into service until after World War II, would regard the necessity for such conversion during World War II as implicit. I discussed conversion to the V.L.R. role because there has been, and manifestly still is, considerable confusion of thought over the subject, and because conversion to the V.L.R. role was crucial to the solution of the V.L.R. problem of the Battle of the Atlantic, *whether aircraft had been converted already to the maritime role or not*. Thus, when Sir John Slessor, after discussing the performance of Liberators Mk. IIIA, modified for V.L.R. work (this being, in the Summer of 1942, the only type of aircraft capable of conversion to V.L.R. work that was made available), followed this by stating that "as many as the Americans let us have went straight into Coastal Command via the modification centre at Prestwick," he conveyed, however unwittingly, the impression that, as soon as Liberators Mk. IIIA began to be received from the Americans in the Summer of 1942 (32 had been delivered by the end of September), they were issued to Coastal Command via the modification centre at Prestwick *modified or V.L.R. work*. They were not. "It was not until 'December, 1942,' that 'conversion of more Liberators for very long range convoy work was commenced'" (I have added italics). This is a fact, the crucial fact at that particular phase of the Battle of the Atlantic. Consequently, as I also pointed out, although "for over a year the Admiralty and the Commander-in-Chief, Coastal Command, had been pressing urgently for V.L.R. aircraft . . . critical months slipped by after Liberators Mk. IIIA began to be received from the U.S. Authorities before their conversion"—to V.L.R. convoy work, and this is implicit in the context—"was put in hand."

As Group Captain Whiteley, who was intimately concerned with the conversion of Liberators for the R.A.F. has expressed incredulity about the dating of this V.L.R. conversion I needs must adduce further facts from a variety of independent sources to substantiate this already well attested stubborn fact.

When the C.-in-C., Western Approaches, attended a meeting at the Admiralty on 25th November, 1942, he "reiterated the urgent demands of his predecessor for 'very long range' aircraft" and "was happy to learn" that three squadrons of V.L.R. Liberators were to be ready by March, 1943. (Chalmers, Rear-Admiral W. S., *Max Horton and the Western Approaches*, p. 162, quoting the Commander-in-Chief.)

When Sir Stafford Cripps visited the C.-in-C., Western Approaches, on 9th January 1943, Admiral Horton recorded that Sir Stafford "said that the V.L.R. aircraft was the true solution to the U-boat menace and . . . referred to his action in arranging for 39 of such aircraft to be made available for the Western Approaches command very shortly. . . ." Now Sir Stafford had been Minister of Aircraft Production for barely two months, *i.e.*, since November, 1942, and in that capacity was a member of the Cabinet Anti-U-boat Sub-Committee, established as recently as November, 1942. He claimed, as it happens erroneously, while conversing with Admiral Horton, "that V.L.R. had never been asked for before he suggested it," *i.e.*, at the earliest in November, 1942, which supports the statement that V.L.R. conversion was not begun until December, 1942. However, the

proof of the pudding, they say, is in the eating. What sort of Liberator pudding had Coastal Command got in 1942 and early 1943?

*Royal Air Force 1939-1945*, Vol. II (p. 105 and note 1, p. 105), states that in August, 1942, there were "only five V.L.R. aircraft in the whole of Coastal Command"—"five Liberator Is (operational range 2,400 miles) of No. 120 Squadron." It continues (my italics) "Long range aircraft, as distinct from V.L.R., at this time included the remainder of No. 120 Squadron's Liberators (Mk. II, 1,800 miles, Mk. III, 1,680 miles)."

On 15th February, 1943, by which time not less than 43 Liberators Mk. IIIA had been delivered according to Sir John Slessor (his closing date is December, 1942), *Royal Air Force 1939-1945* (p. 116 and pp. 378-379, Order of Battle, Coastal Command, 15th February, 1943), informs the reader there was still *one V.L.R. squadron only*, No. 120 Squadron equipped with Liberators, notwithstanding that on that date there were two other squadrons, No. 86 and No. 224, equipped with Liberators. As No. 120 Squadron was the only squadron with V.L.R. aircraft it is manifestly incorrect to suppose that as many Liberators Mk. IIIA as had been supplied to Coastal Command had been modified for V.L.R. work—a supposition refuted not only by these facts but also by those obtaining in August, 1942.

Perhaps I should add that although *Royal Air Force 1939-1945* is not an official history the authors state that they "have been given full access to official documents," and that, although they further state that "they alone are responsible for the statements made and the views expressed," the student is entitled to regard the facts they include as official, *i.e.*, authentic.

It was no doubt a slip of the pen which led Group Captain Whiteley to write: "The aircraft principally concerned were V.L.R. Liberators. I was directly concerned with the supply and modification of these aircraft for the R.A.F. from July, 1941, until [1st] December, 1942," *i.e.*, this reads as though he was dealing with the modification of Liberators for V.L.R. work from July, 1941, to December, 1942, and that the modification of Liberators for maritime duties between those dates included modification for V.L.R. work. It is unfortunate that this is the impression gained for, unlike the Liberators Mk. I, the Liberators Mk. IIIA supplied in 1942 required additional modification for V.L.R. work which, as I hope I have now established beyond doubt, was not initiated until November and put in hand until December, 1942. In short, until then Liberators Mk. IIIA were converted to the maritime *non-V.L.R.* role.

2. When I stated that conversion to V.L.R. work was an Air Ministry responsibility my aim was to point out as succinctly as possible that the Admiralty was pressing for V.L.R. aircraft because the provision of the requisite aircraft to Coastal Command—like the provision and training of its aircrews—was an Air Ministry, not an Admiralty responsibility. Consequently the conversion of Coastal Command aircraft for V.L.R. work was an Air Ministry not an Admiralty responsibility. How the conversion was done, *i.e.*, by the M.A.P., etc., is a different matter and I did not allude to it as it is not pertinent to the point at issue.

3. Towards the end of his letter (this JOURNAL, August, 1956, p. 454) Group Captain Whiteley quotes from my paper a passage of three lines which, as the context from which they are taken states twice, specifically relates to Liberators Mk. IIIA and to no other make or mark of aircraft. Nevertheless, on the strength of taking these three lines out of their context Group Captain Whiteley has written an apologia of the Liberator Mk. II policy, which, as the fact that I was discussing Liberators Mk. IIIA is omitted, gives the appearance of refuting the validity of my conclusions.

The capabilities and disposal of the Liberators Mk. II having been adequately explained by Sir John Slessor I did not introduce the subject into my paper. I mention it now only to correct the impression that may have been caused by Group Captain Whiteley's apologia that I had confused my facts and in consequence had drawn false conclusions.

4. 'Student' did not "advance the theory that British Lancaster bombers could also have been converted to V.L.R. maritime aircraft," he clearly stated that the suggestion came from the Commander-in-Chief, Coastal Command, in early 1942. There may well have been only 18 Lancasters operational on 1st January of that year; in March a year later, when the V.L.R. problem was still acute, there were as many squadrons operational.

5. That conversion of the Lancaster to maritime V.L.R. duties might not have presented insuperable technical difficulties, even in 1942, is suggested by the exploit recounted by the Commander-in-Chief, Coastal Command, of two Lancasters of the detachment of No. 44 Squadron lent by Bomber Command to his which, in the Summer of 1942, "together with two of our own Liberators, contacted at extreme range a convoy homeward bound from Gibraltar, after it had been located by Focke-Wulf aircraft and attacked by a pack of U-boats" beyond "13 degrees west." (Joubert de la Ferté, Air Chief Marshal Sir Philip, *The Fated Sky*, 1952, p. 220.)

6. Finally, I must correct the impression that still appears to be held that there ever was at any time any question of "allocating large numbers of V.L.R. Liberators"—or of any other type capable of conversion to V.L.R. work—to Coastal Command. Therein lies a great part of the fascination of this crucial problem. There were two reasons why large numbers of V.L.R. aircraft were neither demanded nor provided. First and foremost was the fact that the number of convoys—irrespective of whether they were known to be threatened or not—in the Atlantic 'air gaps' at any given time was small and was predictable, *i.e.*, the average number of ocean convoys at sea in the North Atlantic on any given day was about 12, consequently not more than three or four could have been in an 'air gap' at any one time. (Morison, S. E., *The Battle of the Atlantic*, 1948, p. 405.) Secondly, large numbers of Liberators were never available for V.L.R. conversion. What was critical (in view of the rejection of the Lancaster proposal) was that of the small number of Liberators obtained from the Americans a large proportion should have been converted to V.L.R. work on receipt—it is no use throwing a rope to a drowning man when you know it is too short to reach him.

I will clarify—give a quantitative indication—of what I mean by small and large numbers of aircraft. In May, 1942, Bomber Command on one night raided Cologne with a force of 1,046 bombers; in August of that year, there were five V.L.R. aircraft on the operational strength of Coastal Command; in May, 1943, when the U-boats were defeated at sea, a total of about 40 V.L.R. aircraft were engaged in the Battle of the Atlantic, *i.e.*, less than the number of bombers lost in the one raid on Cologne of a year before cited above. Let me put the V.L.R. problem against a different background, that of British heavy bomber production; in August, 1942, there were five V.L.R. aircraft in Coastal Command, and by the end of that year, during which a total of 2,652 British heavy bombers had been supplied to the Metropolitan Air Force between March and December, there was one squadron of V.L.R. aircraft in Coastal Command; again the figure of about 40 V.L.R. aircraft in operation in May, 1943, should be contrasted with that of the 6,648 British heavy bombers supplied to the Metropolitan Air Force in that year (Postan, M. M., *British War Production*, 1952, p. 317). In each instance I would call the figures of V.L.R. aircraft 'small,' the figures of bombers 'large.'

D. W. WATERS,

Lieutenant-Commander (Retd.).

27th September, 1956.

*Postscript.* The decisive impetus for initiating action to modify Liberators Mk. IIIA for V.L.R. work, it is of more than passing interest to remark, can be fairly ascribed to three civilians: the Rt. Hon. S. M. Bruce, the Australian Representative, who urged the War Cabinet in June and July, 1942, to establish a small high-level committee to assess the relative importance of the war at sea and the air offensive against Germany;<sup>8</sup> Professor

<sup>8</sup> Richards, D., and Saunders, H. St. G., *Royal Air Force, 1939-1945*, Vol. II, pp. 106-107.

P. M. S. Blackett, a member of the War Cabinet Anti-U-boat Sub-Committee established in November, 1942, in response to Mr. Bruce's urgings, who assessed quantitatively the relative value of bombers used respectively as V.L.R. convoy escorts and as bombers over Germany;<sup>9</sup> and Sir Stafford Cripps, the newly appointed Minister of Aircraft Production, who as a member of this same committee immediately grasped the vital significance of V.L.R. aircraft.<sup>10</sup>

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<sup>9</sup> Blackett, Professor P. M. S., "Operational Research," the *Advancement of Science*, Vol. V, No. 17, April, 1948, pp. 26-38.

Blackett, Professor P. M. S., "Operational Research, Recollections of Problems Studied," *Brassey's Annual*, 1953, pp. 88-106.

<sup>10</sup> Chalmers, Rear-Admiral W. S., *Max Horton and the Western Approaches*, 1954, pp. 162 and 175-176.

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## **GENERAL SERVICE NOTES**

### **NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION**

**C.-IN-C., ALLIED FORCES, CENTRAL EUROPE**

General Jean-Etienne Valluy became Commander-in-Chief, Allied Forces, Central Europe, on 1st October in succession to Marshal Alphonse Juin.

### **SOUTH-EAST ASIA TREATY ORGANIZATION**

**HEADQUARTERS, PERMANENT MILITARY PLANNING GROUP**

It was announced on 6th September that Bangkok had been chosen by the military advisers of S.E.A.T.O. as the site for the headquarters of the Permanent Military Planning Group. The Siamese capital, where other S.E.A.T.O. agencies including the Secretariat are situated, was chosen, for reasons of economy and efficiency.

### **CASSINO WAR MEMORIAL**

A Memorial in Cassino war cemetery commemorating 4,068 officers and men of the British Commonwealth who fell during the campaigns in Sicily and Italy and have no known graves, was unveiled by Field-Marshal The Earl Alexander of Tunis on 30th September.

The Memorial consists of a formal garden with an ornamental pool in the centre, from each side of which rise marble pillars on which the names are recorded. Two stairways lead from the main road up to the entrance, and on their walls are inscribed, in English and Italian, words of homage to the fallen.

Service chaplains of all denominations offered prayers, and then the guests, led by Lord Alexander, laid wreaths. Among those present were Signor Campilli, an Italian Cabinet Minister representing Signor Segni, who was ill; the diplomatic missions of the British Commonwealth accredited to Italy; General Anders, the Commander-in-Chief of the Polish troops in Italy during the war; and members of the families of those who fell in these campaigns.

### **GREAT BRITAIN**

#### **ATOMIC TESTS**

The fourth series of atomic tests under the direction of Sir William Penney, known as Operation "Buffalo," opened on 27th September when an atomic device was successfully exploded from a tower at Maralinga testing ground in Australia, after a wait of 16 days for suitable weather.

Some 1,500 scientists, Service men, observers, and journalists saw the explosion. The 250 Service men from the United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia were closest to it, about six miles from the tower; and on 28th September they moved forward in protective clothing to see what had happened to purposely exposed equipment. Two Canberra bombers, one of which entered the cloud, flew over the site within 10 minutes of the explosion.

A second, smaller, atomic device was successfully exploded on the ground on 4th October; and a third, also smaller than the first, was exploded in the air on 11th October, after being dropped by a R.A.F. Valiant. These were Britain's first ground and air explosions of atomic devices.

A fourth explosion, again from a tower, took place at night on 21st October.

#### **COURSES IN GUIDED WEAPONS**

The Army's Royal Military College of Science at Shrivenham, Wilts, has been giving courses in guided weapons to serving officers for the past few years. The courses, which are at post-graduate level, are of some nine months duration and have been attended by many officers drawn from the Royal Navy, the Army, the Royal Air Force, and the

Canadian Services. The course provides officers with a good general knowledge of the whole subject of guided weapons, together with sufficient specialization to enable the officer subsequently to be employed on guided weapons development work.

The course consists of a series of lectures on the basic principles and possible applications of all aspects of guided weapons, together with a comprehensive laboratory course of experimental work. It is supplemented in the latter by a series of visits to important research, development, and production centres, and by a series of specialist visiting lecturers. It concludes with a number of exercises in which the students have the opportunity of integrating their recent technical learning with their earlier military knowledge. In some of these exercises they develop possible outline solutions to potential weapon system requirements.

A second and much shorter guided weapons course has proved very successful in helping contractors working on Ministry of Supply developments in this field. This five-week course, the "Guided Weapons Course for Industry," provides an introduction to the main principles for young engineering graduates employed by industrial firms and Ministry of Supply establishments working in this field. This course has enabled a considerable number of young engineers to see very clearly where their work fits into one or more of the various guided weapons systems under development.

### AUSTRALIA

#### NEW SECRETARY TO THE DEFENCE DEPARTMENT

Mr. E. W. Hicks became Secretary to the Defence Department in October, succeeding Sir Frederick Sheddon, who had held this appointment since 1937.

### MALTA

#### DEFENCE EXERCISE, 1956

Exercise "Maltex," the annual inter-Allied, joint Service, defence of Malta exercise took place in July. Its purpose was to test not only the joint defences of Malta itself but also, to a limited extent, the air defence sectors to the west and north of the island.

The exercise consisted of four phases: deployment of the forces involved; the working up phase; an active defence phase; and, on the last night of the exercise, a simulated atomic bomb attack to test Malta's Civil Defence.

The forces involved included surface ships, submarines, and aircraft of the Mediterranean Fleet; army units stationed in Malta; Royal Air Force bomber, fighter, and maritime aircraft; French and Italian fighter aircraft; and carrier-borne aircraft and units of the U.S. Sixth Fleet. The Malta Civil Defence Corps and the Malta Police also took part.

### FOREIGN

#### RUSSIA

##### ESTIMATES OF STRENGTH OF SOVIET ARMED FORCES

The following is a brief summary of an appreciation of the strength of the Soviet armed forces which was published by S.H.A.P.E. on 5th July.

*Navy.*—The Soviet Union had about 450 submarines in service, half of them large or medium ocean-going types. The present naval construction programme emphasized the continued production of large ocean-going submarines.

*Army.*—While the numerical strength of the Soviet Army had remained fairly constant at 175 divisions, the mobility and fire power of these divisions had been increased by improved weapons and equipment, 65 divisions of the present establishment being mechanized and equipped with tanks.

The U.S.S.R., Eastern Germany, and other East European Communist States had about 4,500,000 men in the ground forces, about 3,000,000 of which were in the Soviet Army.

The Soviet Union had 22 divisions in Eastern Germany—the majority being armoured divisions—and there were 60 more Soviet divisions in east European satellite countries and in western Russia. The number of satellite divisions was about 80.

These figures did not take into account the latest reductions in strength announced by the Soviet Government. Reports said, however, that "as yet there has been no evidence that this cut has been actually carried out."

*Air Forces.*—The strength of the Soviet air forces had remained at about 20,000 aircraft, but the introduction of jet planes had increased the potential. In 1956, all Soviet first line bombers and fighters were jets, and heavy jet and turbo-prop bombers had also been supplied to operational units. The number of airfields in Eastern Europe which could accommodate jet fighters had been almost trebled.

The satellite air forces had been improved and had a strength of over 2,500 planes, about half of which were jet fighters.

### UNITED STATES

#### WAR MEMORIAL

A Memorial Chapel in the United States military cemetery at Madingley, near Cambridge, commemorating 3,811 dead and 5,125 United States sailors, soldiers, and airmen missing in action or lost in surrounding waters of the United Kingdom during the 1939-45 War, was dedicated on 17th July.

Nearly 2,000 Service men and civilians attended, and among those present were the U.S. Ambassador, Mr. Winthrop Aldrich; Mr. Selwyn Lloyd, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; Admiral W. F. Boone, U.S. Navy; Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir Arthur T. Harris; Major-General W. J. Donovan, U.S. Army; Air Chief Marshal Sir Francis Fogarty; and General Carl Spaatz, U.S. Air Force.

Messages from President Eisenhower and from The Queen were read respectively by Major-General Donovan and Sir Francis Fogarty.

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## NAVY NOTES

### GREAT BRITAIN

#### H.M. THE QUEEN

**COLOUR FOR FLEET AIR ARM.**—The Queen, accompanied by the Duke of Edinburgh, visited Lee-on-Solent on 30th July to present her Colour for the first time to the Royal Naval Barracks there "in recognition of the size and status of the Fleet Air Arm." Naval air stations in all parts of Britain were represented at the ceremony. A fly-past of over 100 naval aircraft was led by the Flag Officer Flying Training, Rear-Admiral C. L. G. Evans, piloting a Vampire jet fighter.

**WESTERN ISLES CRUISE.**—The Queen and the Duke of Edinburgh embarked in the Royal Yacht *Britannia* at Barrow-in-Furness on 11th August for a cruise in the Western Isles, and disembarked at Rosyth on 21st August to proceed to Balmoral. The Royal Yacht left Portsmouth on 28th August for Mombasa, to be used by Princess Margaret during her East African tour. Subsequently the Duke of Edinburgh was to join the *Britannia* and sail for Australia for the Olympic Games.

**AIDES-DE-CAMP.**—The following officers have been appointed Naval Aides-de-Camp to The Queen from 7th July, 1956, in succession to the officers stated :—Captain V. C. Begg, D.S.O., D.S.C., in succession to Captain E. P. Hinton, D.S.O., M.V.O.; Captain (Commodore First Class) G. A. F. Norfolk, D.S.O., in succession to Captain J. A. W. Tothill, D.S.C.; Captain G. H. Peters, D.S.C., in succession to Rear-Admiral P. D. H. R. Pelly, D.S.O.; Captain (Commodore Second Class) R. C. Medley, D.S.O., O.B.E., in succession to Rear-Admiral T. V. Briggs, O.B.E.; Captain A. H. Wallis, C.B.E., in succession to Captain A. C. A. C. Duckworth, D.S.O., D.S.C.; Captain (Commodore Second Class) K. St. B. Collins, O.B.E., D.S.C., in succession to Captain J. Holmes; Captain P. L. Saumarez, D.S.C., in succession to Captain R. G. Tosswill, O.B.E.

The following officers have been appointed Naval Aides-de-Camp to The Queen from 17th July, 1956, in succession to the officers stated :—Captain J. E. Best, in succession to Captain C. Gatey, C.B.E.; Captain L. F. Ingram, in succession to Captain C. W. Jones, C.B.E.

Instructor Captain P. Bracelin, C.B.E., has been appointed a Naval Aide-de-Camp to The Queen from 6th August, 1956, in succession to Instructor Captain H. S. Gracie, C.B.

Captain K. R. Buckley has been appointed a Naval Aide-de-Camp to The Queen from 31st August, in succession to Captain L. S. Bennett, C.B.E., D.S.C.

**HONORARY NURSING SISTER.**—Miss B. Nockolds, R.R.C., Matron-in-Chief, Queen Alexandra's Royal Naval Nursing Service, has been appointed an Honorary Nursing Sister to The Queen, in succession to Miss K. V. Chapman, C.B.E., R.R.C.

**VISIT OF KING FEISAL.**—For his State Visit to the United Kingdom, King Feisal of Iraq embarked at Ostend on 16th July in H.M.S. *Defender*. The destroyers *Carron* and *Cavendish* and the frigate *Vigilant* acted as escort during the passage to Dover.

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#### BOARD OF ADMIRALTY

It was announced from 10 Downing Street on 2nd September that Lord Cilcennin, First Lord of the Admiralty, had tendered his resignation and that The Queen had accepted it. Her Majesty had approved the appointment of Lord Hailsham, Q.C., as First Lord of the Admiralty in succession to Lord Cilcennin, and had also approved that Lord Hailsham be sworn of Her Majesty's Privy Council.

#### FLAG APPOINTMENTS

**ROYAL NAVAL COLLEGE.**—Vice-Admiral G. Barnard, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O., to be President, Royal Naval College, Greenwich, in succession to Admiral Sir William G. Andrewes, K.B.E., C.B., D.S.O. (December, 1956).

**RESERVE FLEET.**—Vice-Admiral R. G. Onslow, C.B., D.S.O., to be Flag Officer Commanding Reserve Fleet, in succession to Vice-Admiral Sir Peter G. L. Cazalet, K.B.E., C.B., D.S.O., D.S.C. (November, 1956).

**DEPUTY SACLANT.**—Vice-Admiral Sir John W. M. Eaton, K.B.E., C.B., D.S.O., D.S.C., who has combined his N.A.T.O. appointment of Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic (Deputy SACLANT), with that of his national appointment of Commander-in-Chief, America and West Indies Station, is to assume full-time duty as Deputy SACLANT at the Headquarters of the Supreme Commander at Norfolk, Virginia (date to be announced later). When Admiral Eaton takes over his full-time duty as Deputy SACLANT, his duties as Commander-in-Chief, America and West Indies Station, will be assumed by a Commodore who will be afloat in one of the ships of the America and West Indies Squadron.

**GEOGRAPHICAL YEAR.**—Vice-Admiral Sir Archibald Day, K.B.E., C.B., D.S.O., who was Hydrographer of the Navy from 1950 to 1955, has been appointed co-ordinator of operations for the International Geophysical Year, 1957-58. The appointment has been made by the Royal Society "in view of the diversity of the programme both geographically and scientifically . . . to ensure that the year achieves its fullest promise."

**ROSYTH DOCKYARD.**—Rear-Admiral P. D. H. R. Pelly, D.S.O., to be Admiral Superintendent, H.M. Dockyard, Rosyth, in succession to Rear-Admiral P. Skelton, C.B. (September, 1956).

**INTERVIEW BOARDS.**—Rear-Admiral M. S. Townsend, D.S.O., O.B.E., D.S.C., to be Flag Officer Admiralty Interview Boards and President First Admiralty Interview Board, in succession to Rear-Admiral C. T. Jellicoe, C.B., D.S.O., D.S.C. (July, 1956).

**HOME FLEET.**—Rear-Admiral T. V. Briggs, O.B.E., to be Chief of Staff to Commander-in-Chief, Home Fleet, in succession to Commodore (First Class) W. A. Adair, D.S.O., O.B.E. (July, 1956).

#### RETIREMENTS AND PROMOTIONS

Vice-Admiral Sir Ian M. R. Campbell, K.B.E., C.B., D.S.O., was placed on the Retired List to date 12th July, 1956.

Rear-Admiral L. F. Durnford-Slater, C.B., was promoted to Vice-Admiral in H.M. Fleet to date 12th July, 1956.

Rear-Admiral H. P. Currey, C.B., O.B.E., was placed on the Retired List to date 25th July, 1956.

Rear-Admiral C. T. Jellicoe, C.B., D.S.O., D.S.C., was placed on the Retired List to date 7th August, 1956.

Rear-Admiral M. L. Power, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O., was promoted to Vice-Admiral in H.M. Fleet to date 7th September, 1956.

#### THE SUEZ CANAL

Following the announcement by President Nasser of his decision to nationalize the Suez Canal Company on 26th July, operational additions were made to the Mediterranean Fleet of one aircraft carrier, H.M.S. *Bulwark*, which left Portsmouth on 6th August, and a number of landing craft, which were brought forward from reserve. In addition, two headquarters ships and a few minesweepers were also sent out from the United Kingdom.

Moves inside the Mediterranean included the cancellation of a programme of visits in the eastern Mediterranean area by the cruiser *Jamaica* and the fast minelayer *Manxman*, which were ordered to remain in that area for the time being in general company with the small ships operating near Cyprus on anti-smuggling duties. Outside the Mediterranean the cruiser *Kenya* and the "Daring" class ship *Diana*, which were on their way to Malta from the Cape and the Far East, respectively, were ordered to remain in the Red Sea area in the vicinity of Aden for the time being.

In addition, the Navy has provided two non-operational aircraft carriers, the *Theseus* and *Ocean*, which normally constitute a seagoing Training Squadron, and the trials cruiser *Cumberland*, to augment the normal trooping service.

On 23rd August, it was announced that in order to provide additional manpower to meet the commitments arising, the Board of Admiralty had found it necessary to exercise its powers to retain in service Regular ratings and Royal Marine other ranks on special service (7-year) engagements, the active service portion of which ended on or after 1st September, 1956.

#### REDUCED SHORE SUPPORT

Reductions in the shore establishments which support the Royal Navy were announced by the First Lord of the Admiralty, Lord Cilcennin, in the House of Lords on 1st August. A saving of 5,000 posts ashore held by uniformed personnel will result; this will do a great deal to protect the seagoing Fleet against the planned decline in Vote A (numbers) of the Navy Estimates. A detailed list of reductions circulated by the First Lord included the following:—

*Bases.*—Scapa Flow, Orkneys, to be closed; Invergordon to be reduced to care and maintenance.

*Training Establishments.*—Gunnery training to be concentrated in H.M.S. *Excellent*, Portsmouth, and H.M.S. *Cambridge*, Wembury. Gunnery schools in Chatham and Devonport Barracks, and A.A. Range at Barton's Point, Sheerness, to be closed. Chatham and Devonport Signal Schools to be absorbed by H.M.S. *Mercury*, in Hampshire. H.M.S. *Ceres*, Supply and Secretariat School, Wetherby, Yorks, to be housed in the R.N. Barracks, Chatham. H.M.S. *Raleigh*, Training Establishment for Engineering Mechanics, Devonport, to be housed in Devonport Barracks. H.M.S. *Phoenix*, Portsmouth, Damage Control and Anti-Gas School, to be greatly reduced. H.M.S. *Alaunia*, Mechanical Training Establishment, Devonport, to be decommissioned. H.M.S. *Defiance*, Torpedo, A/S, and Electrical School, Devonport, to be closed.

*Air Stations.*—Anthorn, Cumberland, to be closed. Fearn, near Invergordon, to be disposed of.

*Storage and Production Establishments.*—R.N. Armament Depot, Woolwich, to be closed down. R.N. Cordite Factory, Holton Heath, to be reduced to care and maintenance. Naval Ordnance Proofing Range at Kingsclere, near Newbury, Berks., to be disposed of.

Supplementing the above list, it was announced on 10th August that it had been decided to base on their home ports the three ships of the Third Training Squadron operating from Londonderry. This will enable part of the supply and maintenance organization there to be closed.

#### EXERCISES AND CRUISES

**N.A.T.O. MINESWEEPING EXERCISE.**—On 14th September, over 50 warships from the Belgian, British, French, Netherlands, Norwegian, and United States Navies began a month's minesweeping operations. Dummy minefields were laid in Belgian, French, and Netherlands waters as well as in the open sea routes, and the minesweepers endeavoured to maintain the flow of shipping against attacks by aircraft and fast patrol boats. An amphibious assault was mounted by Netherlands Marines, and the minesweepers of six nations worked together in sweeping the landing craft and assault forces up to the beaches. The exercise was jointly planned by Netherlands and British Commanders of the N.A.T.O. Channel Command, and conducted by the Netherlands Admiral Commanding the Benelux Area of that Command.

**MEDITERRANEAN.**—Day and night patrols have continued off the coast of Cyprus to prevent the smuggling of arms to the Eoka terrorists. Some of the patrolling ships steam considerable distances in the course of this duty. One destroyer recently steamed 4,432 miles in a month.

**FAR EAST.**—While on patrol in Malayan waters on 23rd August, H.M.S. *Newfoundland* carried out a bombardment for one hour and 40 minutes in support of operations against Communist bandits. Four targets in the Kota Tinggi district of Johore were attacked with 6-in. shells, 101 rounds being fired. Aerial reports indicated that the targets were well straddled.

**AMERICA AND WEST INDIES.**—Ships of the 5th Frigate Squadron, the *Wakeful*, *Roebuck*, and *Whirlwind*, returned to the United Kingdom on 11th July after taking part with U.S. Forces in N.A.T.O. exercises in the western Atlantic. On returning to their home ports the ships paid off, the *Wakeful* and *Whirlwind* to recommission for service in the Home/Mediterranean cycle, and the *Roebuck* to reduce to reserve. H.M.S. *Torquay*, new anti-submarine frigate, is joining the Squadron for the next commission.

#### PERSONNEL

**R.N. ENGINEERING COLLEGE.**—The foundation stone of the new officers' mess at the R.N. Engineering College at Manadon, Plymouth, was laid by the First Sea Lord, Admiral Lord Mountbatten, on 13th July. It will ultimately accommodate over 450 officers on the staff and under training, and will enable the old Engineering College at Keyham, three-and-a-half miles away, to be evacuated.

**BOULOGNE WITHDRAWAL COMMEMORATED.**—A flag of the 20th Guards Brigade (2nd Battalion Irish Guards and 2nd Battalion Welsh Guards) was presented to the R.N. Barracks, Portsmouth, on 13th July in recognition of the Navy's part in evacuating some 4,400 men from Boulogne on 23rd May, 1940, three days before the evacuation from Dunkirk began. The flag was presented by Major-General W. A. F. L. Fox-Pitt, who, as a Brigadier, commanded the 20th Guards Brigade at the time, and was received at Divisions by Commodore J. Y. Thompson.

**H.M.S. Cambridge.**—A century to the day after the 78-gun wooden ship *Cambridge* became the first official naval gunnery school at Devonport, a shore establishment with the same name and functions was formally commissioned on 9th August at Wembury, near Plymouth.

**UNIFORM CHANGE.**—It was announced in July that junior ratings, below the rank of petty officer, of the Supply and Secretariat, Sick Berth, and Coder Branches are to adopt the uniform officially known as Class II and unofficially as "square rig" (bell-bottomed trousers, jumper with collar, and round, flat, white-topped cap) in place of the present Class III or "fore and aft rig" (jacket with black buttons and trousers, and peaked cap with red badge).

#### MATERIEL

**GUIDED WEAPONS SHIP.**—H.M.S. *Girdle Ness*, the Royal Navy's first guided weapons trials ship, commissioned at Devonport on 24th July. She was built in Canada as a landing craft maintenance ship. In October, 1953, she was taken in hand at Devonport Dockyard and has since been completely stripped and reconstructed for her new role, with a complement of 80 officers and 370 men. Additional accommodation is available for members of the Royal Naval Scientific Service, the Ministry of Supply, and firms who have made equipment associated with the trials.

**ACCEPTANCES.**—Two more ships of the "Blackwood" class of anti-submarine frigates were provisionally accepted from their builders in July, H.M.S. *Keppel* on the 6th and H.M.S. *Pellew* on the 26th. Also during the month the name ship of the "Whitby" class of anti-submarine frigates was provisionally accepted, on the 19th. H.M.S. *Whitby* is the second of this class to enter service, the first being H.M.S. *Torquay* in May.

**PADDLE TUGS.**—The second of the seven new diesel-electric paddle tugs ordered by the Admiralty, H.M. tug *Dexterous*, was launched on 21st August at Scotstoun, Glasgow, following the launch of the first, H.M. tug *Director*, in June. Though primarily for harbour service, these tugs conform to Lloyd's Class 100 A1 for towing and salvage duties. Paddle-driven tugs are found by experience to be the most suitable for moving aircraft carriers and other large warships in the confined waters of dockyard basins.

## ROYAL NAVAL VOLUNTEER RESERVE

## EXERCISE "WAVEX IV"

Coastal minesweepers from each of the 12 divisions of the R.N.V.R. and some 700 Reserve officers and ratings, took part in "Wavex IV," the largest Naval Reserve exercise of the year, which began at Invergordon on 23rd July. Except for three minesweepers manned by Regular R.N. personnel, all of the vessels participating, involving five days' training in minesweeping, had their ships' companies provided entirely by the R.N.V.R., which also provided the staff for their maintenance. The Women's R.N.V.R. helped to operate a shore wireless and signal station at Invergordon.

## ROYAL MARINES

APPOINTMENT.—Colonel J. B. Grant, O.B.E., has been appointed Brigadier and will command the new Joint Services Amphibious Warfare Centre at Poole.

EXERCISE IN NORWAY.—On 5th July a force of 280 all ranks of the Royal Marines embarked at Plymouth in H.M. Ships *Delight*, *Comet*, and *St. Kitts* to take part in an exercise, "Midnight Sun," organized jointly by Britain and Norway to test Norwegian defences and to train the Royal Marines in amphibious landings in mountainous country, opposed by units of the Norwegian Army and Home Guard. Included in the force were nearly 60 members of the R.M. Forces Volunteer Reserve, the first time that this Reserve had taken part in an operation of this kind.

DETACHMENTS IN FRIGATES.—H.M.S. *Loch Killisport* sailed from Portsmouth on 15th August for service on the East Indies Station and in the Persian Gulf with a detachment of approximately 20 Royal Marines as part complement, the first of three frigates to be so manned. R.M. detachments are henceforth to be embarked in certain frigates in lieu of seamen.

COMMANDO MOVES.—Owing to the Suez Canal crisis the 3rd Commando Brigade, R.M., has been relieved of its duties in Cyprus and moved back to Malta. 42 Commando, R.M., left England on 23rd August and has rejoined the remainder of the Commando Brigade in Malta.

## CANADA

H.M.C.S. *Venture*

A telegram from Victoria, British Columbia, published on 18th August, said that 97 cadets had become midshipmen of the Royal Canadian Navy in the first graduation from H.M.C.S. *Venture*, the new training school.

## AUSTRALIA

H.M.S. *Britannia*.—The Queen has approved the inclusion of one officer and four ratings of the Royal Australian Navy in the ship's company of the Royal Yacht *Britannia* during the Duke of Edinburgh's tour of Australia, New Zealand, and Antarctica. Two ratings of the Royal New Zealand Navy will also be included.

GRAVITY SURVEY.—Details were published in *The Times* on 5th September of a scientific cruise to help to determine the exact shape of the earth. The cruise of 7,500 miles was made by H.M. submarine *Telemachus*, Lieutenant-Commander J. E. Moore, R.N., which was lent by the Royal Navy to Australia for this ocean gravity survey. The project was sponsored by the Office of Naval Research of the United States Navy, and was planned jointly by Australian, New Zealand, and American scientists.

## NEW ZEALAND

H.M.S. *Royalist* HANDED OVER.—The cruiser *Royalist*, acquired by the New Zealand Government, was officially handed over by the First Lord of the Admiralty, Lord Cilecennin, to the Prime Minister of New Zealand, the Right Hon. S. G. Holland, at a ceremony at Devonport on 9th July.

**H.M.N.Z.S. *Endeavour* COMMISSIONED.**—The former Falkland Islands Dependencies survey ship *John Biscoe*, which had been bought by the New Zealand Government for £20,000 and refitted at the Thornycroft shipyard, Southampton, was commissioned there on 15th August and renamed H.M.N.Z.S. *Endeavour*.

### SOUTH AFRICA

**SIMONSTOWN DOCKYARD**—A Pretoria telegram on 2nd September announced that Simonstown Dockyard is to be handed over to the Union Government on 2nd April, 1957. Ships of the Royal Navy and the South African Navy will take part in the ceremony.

**FRIGATE *Vrystaat*.**—Four officers and 54 ratings of the South African Navy left for London in August to attend courses at establishments of the Royal Navy before taking delivery of the anti-submarine frigate *Vrystaat*, formerly the British destroyer *Wrangler*.

### CEYLON

#### FUTURE OF TRINCOMALEE

On the conclusion of the Conference of Commonwealth Prime Ministers in London on 6th July, it was announced that the Government of Ceylon had expressed their desire to take over the naval base at Trincomalee and the R.A.F. station at Katunayake. The United Kingdom Government, recognizing the right of the Government of Ceylon to do so under the Defence Agreement of 1947, had expressed willingness to agree to suitable arrangements for this purpose.

### FOREIGN

#### EGYPT

##### DESTROYERS FROM BRITAIN

The Egyptian destroyer *Al Quaher*, formerly H.M.S. *Myngs*, which was sold to Egypt in 1955 and has since been refitted by J. Samuel White and Co. at Cowes, left Portsmouth on 24th August for Alexandria. It had been arranged that the vessel should wait at Portsmouth until joined by the *El Fateh*, formerly H.M.S. *Zenith*, but the latter was detained at Southampton by engine trouble.

### GERMANY

#### RETURN OF MINESWEEPERS

Two coastal minesweepers which originally belonged to the former German Navy were handed over to the new Navy of the Federal Republic on 15th August by the American authorities at Bremerhaven. The vessels had been used by the United States Navy for clearing mines from ocean areas off the North German coast. This brought to 16 the number of ships handed over to the Federal Republic.

### ITALY

#### SUBMARINE SALVED

The hull of the small Italian submarine *Medusa*, which was torpedoed and sunk by an Austrian submarine in the Adriatic on 9th June, 1915, was raised to the surface on 20th August, eight miles off the mouth of the Piave.

### UNITED STATES

#### ATOMIC INFORMATION

The text of the amendment to the Anglo-American Agreement on the exchange of atomic information, signed in Washington on 13th June, was published on 6th September as a British White Paper (Cmd. 9847). It reveals that the United States is to give Britain information about her atomic submarines, the first of which, the *Nautilus*, has been in service since January, 1955.

## ARMY NOTES

### GREAT BRITAIN

#### H.M. THE QUEEN

The Queen presented Colours to the 1st Battalion, The Royal Berkshire Regiment (Princess Charlotte of Wales's) at Windsor Castle on 21st July.

The Duke of Edinburgh visited the Regimental Depot of The Wiltshire Regiment (Duke of Edinburgh's) at Devizes on 24th July.

The Princess Margaret visited the Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst, on 26th July, and took the Salute at The Sovereign's Parade.

The Princess Margaret visited the 1st Battalion, The Suffolk Regiment, of which Regiment Her Royal Highness is Colonel-in-Chief, at Roman Way Camp, Colchester, on 1st August.

The Princess Royal, Colonel-in-Chief, visited units of the Royal Corps of Signals at Catterick Camp on 1st August, and at Headquarters, Northern Ireland District, on 29th September.

The Princess Royal, Controller Commandant, Women's Royal Army Corps, inspected Territorial Army Units of the W.R.A.C. and later was present at a Church Parade at Ballykinler Camp on 30th September.

The Duchess of Kent, on behalf of The Queen, presented new Colours to the 4/5th Battalion, The Queen's Own Royal West Kent Regiment, of which Her Royal Highness is Colonel-in-Chief, at Tonbridge on 20th July.

The Duchess of Kent, on behalf of The Queen, presented new Colours to the 1st Battalion, The Royal Fusiliers (The City of London Regiment) at the Artillery Ground, E.C.1, on 28th July.

The Queen has been graciously pleased to approve the following appointments :—

TO BE AIDE-DE-CAMP (GENERAL) TO THE QUEEN.—General Sir E. C. Robert Mansergh, G.C.B., K.B.E., M.C. (20th July, 1956), vice General Sir Charles F. Keightley, G.C.B., K.B.E., D.S.O., tenure expired.

TO BE HONORARY PHYSICIANS TO THE QUEEN.—Major-General D. Bluett, O.B.E., M.B. (10th April, 1956), vice Major-General A. Sachs, C.B., C.B.E., M.D., M.R.C.P., retired; Colonel W. D. Hughes, C.B.E., M.D., F.R.C.P. (1st June, 1956), vice Colonel (Honorary Brigadier) J. T. Robinson, O.B.E., M.D., D.P.M., retired.

TO BE HONORARY SURGEON TO THE QUEEN.—Major-General P. F. Palmer, O.B.E., M.B. (6th August, 1956), vice Major-General R. Murphy, C.B., C.B.E., M.B., retired.

TO BE HONORARY NURSING SISTER TO THE QUEEN.—Brigadier Cecilie M. Johnson, R.R.C., Matron-in-Chief and Director of Army Nursing Services, Q.A.R.A.N.C. (23rd July, 1956), vice Brigadier Dame Helen S. Gillespie, D.B.E., R.R.C., retired.

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### APPOINTMENTS

WAR OFFICE.—Major-General G. E. Prior-Palmer, C.B., D.S.O., appointed President, Regular Commissions Board (November, 1956).

Major-General J. R. C. Hamilton, C.B.E., D.S.O., appointed Director of Military Operations (November, 1956).

Major-General R. C. M. King, C.B., D.S.O., O.B.E., appointed Director of Quartering (January, 1957).

UNITED KINGDOM.—Brigadier F. McI. Richardson, D.S.O., O.B.E., M.D., appointed a Director of Medical Services, with the temporary rank of Major-General (19th February, 1956).

Brigadier T. F. M. Woods, O.B.E., M.D., appointed a Deputy Director of Medical Services, with the temporary rank of Major-General (9th July, 1956).

Major-General G. D. G. Heyman, C.B., C.B.E., appointed Chief of Staff, Headquarters Southern Command (December, 1956).

Major-General J. H. N. Poett, C.B., D.S.O., appointed Commandant, Staff College, Camberley (January, 1957).

Brigadier (Temporary Major-General) R. W. Urquhart, D.S.O., appointed Commandant, Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst (January, 1957).

Major-General R. W. McLeod, C.B., C.B.E., appointed Chief Army Instructor, Imperial Defence College (January, 1957).

Major-General R. A. Bramwell-Davis, D.S.O., appointed G.O.C., Aldershot District (February, 1957).

GERMANY.—Major-General H. E. Pyman, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O., appointed G.O.C., 1 Corps, with the temporary rank of Lieut.-General (24th September, 1956). Substituted for the notification in the August, 1956, JOURNAL.

Brigadier D. S. S. O'Connor, C.B.E., appointed G.O.C., 6th Armoured Division, with the temporary rank of Major-General (January, 1957).

WEST AFRICA.—Brigadier A. G. V. Paley, C.B.E., D.S.O., A.D.C., appointed G.O.C. (Major-General), Gold Coast Military Forces, West Africa, with the temporary rank of Major-General (1st July, 1956).

Major-General C. D. Packard, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O., appointed Military Adviser, West Africa, with the temporary rank of Lieut.-General (1st August, 1956).

MIDDLE EAST LAND FORCES.—Colonel (Temporary Brigadier) D. A. Kendrew, C.B.E., D.S.O., appointed G.O.C., Cyprus District, with the temporary rank of Major-General (October, 1956).

FAR EAST LAND FORCES.—Colonel F. H. Brooke, C.B.E., D.S.O., appointed G.O.C., Federation Army, Malaya, with the temporary rank of Major-General (11th July, 1956). Substituted for the notification in the JOURNAL for August, 1956.

#### PROMOTIONS

##### *Lieut.-Generals.*—

Major-Generals to be temporary Lieut.-Generals:—C. D. Packard, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O. (1st August, 1956); H. E. Pyman, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O. (24th September, 1956).

*Major-Generals.*—Temporary Major-Generals, Brigadiers, or Colonels to be Major-Generals:—G. E. Butler, C.B.E., B.Sc., M.I.Mech.E. (26th May, 1956); W. S. Cole, C.B., C.B.E. (20th June, 1956); P. F. Palmer, O.B.E., M.B. (6th August, 1956); J. Huston, Q.H.S., M.B., F.R.C.S.(Edin.) (6th August, 1956).

Brigadiers or Colonels to be temporary Major-Generals:—F. McI. Richardson, D.S.O., O.B.E., M.D. (19th February, 1956); A. G. V. Paley, C.B., D.S.O., A.D.C. (1st July, 1956); T. F. M. Woods, O.B.E., M.D. (9th July, 1956); F. H. Brooke, C.B.E., D.S.O. (11th July, 1956); W. H. Hulton-Harrop, D.S.O. (1st September, 1956); R. F. Johnstone, C.B.E. (1st September, 1956).

#### RETIREMENTS

The following General Officers have retired:—Major-General R. Murphy, C.B., C.B.E., Q.H.S., M.B. (6th August, 1956); Major-General J. F. F. Oakeshott, C.B., C.B.E. (11th August, 1956); Major-General J. M. W. Martin, C.B., C.B.E. (2nd September, 1956); General Sir John F. M. Whiteley, G.B.E., K.C.B., M.C. (11th September, 1956); Major-General C. E. R. Firth, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O. (29th September, 1956); Major-General F. D. Moore, C.B., C.B.E. (30th September, 1956).

## REGULAR ARMY RECRUITING

The Regular Army recruiting statistics for August show that the total numbers of enlistments from civil life during the month were 2,532 men and 115 boys compared with 2,317 and 134 in June and 2,292 and 144 in July. The figures for re-enlistments were 2 from Short Service (June, nil; July, 1) and 318 from National Service (June, 394; July, 377).

## GUIDED MISSILE IN BRITAIN

It was reported in the Press on 18th September that the first 'Corporal,' a supersonic, ground-to-ground guided missile with a range of about 50 miles, had arrived in England from the United States.

Two teams of British officers and warrant officers from the Royal Artillery and the Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers have returned from the United States where they were trained in the maintenance, handling, and firing of the 'Corporal.' They will maintain the new weapon at the Guided Weapons Wing of the School of Artillery and at the R.E.M.E. training depot. Later, units will go for firing practice to the inter-Services guided weapons range which is being set up.

## WAR MEMORIALS

## THE WELCH REGIMENT

The Welch Regiment's new Memorial Chapel, which commemorates the dead of the 1914-18 and 1939-45 Wars and also the Korean campaign, was dedicated and consecrated at Llandaff Cathedral, Cardiff, on 22nd September by the Archbishop of Wales. The allied regiments in Canada and Australia gave the lectern and the prayer desk. The latter will contain the Scroll of Honour which was also consecrated.

ARMY GYMNASTIC STAFF, PHYSICAL TRAINING STAFF, AND  
PHYSICAL TRAINING CORPS

A Memorial Tablet to all ranks of the Army Gymnastic Staff, Army Physical Training Staff, and Army Physical Training Corps who died in the 1914-18 and 1939-45 Wars was unveiled in St. Alban's Garrison Church, Aldershot, on 16th September, by Field-Marshal the Viscount Montgomery of Alamein.

## CANADA

**APPOINTMENTS.**—Brigadier G. Kitching, C.B.E., D.S.O., C.D., has become Vice Chief of the General Staff.

Brigadier M. S. Dunn, O.B.E., E.D., C.D., has become Chief of Staff, Headquarters, Central Command.

Colonel W. Scott Murdoch, O.B.E., E.D., is to become Commander, Canadian Base Units in Germany (January, 1957).

**PROMOTIONS.**—*To Major-General:* Brigadier G. Kitching, C.B.E., D.S.O., C.D. *To the acting rank of Brigadier:* Colonel J. G. Housser, M.C., E.D., and Colonel G. L. Cassidy, D.S.O., E.D.

**RETIREMENTS.**—Major-General N. E. Rodger, C.B.E., C.D.; Brigadier G. E. R. Smith, C.B.E., C.D.

**VISIT OF C.-in-C. NORTHERN ARMY GROUP.**—General Sir Richard N. Gale, C.-in-C. Northern Army Group, visited Camp Gagetown at the end of July to see the 1st Canadian Infantry Division take part in Exercise "Morning Star."

**VISIT OF CHIEF OF STAFF, U.S. ARMY.**—General Maxwell D. Taylor, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, visited Ottawa on 27th and 28th August where he met the Chiefs of Staff Committee and other senior officers.

**MILITIA GROUP COMMANDERS' CONFERENCE.**—Some 25 Militia Group commanders met at Camp Borden on 19th September for a three-day conference. Major-General H. F. G. Letson, Adviser on Militia to the Chief of the General Staff, was the chairman

of this first conference of Militia Group commanders since the Militia was reorganized under the group system in 1954.

**UNIVERSITY STUDENTS TRAIN IN EUROPE.**—Seventy-four university students, who are studying for army commissions in addition to university degrees, spent three months of the Summer training with the 2nd Canadian Infantry Brigade in Europe. They returned to Canada during September.

**ROYAL CANADIAN ARMY CADET ORGANIZATION.**—The Royal Canadian Army Cadet Organization has been authorized to enrol to a total of 75,000 cadets—an increase of 10,000. In addition, the number of instructors in the Cadet Services may now be increased from 2,500 to 2,900. The additional instructors will provide leaders for additional corps or corps whose authorized strengths may be increased. At present there are 567 corps in Canada.

### **AUSTRALIA**

**APPOINTMENTS.**—Brigadier H. H. Hammer, C.B.E., D.S.O., promoted to Major-General, has been appointed G.O.C., 3rd Australian Division.

Brigadier I. H. Lowen, O.B.E., has been appointed Commander, 4th Infantry Brigade.

Brigadier A. C. Murchison, M.C., has been appointed Commander, 8th Infantry Brigade.

**HEADQUARTERS BRITISH COMMONWEALTH FORCES, JAPAN.**—On 1st July, the Headquarters British Commonwealth forces at Kure in Japan ceased to exist, and Lieut.-General R. Bierwirth, the Australian C.-in-C. of these forces in Japan and Korea since 1954, relinquished his command.

### **SOUTH AFRICA**

#### **NEW MILITARY TITLE**

Commandant-General H. B. Klopper, D.S.O., assumed his new appointment as Commandant-General of the Union Defence Forces on 23rd September. The new title, which has replaced that of Chief of the General Staff in South Africa, is the equivalent to the rank of full general, but the rank insignia is crossed swords and three stars.

### **FOREIGN**

#### **FRANCE**

#### **NEW C.-IN-C. IN GERMANY**

It was announced on 9th August that Lieut.-General Jacquot had been appointed C.-in-C. of the French forces in Germany in succession to General Noiret.

### **EAST GERMANY**

#### **REDUCTION IN ARMY STRENGTH**

On 1st July, it was officially announced that the East German Government had decided that the strength of the East German Army would be reduced from 120,000 to 90,000 men; that the funds made available from this reduction would be used to develop the country's economy; and that recruiting would be entirely on a voluntary system.

### **NORWAY**

#### **NEW C.-IN-C.**

Major-General Björn Christophersen has become C.-in-C. of the Norwegian Army in succession to General Hansteen, who had been C.-in-C. for eight years.

### **RUMANIA**

#### **REDUCTION IN ARMY STRENGTH**

It was reported by Radio Budapest on 11th July that the Rumanian Cabinet had decided to reduce the size of the Rumanian Army by a further 20,000 men by 15th September. In August, 1955, Rumania announced that a reduction of 40,000 men in her armed forces would take place by last December.

## AIR NOTES

### GREAT BRITAIN

#### H.M. THE QUEEN

VISIT TO R.A.F. STATION, MARHAM.—On 23rd July, The Queen and the Duke of Edinburgh, accompanied by the Secretary of State for Air, the Chief of the Air Staff, and the A.O.C.-in-C., Bomber Command, visited R.A.F. Station, Marham. After presenting the Squadron Standard to No. 207 Squadron, Her Majesty and members of the Royal Party inspected some of the Station equipment. At the end of the visit there was a fly-past by 20 Valiants and 72 Canberras.

PRINCESS MARGARET VISITS FIGHTER STATION.—On 27th July, Princess Margaret visited R.A.F. Station, Horsham St. Faith. There was a display by Hunter aircraft of No. 43 Squadron and a fly-past by 48 aircraft: Hunters, Meteors, and Venom night fighters.

AIDES-DE-CAMP.—Group Captains H. E. C. Boxer, O.B.E., B. Robinson, C.B.E., A.F.R.Ae.S., and E. Knowles, M.B.E., B.Sc., A.F.R.Ae.S., appointed Aides-de-Camp to The Queen (31st July, 1956).

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#### APPOINTMENTS

AIR MINISTRY.—Air Vice-Marshal Sir John R. Whitley appointed Air Member for Personnel, with the acting rank of Air Marshal (1st January, 1957).

Air Vice-Marshal R. G. Hart, C.B., C.B.E., M.C., appointed Controller of Engineering and Equipment with the acting rank of Air Marshal (October, 1956).

Air Vice-Marshal P. B. L. Potter, C.B.E., M.D., Ch.B., D.P.H., D.T.M. & H., Q.H.P., appointed Director-General, Royal Air Force Medical Services, with the acting rank of Air Marshal (February, 1957).

Mr. Scott Hall, C.B., M.Sc., D.I.C., F.C.G.I., F.R.Ae.S., appointed Scientific Adviser (October, 1956).

BOMBER COMMAND.—Air Vice-Marshal W. H. Merton, C.B., O.B.E., appointed Officer-in-Charge of Administration (September, 1956).

FIGHTER COMMAND.—Air Marshal Sir Thomas G. Pike, K.C.B., C.B.E., D.F.C., appointed Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief (8th August, 1956).

COASTAL COMMAND.—Air Vice-Marshal I. L. Saye appointed Air Officer Commanding No. 19 Group (July, 1956).

FLYING TRAINING COMMAND.—Air Commodore J. Worrall, D.F.C., appointed Air Officer-in-Charge of Administration, with the acting rank of Air Vice-Marshal (20th August, 1956).

41 GROUP.—Air Vice-Marshal W. A. Opie, C.B., C.B.E., appointed Air Officer Commanding (September, 1956).

LEVANT.—Air Vice-Marshal W. J. Crisham, C.B., C.B.E., appointed Air Officer Commanding (August, 1956).

PRINCESS MARY'S ROYAL AIR FORCE NURSING SERVICE.—Group Officer A. M. Williamson, R.R.C., appointed Matron-in-Chief, with the acting rank of Air Commandant (1st September, 1956).

#### PROMOTIONS

*Air Vice-Marshal to be acting Air Marshal*: D. H. F. Barnett, C.B., C.B.E., D.F.C. (1st August, 1956).

*Air Commodores to be acting Air Vice-Marshals*: J. M. Cohu, C.B.E. (2nd April, 1956); J. F. Hobler, C.B.E. (23rd July, 1956).

**\* RETIREMENTS**

The following officers have retired :—Air Marshal Sir Charles Guest, K.B.E., C.B. (29th August, 1956) ; Air Vice-Marshal N. H. D'Aeth, C.B., C.B.E. (25th June, 1956) ; Air Vice-Marshal B. E. Essex, C.B., C.B.E. (29th June, 1956) ; Air Vice-Marshal G. R. C. Spencer, C.B., C.B.E. (10th July, 1956) ; Air Vice-Marshal N. S. Allinson, C.B. (17th September, 1956) ; Air Commandant Dame Nancy M. Salmon, D.B.E., A.D.C., W.R.A.F. (7th September, 1956).

**FLIGHTS**

**ATLANTIC FLIGHT.**—The first non-stop flight across the Atlantic by a British V-bomber was carried out on 2nd September by a Vickers Valiant bomber from a service squadron. The flight from west to east took six and a quarter hours.

**VULCAN AVERAGES 500 M.P.H. TO AUSTRALIA.**—A four-jet delta-winged Vulcan bomber landed at Melbourne on 11th September after completing the 11,475 miles in 47 hours 26 minutes.

**EXERCISES**

A major air defence exercise known as " Stronghold " took place between 21st and 28th September. Its object was to exercise the air defence system under the command of Air Marshal Sir Thomas Pike, Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Fighter Command, against all forms of air attack.

**MATERIEL**

**MACH 3 FIGHTER FORECAST.**—The development of another high supersonic fighter capable of speeds up to three times the speed of sound has been forecast by Air Marshal Sir Thomas Pike, Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Fighter Command. The P.1 swept-wing fighter already on order for the R.A.F. would be capable of about 1,500 miles an hour. He said that it is necessary to continue developing fighters of ever-increasing performance indefinitely because, even with the advent of guided missiles, the Country cannot afford to neglect defence against manned bombers.

**BEVERLEY DROPS 10 TONS.**—On 2nd July, the heaviest single load ever dropped by parachute in this Country—22,173 lb.—was released from a Blackburn Beverley at 1,200 ft. The 10-ton load was suspended from six 66-ft. parachutes.

**MISCELLANEOUS**

**BATTLE OF BRITAIN SERVICE.**—The Battle of Britain Service of Thanksgiving was held in Westminster Abbey on 16th September.

**R.A.F. HELICOPTERS IN MALAYA.**—A special squadron of R.A.F. helicopters which arrived in Malaya in 1953 has recently evacuated its 1,500th casualty from the Malayan jungle.

**FOREIGN****DENMARK****AIR DISPLAY**

The Royal Danish Air Force gave a weapons demonstration at Jaegerspris, on the west coast of Zealand, on 9th August. It was attended by the heads of the Services and a large number of Danish Navy, Army, and Air Force officers. The demonstration was divided into three parts :—(a) an individual fly-past of the types of aircraft in use in the Royal Danish Air Force ; (b) a weapons demonstration of air-to-ground firing, air-to-air firing, dive bombing, napalm bombing, and rocket firing ; and (c) formation flying.

**FRANCE****MYSTERES RENAMED**

To indicate more accurately their ground support role, the Dassault Mystères 22, 24, and 26 have been renamed Etendard II, IV, and VI, after the standards of the French cavalry corps. The Etendard II has two Gabizo turbojets and should now have flown; Etendard IV, has an Atar 101-E, and the Etendard VI, to fly later this year, has two Bristol Orpheus.

**GERMANY****FIRST AIRCRAFT FOR THE GERMAN AIR FORCE**

On 30th July, the German Air Force received its first aircraft. At the Erding Air Force Depot, General Milton F. Summerfield, Deputy Chief of U.S. Military Advisers Group in Germany, handed over 49 piston-driven trainers and flying equipment to the value of 13,860,000 DM to Oberstleutnant von Riesen, O.C. the German training groups.

The aircraft in question, which are to be used for training at Landsberg, are 29 Canadair North American AT-6 Harvard Mk. IV and 20 Piper L-18C Super Cub. The single-engined and two-seater aircraft are being used for the *ab initio* training of pilots. Those taking the course who are trained in the Harvard Mk. IV will receive subsequent training at Fuerstenfeldbruck in Lockheed T33A turbo-trainers, and those taking the L-18 special course will later be trained at Memmingen air base, to fit them for their duties as flying instructors.

**ISRAEL****SABRES FROM CANADA**

Canada announced, on 21st September, that she will sell 24 Sabre jet fighters to Israel. The jets will be sold subject to a six-months' licence which can be cancelled or postponed if the Middle East situation changes.

**NORWAY****AIR DISPLAY**

A civil and military air display took place at the R.N.A.F. airfield Gardermoen on Sunday, 19th August. The day was wet and foggy, but nearly 10,000 people attended the display. There was a static park of aircraft and a show of ground equipment, a flying display of model aircraft, and the first commercially operated helicopter hovered over the ground.

The display opened with glider flying, followed by a 'balloon-flight' between two light aircraft and a demonstration of low aerobatics by a Swedish pilot in a Klemm.

**RUSSIA**

**RUSSIA SHOWS NEW JETS.**—Seven new Soviet jet fighters—three of them triangle-shaped flying wings—took part on 24th June in the Aviation Day annual display at Tushino military airfield, outside Moscow. An article in *Pravda* by A. Yakovlev, the aircraft designer, said that the new fighters displayed are capable of speeds which "far surpassed the speed of sound." They varied slightly in nose design, but all appeared to have conventional tailplane assemblies and were clearly experimental, carrying test instruments in the nose. One other new aircraft shown was a medium-sized, high-winged armed transport powered by two turboprop engines, compared by U.S. observers to the American C-123. The Moscow newspaper *Trud* said that Soviet aircraft designers were working on machines with four jet or turbo-propeller engines. No new bombers were shown, though some had been expected. Poor weather may have kept such machines on the ground.

**RUSSIAN VISITORS AT DISPLAY.**—Two Russian delegations—one led by Chief Marshal of Aviation P. F. Zhigarev, Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Air Forces, and the other by the Minister for the Aircraft Industry, P. V. Dementiev—were among the thousands of visitors from many countries who watched the flying display at the Society of British Aircraft Constructors' show at Farnborough, Hampshire, on 5th September.

**SOVIET PILOT FLIES HUNTER.**—The Soviet Air Force's chief test pilot flew Britain's Hunter jet trainer at Farnborough.

### SWITZERLAND

#### VISIT TO MOSCOW

In common with certain other countries the Swiss have lately been favoured with Russian esteem and, as a result, were invited to send a delegation to the Tushino Air Display at Moscow in June. They were represented by Colonel of Division E. Primault, the Commander-in-Chief, Air Force and A.A. Troops, Colonel Mosimann, Artillery Instructor, and Lieut.-Colonel Triponnez, Instructor Light A.A. Troops.

### UNITED STATES

**X-2 ACHIEVES 1,900 M.P.H.**—A Bell X-2 research rocket aircraft has set up a speed record of about 1,900 m.p.h., it was learned in New Orleans on 2nd August. The previous record of 1,650 m.p.h. was set up by the Bell X-1A in 1953.

**HELICOPTER FLIES 1,000 MILES.**—From Washington comes news that an H-21 (the Piasecki Work Horse) has set up what is claimed as a world record for helicopters by flying non-stop on 11th August for 1,199.07 miles. The previous longest flight, 778.3 miles, was made in France three years ago.

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## REVIEWS OF BOOKS

### GENERAL

#### **The Decisive Battles of the Western World and their Influence on History.**

**Volume III.** By Major-General J. F. C. Fuller, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O. (Eyre and Spottiswoode.) 45s.

This, the final volume of a very impressive work, covers the period from the American Civil War to the end of the 1939-45 War. As in the previous volumes, the decisive battles are linked by 'chronicles' describing how the wars arose and were shaped by their political origins. The results of the industrial revolution, the development of weapons, railways, the internal combustion engine, and the consequent changes in the methods of conducting war are clearly shown. Though some may disagree with a number of the author's very definite views on the acts and policies of statesmen, the fact remains that, though victorious in both world wars, the Western Allies did not succeed in restoring the balance of power in Europe as Wellington did after Waterloo.

The battles selected for the period 1860-1920 are the 'Seven Days,' 1862; Vicksburg and Chattanooga, 1863; Sedan, 1870; the siege of Port Arthur, 1904; Marne and Tannenberg, 1914; Sari Bair and Suvla, 1915; Amiens, 8th August, 1918; Vittorio Veneto, 1918; and Warsaw, 1920. These actions are well described, their influence on history is clearly stated, and military criticism is fair. The author stresses the impact of the Japanese victory on the masses of Asia and Africa; he deplores the fact that the century old *Pax Britannica* was replaced by the League of Nations—"a sham to replace a reality." But, in the chronicle for the years 1915-1918, he still insists that the battlefield of Third Ypres was a "reclaimed swamp," and that the continuation of the battle after August was "an inexcusable piece of pigheadedness on the part of Haig."

Events considered in the second half of the volume are still fresh, yet the author's analysis is very good indeed; and, he does not 'pull his punches.' The battles included are Sedan, 1940; Moscow, 1941; El Alamein and Tunis, 1943; Stalingrad, 1943; Normandy, 1944; and, two naval actions in the Pacific—Midway Island, 1942, and Leyte Gulf, 1944. The narrative in each case brings out the essential military factors and political decisions. The legend that Hitler saved the B.E.F. by halting his armour on the Canal Line on 23rd May, 1940, and by forbidding their use against the Dunkirk bridgehead is disposed of. The author remarks that during the preparation for D Day "strategic bombing, for the time at least, became truly strategic." He rightly condemns the large detachments from Italy for the assault on the French Riviera on 15th August, 1944, which not only "wrecked Alexander's campaign," but was too late to be of any value. He discusses Montgomery's proposal of 23rd August, 1944, for a "full-blooded thrust across the Rhine into the heart of Germany," to which Eisenhower would not agree. The latter's reasons are given: they are not convincing now and will probably be less so when more information becomes available.

The author makes scathing comments on the proclamation insisting on 'unconditional surrender,' the Morgenthau plan, the many high-level conferences and their results, Roosevelt's credulity towards the Russians, and that "sublime nonsense" the United Nations. "Unfortunately for the world, because her leaders lacked historic sense and looked upon war as a lethal game rather than an instrument of policy, battles began to lose their political value as soon as the United States entered the war." And so: "The Asiatic hordes are back in Germany and this time they penetrated within the walls of Vienna."

Conceived when the author was at the Staff College before 1914, this work is of outstanding value to professional officers and an example of lucid military writing. Candidates for and students at the staff colleges can consider themselves lucky to have at their disposal such a comprehensive work on war; their predecessors had the misfortune to be without anything like it. In addition, this work should be of absorbing interest to the general reader and a necessity for all those whose duty is to know something of war and to try to prevent the recurrence of mistakes.

**Grand Strategy, Volume V.** History of the Second World War. United Kingdom Series. By John Ehrman. (H.M.S.O.) 42s.

This is the first of the six contemplated volumes dealing with grand strategy in the 1939-45 War to be published. It deals with the events which took place between August, 1943, and September, 1944, and it is unfortunate in some ways that the volumes intended to cover the previous years have so far not made their appearance. It would seem, however, that each of these volumes has been designed to be studied individually since in each case the authors are different, and in this volume there is sufficient 'lead in' to put the reader fully in the picture. The object of the series is to render an account of the war from the point of view of the War Cabinet and the Chiefs of Staff. Whilst therefore they explain to some extent the changing fortunes in the various theatres, this is only referred to in such detail as to show their impact on the main theme.

It is a success story, for by August, 1943, the threat of the U-boat had been overcome, Italy was reeling and was soon to pass out of the war, Japanese expansion had been checked, and the German armies were recoiling in Russia. So perhaps it was easy to tell, but this does not in any way detract from the competence of the author nor the masterly way in which he has presented all the facts.

Throughout the whole period the British war leaders could not act alone and all the decisions taken had to receive the recognition of their American colleagues. At times agreement was not easy to reach, especially after the full power of the U.S.A. had been deployed, making her the dominant partner in the alliance.

Two diametrically opposed views were in evidence from the start. The British, nurtured on all forms of maritime warfare, placed a high value on strategic flexibility and desired to take advantage of each opportunity as it occurred. With limited resources they wished to engage the enemy where he was weakest. The Americans with their unparalleled power pressed for a single objective based on a well prepared plan. To them any detachment from the main front was a 'side show' and an abomination, whilst to the British they were an inherent form of war. How these two divergent theories eventually came to be reconciled by good will and wise governance on both sides is one of the main lessons of this work.

This very well constructed volume naturally divides itself into two parts of which the first is the more interesting. After describing in outline the system devised by the two great Allies for the high level control of the war and for obtaining a unified command of available resources, the author takes us to each of the big conferences in turn. In each case the military appreciations of both are presented, followed by a detailed account of the resulting discussions and the decisions finally taken. If, not unnaturally, the views expressed by our own great leader, Sir Winston Churchill, seem to dominate the scene, there can be no doubt that most of those who participated, both British and American, will find their reputations enhanced as a result of this record.

At the Quebec Conference of August, 1943, the plans for the defeat of Germany were approved and the details settled at the conferences which followed at Cairo and Teheran in December, where the strategy for the overthrow of Japan was also discussed in some detail, and at times with some heat, owing to the intransigence of the American navy, which had come to look upon the Pacific as a private battleground.

The latter part of the book deals with the results achieved by the decisions taken, so leading into the next volume.

To the lay reader, the information now given must be completely fresh, since only those who took a prominent part at the time could have known of all the facts now revealed. The German plans for the development of the 'doodlebug' and the rocket, their detection by British Intelligence and final defeat, the reasons why the Fourteenth Army in Burma came to be 'forgotten,' and the part played by General de Gaulle in this phase of the war, affected even the most humble of us; whilst the impressive size of the

forces deployed for the assault phase in Normandy (185,000 men, 19,000 vehicles, 6,500 ships, 10,000 aircraft with 1,087 transport aircraft carrying an additional 19,000 men of the airborne forces) must make us marvel at the skill and knowledge of the commanders and of their staffs, who could weld such a diversity of resources into a coherent plan and execute such a magnificent conception with such success.

This is in fact a really first-class book in every way and it is unfortunate that its price may prevent it being more widely read. At the end one is left with the conclusion that never before has a great alliance been so well conducted nor a war so well controlled. Few, if any mistakes, were made during the period under review, but one wonders how the author will deal with the events which follow when politics and the winning of the peace have to be considered.

**Military Heritage of America.** By Colonel R. E. Dupuy, U.S. Army (Retd.), and Colonel T. N. Dupuy, U.S. Army. (McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., New York, Toronto, London.) \$10.

The two authors, father and son, have both had distinguished careers in the U.S. Army and in compiling this record of the wars in which the military forces of America have been engaged, they have set out to stress the importance of the study of military history and to enhance the traditions founded in war. The result is a reference work which will undoubtedly carry a higher value in America than it may here, for though countless books have been written on the American Civil War, the production of military histories in America has in general tended to lag behind that of European countries and they have not as yet produced any official history for their participation in the Great War of 1914-18.

In such a work based on such ideals the question has been what to leave out. In all the major conflicts, with the exception of the Civil War, America has fought alongside allies and in the two world wars of this century has not been engaged at the start. The authors have therefore been faced with the problem of relating the operations of the American forces to the broader picture of which they formed part. They have not been consistent over this, and in the cases of both the world wars have preferred to summarize the political events and military campaigns prior to America's entry into the war rather than to build up the picture as it confronted America on her enforced entry. Though one can find little fault with the summaries of these campaigns they unduly lengthen the work and will be skipped by most readers in this Country, where more authoritative works are available.

They have attempted no definite history of any of the wars referred to and, at the end of the chapter relating to each, have summarized the lessons learned as a result of the new weapons, new organizations, and new techniques introduced, with a view to showing the changes in tactics.

The first half of the book deals with the wars prior to 1914 and this includes chapters dealing with the theory of war and its evolution from the earliest times; the writings of Jomini, Clausewitz, Von Schlieffen, and Mahan, and with the effects of the industrial revolution on the means of making war. No new writing has been attempted and the generally accepted views on each of these subjects have been presented.

In the case of each war referred to, the authors have been prepared to accept selected and already published summaries of the various campaigns. The second half relates to the 1914-18 and 1939-45 Wars and to the war in Korea. Here the 1914-18 War is dismissed, not unnaturally, in some 70 pages since the American forces in France did not become really effective till 1918. It is, however, interesting to note that the authors neither in this war nor in the one that followed really understand the British theory of world strategy nor the results that may accrue from the deployment of small forces in the right area at the right time.

The 1939-45 War is divided into two parts dealing with the campaigns against Germany and Italy in the west and against Japan in the east. Here, again, the various

*D. E. Charlwood perhaps the  
Richard Hillary of Bomber  
Command*

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## British Military Administration in the Far East

By F. S. V. DONNISON

One effect of the westward spread of Japanese force during 1941-2 was the crumbling of the British administration in Burma and Malaya. Mr. Donnison shows how, in an attempt to avert collapse, the Army assumed responsibilities which normally fell to the civil authorities. In that part of Burma not overrun, the need for a full military administration was forced upon the Army for operational reasons; and it was then decided that the initial administration of all reoccupied territories in the Far East should be a military responsibility. The plans and preparations for, and the subsequent establishment of, Military Governments in Burma, Malaya, Borneo and Hong Kong are described. The book continues with a discussion of general topics, such as finance, relief, and the administration of justice, which are more conveniently treated functionally than geographically. Finally, it is shown how nationalist aspirations, born of enemy occupation in dominions of Allied Powers who expected to re-assert their authority after victory, created political problems that complicated the return to civil administration.

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campaigns have been summarized at various lengths depending on their importance in American eyes or on the sources readily available. This tends to make the book become unbalanced for, whilst 13 pages are devoted to the account of the campaign in France and Flanders in 1940, the campaign in Italy, where large American forces were committed, is dismissed in nine.

Whilst the British reader will not agree with all the views expressed, there are few inaccuracies in the text with the exception of some dates of little importance.

The account of the war in Korea contains much that is new, since the overall command was in American hands. The story of the actual operations tallies with accounts that have appeared here and the whole serves as a useful background for the true appraisal of the activities of such forces as were committed by the Commonwealth.

This is a very long book which gives one the impression of a series of lectures, designed for some other object, cut to suit a new conception. Careful editing, or even a rigid adherence to the intentions expressed by the authors, would have shortened it considerably and made the result more informative on the whole.

**Military Policy and National Security.** Edited by William W. Kaufmann. (Oxford University Press.) 30s.

Since the 1939-45 War American foreign policy has been based on the assumption that the Soviet Union and Communist China are aggressive and expansionist Powers which threaten world stability; consequently the United States of America is vitally interested in the stability of the world outside the Western hemisphere, and in its own interests is bound to make every effort to restrict Communist expansion at all times and in all places. In pursuance of this policy successive United States governments have built up an elaborate military structure designed to meet the needs of both a conventional war and all-out nuclear warfare. These forces combined with N.A.T.O. and the other less rigid alliances covering South-East Asia and the Far East have, at any rate in the eyes of the American public, hitherto succeeded as a deterrent due to American superiority in nuclear weapons and the means of delivering them.

Today the situation is rapidly changing and the time is fast approaching when the Soviet Union will have attained equality with U.S.A. both in the size of its stock-pile of nuclear weapons and in its capacity to deliver them over very great ranges. This development calls for a reappraisal of American policy and strategy. The essays comprising this volume are designed to facilitate this process. The contributors are all members of the staff of Princeton University, and their contributions are part of a continuing programme of research into problems of defence and national security undertaken by the Centre of International Studies in that University.

Being a collection of essays by different authors the book, needless to say, lacks continuity, and the reader who expects to find neat solutions for all problems facing and likely to face Western politicians and strategists will be disappointed. According to the editor what this volume aims to cover are the defence plans and preparations required to meet either an all-out or a limited war; in particular it deals with the means whereby the latter may be prevented from degenerating into the former.

To attempt to analyse the eight essays is beyond the scope of this review. Suffice it to say that many, if not all the arguments and theories evolved have application to Great Britain; that the chapter dealing with "N.A.T.O. and the New German Army" reminds us that the policy of rearming Western Germany is still very much of a gamble; and that here is a book in which the problem of national survival under nuclear attack is fairly and squarely presented.

"Passive defence" is a term which passed out of our vocabulary in the early days of the late war, but here we find the term revived to embrace all measures designed to diminish the vulnerability of industrial and urban targets. The author of the essay so entitled argues that effective defensive preparations "would demonstrate to any would-be

aggressor that the United States is neither given to delusion nor bluffing, but that it means business": furthermore that, although nuclear attacks would probably start a war, they would not necessarily finish it, and victory (if we can still use the term) would go to the side whose civil population and industrial capacity mustered the highest percentage of survival.

The volume is copiously annotated and contains an index.

**Paradise Precarious.** By Howard Williams. (The Welcome Press, Nairobi and London.) 9s. 6d.

In these days when many of our colonial possessions—if one may still call them such—in Africa are undergoing the stresses and strains of progress towards self-government, the claims of Kenya cannot be overlooked. Mr. Williams is justly perturbed both as regards present conditions in the colony and its prospects for the future.

He speaks with considerable authority. A product of Cranwell, possessing a distinguished record of service, his experience of Africa extends over 40 years; and he was a Resident Magistrate at Nairobi before he became Intelligence Officer to the Commissioner of Police in Kenya. Now he is raising cattle and farming in the colony and has become Chairman of the Council for Self-Government.

By self-government is meant freedom from the remote rule of Whitehall. Mr. Williams urges that there are good men, official and unofficial, on the spot: natural leaders, but hampered and frustrated by the policy of the Colonial Office. He proceeds to unfold a disturbing tale of mis-government: ignoring of the earliest warnings of the Mau Mau peril; maladroitness in putting down the rebellion; neglect of the people in

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the Kikuyu Reserves; failure to utilize the economic resources of the colony; and allowing illegal immigration from India to proceed unchecked.

In these pages the Kenya of today and the problem and difficulties which beset the colony are vividly described with impressive sincerity. The horrors of Mau Mau are starkly revealed. The main argument is that to the European settlers—farmers, cattle-breeders, professional men, and others who have made Kenya their home—must be given the main share of the task of leadership: to build up from the best elements of the African races a population which in the course of a few generations may be fit to bear their part in the responsibilities of government. At present the great majority of the Africans are only emerging from a primitive savage state, which makes the cry of "Africa for the Africans" premature and ludicrous.

Mau Mau, it is said, has been driven underground, not destroyed, and martial law is the only remedy. The Kikuyu should be put to work, principally on an irrigation scheme which by harnessing the Tana river would bring a vast area into productivity. The tourist trade is capable of great and profitable expansion, and the improvement of air communications is a prime necessity. There is no lack of constructive suggestion here.

One danger, we are told, is that of Indian influence which increases as illegal immigration continues. The Indians "must not be allowed to usurp our prerogatives. They have no title to determine Africa's destiny." It is perhaps worth while to recall that a few weeks ago a correspondent of one of our leading newspapers reported the president of the Kenya Indian Congress as making "a surprising defence of the Europeans in Kenya." This can hardly have escaped the notice of Mr. Williams.

His views have been well ventilated in the East African press, and it is well that they should be known to us in Britain. His ideal is the establishment of a loyal Dominion embracing Kenya, Uganda, and Tanganyika, its peoples peaceful and prosperous, its existence of significant strategic value.

#### NAVAL

**Ark Royal.** By Kenneth Poolman. (William Kimber.) 18s.

This is the story of the aircraft carrier which for a spell was the most famous ship in the world.

Launched at Birkenhead in April, 1937, the *Ark Royal* was the fourth of her name to follow their famous ancestor the first *Ark Royal*, which, flying the flag of Lord Howard of Effingham, led the van against the Spanish Armada.

Early in 1939, aircraft landed aboard the new *Ark Royal* for the first time. It was easy. They came straight in and rolled up the enormous 800-foot-long flying deck. But the carrier's life, even during the brief spell of peace, was not always smooth, for while working up in the Atlantic she suffered heavy damage during the worst gale of her whole career. Events, too, were going badly in Europe, and as the year drew on Nazi Germany like a great octopus began to devour her weaker neighbours. Soon the *Ark Royal's* captain was warning the ship's company that war was imminent.

By the end of August, ships of the Home Fleet were at their war stations patrolling between the Shetlands and Norway while *Ark Royal* aircraft searched their route for enemy submarines. Three days later orders reached the Fleet that hostilities were to be opened against Germany.

On 13th September the *Ark Royal* experienced the first of many hairbreadth escapes, being missed by a salvo of torpedoes which raced past and exploded 300 yards away. She was undamaged, but the attacking U-boat, U.39, paid dearly for her temerity, being sunk by the escorting destroyer *Faulkner*, who picked up 43 German survivors. Soon after this another carrier, the *Courageous*, was sunk by a U-boat, and the four remaining big carriers became priority targets for hostile submarines and aircraft. Towards the end of September the *Ark Royal* came under heavy air attack. She dodged the bombs, but the jubilant and over-optimistic Lord Haw-Haw announced gleefully that she had gone

to the bottom. This false claim was repeated *ad nauseam* for more than two years, during which the ship saw service in the South Atlantic, in Norwegian waters, and in the Mediterranean.

At long last her charmed life came to an end. On 13th November, 1941, she was landing-on aircraft within sight of Gibraltar when hit by a torpedo amidships. Some hours later she turned slowly over and sank.

This book is well bound and printed. It contains a generous number of illustrations and is an interesting account of one of the best loved, best fought ships ever to fly the White Ensign.

**The Battle of the River Plate.** By Dudley Pope. (William Kimber.) 18s.

The Battle of the River Plate was the first sea action in the 1939-45 War where more than two ships, larger than destroyers, were involved. The ships concerned were the British cruisers *Ajax*, *Achilles* (R.N.Z.N.), and *Exeter*, and the German pocket battleship *Admiral Graf Spee*.

This book contains much more than the plain story of a sea fight between, on paper, ill-matched opponents. It begins with an historical survey of the inter-war years, the starting point being the Treaty of Versailles, wherein the author has briefly sketched the salient features of the crippling effect on the British Navy of the Washington and London Naval Treaties, as well as the phoenix-like emergence of the German Navy. He also explains the *raison d'être* of a surface commerce raider, whose functions are not merely confined to the sinking of merchant ships. Fortunately for us, Grand Admiral Raeder's plan for a balanced fleet in 1944, before which date war with Great Britain was not envisaged, was wrecked by Hitler's attack on Poland in 1939. The reader thus has a clear picture of the many difficulties which had to be surmounted by both sides.

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The enemy which was encountered in the Plate area was one of Germany's three pocket battleships which had been completed before the war for the express purpose of commerce raiding. She had sailed undetected from Germany on 21st August, 1939. There followed a wait in the open spaces of the Atlantic, where she remained, still undetected, for more than a month before receiving orders to begin operations against individual merchant ships. These activities are then described. Measured in terms of ships sunk, the *Graf Spee's* success—nine ships in two and a half months—was not spectacular; but before she was finally caught by Commodore Harwood, a large number of British warships, organized in nine hunting groups, had been diverted from other important duties in the attempt to find her.

A spirited account is given of the action which ensued, and of the retreat of the raider to take refuge at Montevideo. The circumstances of her inglorious end by scuttling just outside territorial waters are fully related.

Although Captain Langsdorff left on record his reasons for many of the decisions he took, on one point—and this is perhaps the most intriguing of them all—he is silent. We shall never now know why he did not concentrate his main armament of 11-inch guns on finishing off the *Exeter*, when he had nearly knocked her out, and instead used part of it to engage her more lightly armed consorts.

The narrative is couched in simple language and is easy to follow. The sources used are those in official documents, both British and German, as well as information supplied to the author by several of the chief participants.

Good diagrams and useful appendices are provided, as well as a number of interesting photographs. The index is confined to names of ships and persons, but there and in the text a few mistakes in the spelling of ships' names have crept in. Mr. Pope's terminology is correct for the period and he has wisely refrained from interpolating imaginary conversations between persons, but the frequent reiteration of the Christian names and full ranks of German officers makes rather tiresome reading.

On the whole, the book can be recommended as giving an accurate account of what happened before, during, and after this notable action which, in the words of Admiral of the Fleet Sir Dudley Pound, the then First Sea Lord, "has set a standard for this war, a matter of great importance."

**Close of a Dynasty.** By Vice-Admiral Sir Francis Pridham, K.B.E., C.B. (Allan Wingate.) 18s.

This book opens with a foreword by Her Imperial Highness the Grand Duchess Xenia of Russia and includes the story of the captivity and murder of the Russian Imperial family of Romanoff.

Immediately after the 1914-18 War the author was serving in the battleship *Marlborough* as gunnery officer and first lieutenant. In March, 1919, the *Marlborough* sailed for Turkish waters to take part in the Allied occupation of Constantinople. She wasted no time on the way, and on a cold and misty morning in April left Constantinople for Sebastopol with a letter from Queen Alexandra urging her sister, the Dowager Empress Marie Feodorovna, to leave Russia without delay.

The number who would embark in the *Marlborough* with the Empress was not known, but it soon became clear that it would be much greater than originally expected, and the author was placed in charge of the arrangements for accommodating the battleship's distinguished passengers. On 7th April the *Marlborough* moved to Yalta and by the 11th had embarked 20 members of the Imperial family including the Dowager Empress and the Grand Duchess Xenia, 36 servants and others, and some 200 tons of baggage. That afternoon she left Yalta, and in her all the surviving members of the Imperial Romanoff family left Russia for the last time. The dynasty which had risen to power in 1613 had come to an end.

One incident may be quoted here as typical of the affectionate regard these Royal people had for their servants. One of them, the Princess Marina, daughter of the Grand

Duke Peter, cousin of the Emperor, was to share a cabin with her elderly maid. For the maid a mattress, pillow, and blankets were laid on the deck. But the maid slept on the bed with both mattresses; the Princess explaining in the morning that she had made these arrangements because the maid suffered from rheumatism. Nor was this an isolated incident. Yet these were the very people who had for years been accused of being pitiless tyrants, holding their people in bonds of cruel slavery.

The author is undoubtedly at his best when describing his own personal experiences, but not so happy when he enters the realm of historical prose. His book is well illustrated and includes a number of useful maps and appendices. It should be read by everyone interested in the cruel tragedy that overtook the Emperor Nicholas Romanoff and his ill-fated family.

**A Great Seaman.** The Life of Admiral of the Fleet Sir Henry Oliver. By Admiral Sir William James. (H. F. and G. Witherby.) 18s.

To a great number of living naval officers, Admiral of the Fleet Sir Henry Oliver is little more than a name. He served in a period that most of us have forgotten, and his quiet, unobtrusive brilliance as a naval officer and leader is now almost a legend. In his time he was one of the greatest of the great, a sailor of infinite wisdom and experience. He always shunned the limelight and his dislike of any form of publicity made him less well known than he deserved.

Henry Oliver's service at sea spanned the change from sail to steam. His first ship was the five-masted battleship *Agincourt*, square rigged on fore, main, and mizen, his last was the battleship *Revenge*, flagship of the Atlantic Fleet. The span of his active service covered 47 years, and during them he saw the Royal Navy develop into a fighting machine

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of power and precision. Much of the credit for this development could well be laid at Oliver's door.

Admiral James has done a notable piece of work in bringing vividly to life the naval career of this remarkable sailor. He is, perhaps, the epitome of all that is best in the naval officer; a seaman of great distinction, with a wise and balanced view of the naval duty both in peace and war. This biography of him is based on his own logs and notebooks, and the author has done a fine piece of work in making from them a book of absorbing naval interest. We get a glimpse in these pages of a Navy that most of us have forgotten, a new Navy in the making, changing from the great past of masts and sails into the mechanical present of engineering precision. It is an absorbing and fascinating picture, and its central character, this almost legendary Admiral of the Fleet, stands out as the tremendous personality whose influence, so often unseen and unnoticed, yet contributed so much to the change.

**One Marine's Tale.** By General Sir Leslie Hollis. (André Deutsch.) 15s.

The author of this short record of service, General Sir Leslie Hollis, reached the highest position in the Royal Marines, but is best known through the references to him in Sir Winston Churchill's *The Second World War*. He attended nearly 3,000 meetings of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, either as its Secretary or, subsequently, as Chief of Staff to the Minister of Defence. Sir Maurice Hankey, himself a marine, chose him, a young major, to be Secretary of the Joint Planning Committee. At their first meeting, with orders to produce, within three hours, a report on the situation resulting from Hitler's entry into the Rhineland, none of the three deputies seemed anxious to open their mouths. Accordingly, Hollis broke the silence. Whereupon, all three deputies rose to their feet and remarking "He seems to know all about it. Let him get on with it," went off to luncheon, leaving this *enfant terrible* to prepare the report.

Hollis modelled himself on Hankey, of whom, it will be remembered, it was commonly said that it was he, and not Lloyd George and Clemenceau, who made the peace treaty after the 1914-18 War! Nevertheless, he was continually impressed by the efficiency of the various officers who composed the Chiefs of Staff Committee, as indeed all must be who know how wonderfully the system worked; and if discussion was often ragged, the secretary existed in order to ensure that conclusions or decisions were recorded in accordance with the general sense of the discussion.

Hollis tells a curious story about 'Bomber' Harris and Tom Phillips, the Admiral who lost his life in the disaster to the *Prince of Wales* and *Repulse*. Phillips was convinced that armoured ships with adequate anti-aircraft armament could stand up to air bombardment. Harris did not share this view. One day he said he could see the future quite plainly, and proceeded to foretell the exact manner of Phillips's end, even to the fact that it occurred in the South China Sea whilst operating against Japanese convoys—this, moreover, in the summer of 1937, four and a half years before Japan went to war.

Success in standing up to the tremendous load of his work is ascribed by Hollis to his sense of humour. It may be added that he was fortified by religion and took a great interest in his work.

**U.S. Marine Operations in Korea, 1950-1953. Volume II.** The Inchon-Seoul Operation. By Lynn Montross and Captain Nicholas A. Canzona, U.S.M.C. (Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps.)

This volume is the second of a planned series<sup>1</sup> and gives a detailed and fully documented account of the operations of the 1st Marine Division and the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing as part of X Corps, U.S.A., during and immediately following the Inchon landing on 15th September, 1950. The period covered takes the reader up to the seizure of Seoul and its environs on 7th October.

As this is primarily a Marine Corps story, the part played by other units and Services is presented in sufficient detail only to provide the correct perspective.

<sup>1</sup> See review in the JOURNAL, November, 1955, pp. 655-56.

When the Korean conflict broke out the forces available on the spot to General MacArthur were very thin on the ground, but he intended to assume the offensive at the earliest possible moment and to launch an amphibious attack on Inchon, in order to cut the supply lines in the enemy's rear. He accordingly asked for a Marine division to be sent out. This involved the calling-up of the Marine Corps Reserve, which was authorized by President Truman with the sanction of Congress on 19th July. Much had to be done, but progress was rapid.

The main body of the 1st Marine Division arrived in Japan between 29th August and 3rd September, after which the force had to be tactically re-embarked. Meanwhile, the planning staffs, who had been flown out, were fully occupied. The various phases in the planning conferences are described in some detail; by 23rd August the *when, where, and who* had been more or less settled, but there were still doubts about the *how*. Intelligence of the natural defences at Inchon and also the amount of enemy resistance that might be expected was not complete, though the assumptions made by the staff planners were subsequently found to be reasonably accurate. After everyone concerned had had their say in pointing out the difficulties of, and objections to, an immediate amphibious assault, the matter was finally clinched by General MacArthur—"We shall land at Inchon and I shall crush them." It was no idle boast.

Organizing the details and timing of the passages from three separate ports in Japan, as well as from Pusan, called for a tight schedule if the whole force was to arrive together at Inchon on 15th September, but in spite of two typhoons which struck the area on the 3rd and 11th, all difficulties were surmounted though the troops had a most uncomfortable voyage.

The assault of the Inchon beaches was preceded by an effective softening up of the defences by air and sea bombardments, which began on the 10th. A number of mines also were destroyed. Dawn on the 15th saw the 3/5th Marines land and overwhelm the outer defences. H-hour for the main assault was timed for 1730. Following a concentrated fire on Inchon itself from the supporting cruisers and destroyers, the assault troops rushed the beaches and before midnight had established themselves on shore. Fatal casualties were surprisingly light. The teamwork, for which there had been no opportunity for rehearsal, was excellent and the calculated risk taken was fully justified. The landing of tanks, ammunition, and stores was conditional on the large rise and fall of tide, but about 24 hours after the first wave had landed General Smith was able to report that he was assuming responsibility for the conduct of operations ashore.

Space does not permit following up the successive operations which culminated in the capture of Seoul. These were more stoutly contested by the N.K.P.A., but their resistance was gradually worn down.

The book is nicely produced, with a number of action and personal photographs; there is a good index, but the narrative would have been easier to follow if the action diagrams had been arranged to pull out. Twelve essential appendices are provided, including details of regimental units, a summary of the operation orders, the task organization of Joint Task Force 7 (ships), the enemy order of battle, and daily statistics of casualties. The bibliography contains a complete list of authorities referred to, which is amplified by the numerous footnotes in the text.

Like the previous volume, this also can be thoroughly recommended to all classes of reader.

#### ARMY

**Blackburn's Headhunters.** By Philip Harkins. (Cassell and Co.) 16s.

This book tells the story of Captain Donald Blackburn, an instructor in the Philippine Army, who escaped with a few other American officers into the jungle when the Japanese landed in Luzon in December, 1941. After a year of evading the Japanese and of a precarious existence mainly with Filipino well-wishers, Blackburn and Major Volckmann,

who escaped with him, reached the mountainous country of Ifugao and began the laborious task of recruiting a guerrilla regiment from the head-hunting natives.

It was a long and uphill task; how long and uphill is told in the pages of this book. It is based mainly on a diary kept by Blackburn, supplemented by his memories of the events which took place. Finally, when his men were fully trained and battleworthy, they moved over to the offensive and won several decisive, if minor, victories over the Japanese in the north-eastern corner of Luzon. Blackburn ended the war in the rank of lieut.-colonel.

The book is certainly most readable, and affords a good idea of the pitfalls, and also the humour, which can attend the building-up of a force of guerrilla fighters in a backward country. It has its full share of excitement and achievement, and shows very forcefully what a sense of determination can do when faced with hardship and difficulty. It is a book well worth the reading.

**Conspiracy Among Generals.** By Wilhelm von Schramm. Translated by R. T. Clark. 16s.

Ritter von Schramm, in the Spring of 1944, held the appointment of Senior War Reporter to the Army Groups commanded by Marshals Rundstedt and Rommel in France. He was also a personal friend of General Speidel, one of the actors in the drama which he narrates in this book.

The conspiracy in question was the plot of certain German generals to kill Hitler in order to set up a new government which might be able to negotiate peace with the Allies and so save Germany from utter ruin. The plot culminated in the unsuccessful attempt upon Hitler's life in East Prussia on 20th July, 1944.

This book, however, is only indirectly concerned with the story of the bomb concealed in an attaché case, which Colonel von Stauffenberg smuggled into a conference room at Hitler's headquarters. Ritter von Schramm's narrative deals with the repercussions of that ill-fated enterprise upon German commanders, staffs, and operations in France.

Though military operations in Normandy inevitably come into the story, they do so only as background to the extraordinary train of events which took place in Paris, St. Germain, and La Roche Guyon (this last being at that time the headquarters of Field-Marshal von Kluge, who had succeeded Rommel as C.-in-C. West).

British readers will note with surprise and annoyance that, in spite of von Schramm's presumably advantageous access to German intelligence reports, he appears to have formed some extremely erroneous impressions concerning the relative British and American shares in the Normandy fighting. The former are hardly mentioned at all. When they are, the term "Anglo-American forces" is used. The Americans on the other hand, get the fullest publicity, even to the extent of receiving credit (*inter alia*) for the crossing of the Seine at Vernon, an operation hitherto ascribed to the British XXX Corps!

Whether this bias comes from the author or translator is not absolutely clear, for the latter admits in his preface that he has somewhat altered the text. His frequent use of the American expression 'aide' suggests that his sympathies may lie unduly in that direction.

However, these inaccuracies in the military narrative in no way detract from the interest of the conspiratorial part of the story. Briefly, this revolves round the actions and reactions of von Kluge and other generals on receipt of the first garbled and incomplete news of the Hitler 'attentat.' Stuelpnagel, Military Governor of France, was the chief actor in the tragedy, having prematurely initiated vigorous action against the S.S. and S.D. formations in Paris on receipt of an unconfirmed rumour of Hitler's death. The subsequent frantic and (as it turned out) unsuccessful efforts of individual officers, and of the various headquarters, to cover up this terrible 'gaffe,' and to save themselves

and one another from Hitler's vengeance, not only gives a valuable insight into the characteristics of the German officer class, but also provides readers with a true thriller just as exciting as any fiction.

**Freshly Remembered.** By Cecil Aspinall Oglander. (The Hogarth Press.) 25s.

A mind not bilious with professional jealousy will always spare a quota of genuine admiration for the inspired amateur; hence, in all probability, the longevity of the Lawrence of Arabia legend. An inspired amateur of far more sustained and solid achievement than T. E. Lawrence could ever claim is the subject of this memoir; and on that score alone is bound to enlist the sympathetic reader's interest.

In 1775, Thomas Graham of Balgowan was a typical Scottish laird of comfortable means, with an entirely un-Caledonian love of horseflesh and cricket; and a wife whose beauty was immortalized by Gainsborough. Unfortunately, Mrs. Graham's health was so delicate that she died while on a trip to the Continent; her coffin, on the journey home, being wantonly defiled, in an alleged search for hidden weapons, by the bestial ruffians the French Revolution had elevated to power.

Deeply affected by his wife's death, Graham sought distraction by travelling to the Mediterranean as a guest of the Fleet. With Toulon under siege, this simple country gentleman, who hitherto had never given the profession of arms a single thought, drifted into soldiering as a volunteer A.D.C. to Toulon's British Military Governor. Now, whatever its ethical standing, there is no getting away from the fact that war can be infernally interesting; and so Graham found it. So much so, indeed, that on the strength of the instructive experience he had undergone at Toulon, he determined to return home and raise a regiment, of which he would assume the command under the terms of the contemporary formula of "raising men for rank." This he did; but for seven years he failed to get his commission made 'permanent,' despite active service experience at Minorca, at the siege of Malta, and with Sir John Moore in Sweden, Portugal, and Spain. Prospects were so dim, indeed, that even his warmest well-wishers counselled retirement into private life. His time with Moore, however, had been very far from wasted, since it was on this generous and perceptive commander's recommendation that the Laird of Balgowan's temporary commission was made permanent . . . at the age of 60!

Graham's splendid showing at Barrosa, where he undoubtedly saved the day, exempted him from the reproaches justifiably heaped on the Government, Lord Chatham, the military commander, and Strachan, the naval chief, for the costly and dispiriting fiasco of Walcheren; where only the men of the Revenue Service, responsible for the small boat work, had reason to congratulate themselves. The complete vindication of Graham's refusal to abandon the profession of his choice came with his appointment as Second-in-Command to Wellington. The inspired amateur had indubitably arrived!

The Iron Duke was not given to reposing much confidence in his immediate subordinates—not, perhaps, without reason. But Graham had it to a degree not accorded even to 'Daddy' Hill; and it was a trust he never failed.

The end of the war brought honours richly earned—but never more hesitantly accepted. His soldiering days were over, however: failing eyesight and the strain of active campaigning endured by a man well past middle age called for a long period of recuperation. That it did all that was required of it is witnessed by the fact that Thomas Graham Lord Lynedoch lived to enter his 95th year, still vigorous in mind and body, and as well beloved as he had always been throughout his long and distinguished career.

General Aspinall Oglander has one of the most engaging success stories to tell it is possible to imagine. If the obvious pleasure with which he has written this book occasionally leads him into discursiveness and repetition, these are minor blemishes in a work which makes a notable addition to the vast volume of Peninsular literature.

**History of The 5th Royal Gurkha Rifles (Frontier Force), Volume II, 1929 to 1947.** (Gale and Polden.) 23s. 6d.

This volume continues the story of one of the Regiments of the famous Punjab Frontier Force. It begins with a record of the 5th Gurkhas' services on the North-West Frontier as well as training, organization, and sporting activities up to the outbreak of war in 1939. The remainder of the book is divided into parts each devoted to one of the battalions or depot establishments during the war and its aftermath. The narrative is very well arranged and has insets in the text that facilitate reference, while descriptions are clear and concise with adequate reference to the major events which formed the background to each battalion's activities. Some humorous incidents are rightly recorded.

The 1st Battalion embarked in May, 1941, for service overseas and after two years in Iraq, Persia, and Syria reached Italy where it served with the 8th Indian Division until the Germans surrendered. The record is most inspiring and the individual acts of gallantry mentioned are typical of the Gurkha soldier. Of the many major actions in which the 1st/5th fought during the long advance, Mozzagrogna and San Angelo are perhaps, the most impressive.

Part III describes the odyssey of the 2nd Battalion from the disastrous Sittang crossing in February, 1942, until September, 1944, when the unit returned to India owing to shortage of reinforcements. The fighting withdrawal from Burma, followed by the defence of the Assam/Burma border, the advance and withdrawal from Tiddim, and the long defence of Imphal constituted an amazing performance. In all, the 2nd/5th fought in 11 major actions and received 42 decorations, including three V.C.s—two won in one action. Losses were heavy, and conditions always hard, or worse, but whether in victory or failure the spirit of the Regiment remained undaunted. After service in India the battalion formed part of the occupation forces in Japan.

The next two parts deal with the 3rd Battalion, reformed in October, 1940, and the 4th Battalion raised in March, 1941. The 3rd/5th was on the Assam/Burma frontier from 1942 until 1944, when it took part in the Tiddim road fighting and the Imphal battles. The unit afterwards served in Java and Malaya. The 4th/5th served with the 7th Indian Division in Arakan from October, 1943, then on the Kohima front, and in the final advance through Burma.

This handsome volume is provided with 22 sketch maps and excellent illustrations. The authors have succeeded in producing not only a fine record of the 5th Gurkhas' achievements, but a work of considerable interest to officers of Gurkha units and, indeed, to all those who would learn something of the value of *esprit de corps*. Field-Marshal Sir W. Slim, in an appreciative foreword, remarks that "while the 5th Gurkhas still march on with their glories untarnished, it is, alas! no longer at our side."

**Historical Record of The 6th Gurkha Rifles, Volume II.** By Lieut.-Colonel H. R. K. Gibbs. (Gale and Polden.) 35s.

This volume continues the story of the 6th Gurkhas, one of the four Gurkha Regiments transferred to the British Army in 1947. Formed in 1817, as The Cuttack Legion, the 1st Battalion, renamed The Assam Light Infantry in 1827, remained a local corps until absorbed into the Line in 1861. The present title dates from 1903; the 2/6th was formed a year later.

The first four chapters record the Regiment's services from 1919 to 1940—much of it on the North-West Frontier. Expansion did not commence until October, 1940, when the 3rd Battalion was reformed; the 4th Battalion was raised in the following March. During the Summer of 1941, the 2nd Battalion left India for the Middle East, and a few months later the 1st and 4th Battalions moved south to join the 19th Division, afterwards famous as the 'Dagger' Division. In the meantime, the 3rd Battalion, which contained a high proportion of seasoned soldiers, had been sent to the Khyber. Like all other units in India at this time the 6th Gurkhas were hampered in their training by shortages of modern equipment and transport.

Three years were spent by the 2nd Battalion in Iraq and Persia, often in extremes of temperature, before landing at Taranto in August, 1944. After taking part in the

Gothic Line battles of September, the Battalion earned distinction by capturing Monte Chicco in October, and was thereafter heavily engaged until the Germans surrendered in 1945. Meanwhile, the 3rd Battalion, serving in the 77th Brigade (Chindits), had distinguished themselves, particularly in the capture of Mogaung in June, 1944, during which two V.C.s were won. The 1st and 4th Battalions, after long and tedious service in Southern India in an anti-invasion role, arrived in Burma with the 19th Division during October, 1944, in time to play a notable part in the strenuous advance to Mandalay, its capture, and the final destruction of the enemy forces. One chapter describes the excellent work of the Regimental Centre at Abbottabad, another deals with the aftermath of the war.

The author has succeeded in presenting an inspiring and interesting record of the devotion to duty, fighting spirit, and efficiency of the 6th Gurkhas, which is also a family history. Field-Marshal Sir John Harding and Sir William Slim, himself a '6th Gurkha,' contribute a foreword and introduction respectively. The volume is well produced, illustrated, and is provided with five sketch maps and an index. Among the six excellent appendices is one dealing with uniforms and equipment from 1817 to 1939.

**The Middlesex Regiment (Duke of Cambridge's Own), 1919-1952.** By Lieutenant-Commander P. K. Kemp, F.R.Hist.S., R.N. (Retd.). (Gale and Polden.) 25s.

This book brings the long story of 'The Diehards' up to date. The Regiment suffered the usual reorganizations and reduction of the inter-war years and emerged as a machine gun unit with two Regular and two Territorial battalions which were duplicated in the Summer of 1939. One other battalion had been converted to anti-aircraft.

In December, 1941, the 1st Battalion was one of the two British Regular battalions in the ill-fated garrison of Hong Kong. The Japanese, unopposed in the air and in control of the sea, attacked on 8th December, with two first-class divisions and another in reserve, but it was not until 26th December that the last units of the garrison were forced to surrender. The narrative shows how the Battalion lived up to its traditions; the enemy lost some 4,000 killed and over 9,000 wounded. In September, 1939, the 2nd Battalion mobilized as the machine gun battalion of the 3rd Division and served in that formation throughout the war. The author not only gives a clear account of their achievements, but brings out the fine spirit and marked efficiency of the unit.

Territorial battalions tend to follow the example of their parent unit. This is shown to have been the case in the Middlesex whose Territorial battalions became notably efficient and of high morale. Four battalions served overseas as support battalions in France, North Africa, Sicily, Italy, and North-West Europe, playing an often vital part in most of the major actions. The 2/8th Battalion, reconstituted as the new 1st Battalion on 28th May, 1942, joined the 15th Division and served with the formation from D Day to the end of the war.

In 1948, the 1st and 2nd Battalions were amalgamated and shortly afterwards the 1st Middlesex sailed for Hong Kong. Restored to its normal infantry role and one of the first British units in Korea, the Battalion showed what good infantry can do in all circumstances.

The narrative is well arranged, each battalion's war service being described in separate chapters. In spite of the difficulty of recording the achievements of six battalions, that are normally split up in training and action, the author has succeeded in presenting an excellent and interesting history and in doing justice to the fine services of the Regiment. Lieut.-General Sir Brian Horrocks, himself an old 'Diehard,' adds a tribute to the Cockney soldier in his foreword. The volume is well produced, is illustrated, and is provided with an index and appendices.

**Regiments at a Glance.** By Lieut.-Colonel Frank Wilson. (Blackie and Son.) 7s. 6d.

The author of this book has a well-deserved reputation as a skilful draughtsman and a witty writer, and in this modestly-priced volume he has set himself an aim which he

has fully succeeded in achieving. All the illustrations are in colour, over 40 pages of them, the endpapers show the latest regimental crests, and every page of letterpress is packed with lively information about the raising of regiments, their traditions, special achievements and privileges, titles, and general history.

A fair proportion of the individual figures are shown in uniforms of historical nature; this, with pressure on space, sometimes leads to statements which might make a purist blink; as for example the kilted figure of 1854 on page 72 described as a private of the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders. However, the whole book is carefully planned, infantry regiments being grouped in their modern brigades, and skilful compression allows room not only for corps and services, but even for Yeoman Warders, army apprentices, cadets, and others. One appendix gives head-dresses, shoulder piping, trouser stripes, dates of raising, and the more respectable nicknames, and those disappointed in not finding themselves pictured will find themselves here; another appendix gives some useful notes on No. 1 dress, Colours, and crests. The drawings of No. 1 dress throughout are particularly noteworthy: the sword slings of officers of cavalry should be white and not gold, and the badge of the Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst, should be silver; but these slips merely add zest to eager searchers-out of detail. It is, perhaps, a pity that one of these carefully drawn figures could not have been given to plain, simple battledress. It is a greater pity that the Dorset Regiment's motto should be wrongly given, and that dear old 'Brown Bess' should be maligned again.

Generally speaking, the standard of accuracy is high; exceptionally so, for the author is working in a field where too often gossip and a picturesque looseness cover a good deal of ignorance and pretence. This book is wonderful value for money and abounds with interest and excitement.

**The Uniforms and History of the Scottish Regiments.** By Major R. Money Barnes in collaboration with C. Kennedy Allen. (Seeley Service and Co.) 30s.

Many books on military history are very well written and few but have some value; and yet there is no one book which can be guaranteed to satisfy all readers. There are different levels of depth of interest and acquired knowledge which demand different techniques from authors. Some are written as introductions to vast subjects such as tactics or weapons, others as detailed monographs on single battles or military millinery. Into which category does Major Barnes's work fall? It is a long one, of over 350 pages, excellently printed and bound; 12 coloured plates portray over 80 different uniforms, with more than a couple of dozen line drawings in addition; not only Scottish regiments, Regular, Fencible, Volunteer and Territorial, are dealt with, but their overseas cousins, such as the Calcutta Scottish, the Witwatersrand Rifles, the Byron Regiment, or the 48th Highlanders of Canada.

Very obviously a great deal of effort has been expended in gathering material, for a formidable list of authorities appears amongst those thanked by the author for their help. In the body of the book, however, hardly a single source is quoted, and rumour and regimental tradition are sometimes given as fact. There are no maps and, indeed, since the scene can range from the Cape to Buenos Aires and on to Southern Italy and Egypt on one page or move on another from Burma and Malayá by way of Madagascar to Tobruk, any attempt to keep pace by sketch-maps would be impossible. The style is racy, with plenty of modern allusions, and there is of course a wonderful story to tell.

No two persons will ever agree on the proper proportions to be observed in such a long period of time as that from 1660 to the present day: here the Peninsula is given eight pages as against nine for the Indian Mutiny, seven for the Boer War, and 50 for the two recent world upheavals. There is much imprecision and generalization. Although the general effect may be right the details are very often so blurred as to be meaningless: we are told 'Brown Bess' was in action from 1690 to 1840, that charger loading was invented between 1902 and 1907, that body armour was "finally" discarded in the XVIII Century, that the sole function of the Special Reserve after 1907 was to provide reinforcements for Regular battalions, that regiments were "prohibited" in

1759 from using the Colonel's name as reference. Some one-sixth of the book deals with weapons and uniforms; and here again over-much attempted has results which will displease the experts. No authorities are given for the pictures, which are often too small to show details of the buttons, lace, badges, buckles, belts, pouches, sporrans, head-dress, or weapons on which uniform experts flourish.

This book will fascinate many people who do not know much about the subject, and will drive the knowledgeable to fury and violent uses of blue pencil. Yet who amongst the critics could have done better? There is need of a good one-volume book on the Scottish Regiments, and Major Barnes has made a gallant and spirited effort to supply it.

### AIR

**The Central Blue.** By Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir John Slessor, G.C.B., D.S.O., M.C. (Cassell.) 30s.

In its short existence the Royal Air Force has not had time to accumulate a wealth of literature comparable to that possessed by the older Services, and the appearance of a book by Marshal of the R.A.F. Sir John Slessor is therefore particularly welcome. Sir John Slessor served for more than 40 years in the Royal Air Force, and its predecessor, the Royal Flying Corps, and his career thus covers practically the whole story of the rise and development of air power. He has seen it grow from very small beginnings to a mighty force.

Our people are well aware of what we owe to sea power—as Sir John Slessor says, we have salt water in our veins—and the Navy and the Army are still much more a part of our national life than is the Air Force. He is very conscious of the need to tell the people of this Country what the Air Force has meant to Britain, in the hope that this may lead to a better understanding of what it will mean to us in the future.

No one is better qualified to write such a book, for in addition to his great experience as an airman, Slessor has had unusually close contacts with the Army and the Navy. In his young days he served mainly in army co-operation units, in France and the Middle East in the 1914-18 War, and later in this Country and in India. He was the R.A.F. Instructor at the Staff College, Camberley, from 1931 to 1934. As Commander-in-Chief Coastal Command in 1942, during one of the most critical phases of the Battle of the Atlantic, he worked in very close touch with the Admiralty.

And it is as a great planner and policy-maker that Slessor will always be remembered in the Royal Air Force. As early as 1928, when he was posted to the Plans Branch of the Air Staff, Air Ministry, he found himself in the milieu in which he was so pre-eminently successful. He returned to the Air Ministry as Deputy Director of Plans during the critical years from May, 1937, to the end of 1940, and again as Assistant Chief of Air Staff (Policy) in 1942. No Royal Air Force officer has seen more of policy in the making.

Particularly interesting is his account of the difficulty which the Air Staff encountered in trying to make the Government realize the extent of our shocking weakness in the air before the last war, and the impossibility of waging a successful war against Nazi Germany if it were allowed to continue. As he points out, no Prime Minister could have avoided a shameful surrender at Munich, which was the direct result of years of short-sighted parsimony in our defence budgets, and the refusal of the Government to take effective steps to re-arm before it was too late.

Though the author disclaims any intentions of writing a "potted history", the book is a notable contribution to the history of the Royal Air Force, happily blended with the reflections and recollections of a long and distinguished career. It is to some extent controversial, as any book dealing with the Royal Air Force since its inception is bound to be, but Slessor's wide knowledge of, and sympathy with, the two older Services ensures that he is never unfair or ungenerous. He is careful to avoid overstatement, and his facts and arguments are everywhere supported by adequate references.

This is a book which is valuable to the general reader as well as to the student of war, and it is an important addition to the literature of our Fighting Forces.

## ADDITIONS TO THE LIBRARY

(\*Books for Reference in the Library only)

### GENERAL

- ACONCAGUA. South Face. By René Ferlet and Guy Poulet. Demy 8vo. 209 pages. (Constable, 1956.) 25s.
- THE ANNUAL REGISTER OF WORLD EVENTS, 1955. Edited by Sir Ivison Macadam. Medium 8vo. 505 pages. (Longmans, Green, 1956.) 105s.
- A. V. ROE. By Edward Lanchbery. Demy 8vo. 140 pages. (The Bodley Head, 1956.) 10s. 6d.
- AUTOMATION, FRIEND OR FOE? By R. H. Macmillan. Demy 8vo. 100 pages. (Cambridge University Press, 1956.) 8s. 6d.
- BLOOD ROYAL. By Iain Moncreiffe and Don Pottinger. Crown 4to. 64 pages. (Nelson, 1956.) 12s. 6d.
- THE BRABAZON STORY. By Lord Brabazon. Demy 8vo. 227 pages. (Heinemann, 1956.) 25s.
- BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES. Report by R.I.I.A. Demy 8vo. 224 pages. (R.I.I.A., 1953.) 8s. 6d.
- THE CALIPH OF FONTHILL. By H. A. N. Brockman. Demy 8vo. 219 pages. (Werner Laurie, 1956.) 21s.
- CHANNELS, CLOVES, AND COCONUTS. By Commander C. J. Charlewood, R.N.R. Demy 8vo. 124 pages. (The Western Press, 1956.) 7s. 6d. Presented by the author.
- A CRACKLE OF THORNS. By Sir Alec Seath Kirkbride. Demy 8vo. 201 pages. (John Murray, 1956.) 21s.
- EDWARD VII AND HIS CIRCLE. By Virginia Cowles. Demy 8vo. 378 pages. (Hamish Hamilton, 1956.) 25s.
- EUROPA MINOR. By Lord Kinross. Demy 8vo. 167 pages. (John Murray, 1956.) 18s.
- FERDINAND DE LESSEPS. By Charles Beatty. Demy 8vo. 334 pages. (Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1956.) 30s.
- THE HEART HAS ITS REASONS. By The Duchess of Windsor. Medium 8vo. 381 pages. (Michael Joseph, 1956.) 30s.
- KUWAIT AND HER NEIGHBOURS. By H. R. P. Dickson. Medium 8vo. 627 pages. (Allen and Unwin, 1956.) 75s.
- LIFE IN BRITAIN. By J. D. Scott. Demy 8vo. 273 pages. (Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1956.) 25s.
- NANGA PARBAT PILGRIMAGE. By Hermann Buhl. Medium 8vo. 360 pages. (Hodder and Stoughton, 1956.) 25s.
- THE NEW OUTLINE OF MODERN KNOWLEDGE. By John Holloway and others. Demy 8vo. 623 pages. (Gollancz, 1956.) 18s.
- PARADISE PRECARIOUS. By Howard Williams. Demy 8vo. 290 pages. (The Welcome Press, 1956.) 9s. 6d. Presented by the publishers. (See review in this JOURNAL.)
- PRIVATE ANGELO. By Eric Linklater. Demy 8vo. 272 pages. (Jonathan Cape, 1946.) 10s. 6d.
- THE RISE OF SCOTLAND YARD. By Douglas G. Browne. Demy 8vo. 392 pages. (Harrap, 1956.) 25s.
- SCIENTIFIC WONDERS OF THE ATOMIC AGE. Edited by John W. R. Taylor. Demy 4to. 128 pages. (Macdonald, 1956.) 15s.

- THE SIEGE OF NANGA PARBAT, 1856-1953.** By Paul Bauer. Demy 8vo. 211 pages. (Rupert Hart-Davis, 1956.) 25s.
- THOUGH THE HEAVENS FALL.** By Lord Russell of Liverpool. Medium 8vo. 251 pages. (Cassell, 1956.) 18s.
- TO KISS HIGH HEAVEN.** By J. J. Languepin. Demy 8vo. 199 pages. (William Kimber, 1956.) 21s.
- TWO NATIONS AND KASHMIR.** By Lord Birdwood. Demy 8vo. 237 pages. (Robert Hale, 1956.) 21s.

**GENERAL (SERVICE)**

- BY THE HUNTER'S MOON.** By Michael Blackman. Demy 8vo. 191 pages. (Hodder and Stoughton, 1956.) 15s.
- ESCAPE FROM THE BLOODIED SUN.** By Captain Freddie Guest. Demy 8vo. 192 pages. (Jarrolds, 1956.) 16s.
- HISTORY OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR. VOLUME V. Grand Strategy.** By John Erhman. Medium 8vo. 634 pages. (H.M.S.O., 1956.) 42s. Presented by the publishers. (See review in this JOURNAL.)
- THE LONG ROAD HOME.** By Adrian Vincent. Demy 8vo. 208 pages. (Allen and Unwin, 1956.) 15s. Presented by the publishers.
- MILITARY HERITAGE OF AMERICA.** By R. E. and T. N. Dupuy. Medium 8vo. 794 pages. (McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1956.) \$10. Presented by the publishers. (See review in this JOURNAL.)
- MILITARY POLICY AND NATIONAL SECURITY.** Edited by W. W. Kaufmann. Demy 8vo. 274 pages. (Oxford University Press, 1956.) 30s. Presented by the publishers. (See review in this JOURNAL.)

**NAVAL**

- ARCTIC CONVOY.** By Taffrail. Demy 8vo. 315 pages. (Hodder and Stoughton, 1956.) 16s.
- ARK ROYAL.** By Kenneth Poolman. Demy 8vo. 202 pages. (William Kimber, 1956.) 18s. Presented by the publishers. (See review in this JOURNAL.)
- COMMANDER CRABB.** By Marshall Pugh. Demy 8vo. 166 pages. (Macmillan, 1956.) 12s. 6d.
- A GREAT SEAMAN.** By Admiral Sir William James. Demy 8vo. 190 pages. (Witherby, 1956.) 18s. Presented by the publishers. (See review in this JOURNAL.)
- THE MAGNIFICENT MITSCHER.** By Theodore Taylor. Demy 8vo. 364 pages. (W. W. Norton and Co., New York, 1954.) 52s. 6d.
- \*MERCHANT SHIPS, VOLUME IV, 1956.** Adlard Coles. Demy 8vo. 264 pages. (Adlard Coles Ltd., 1956.) 30s.
- ONE MARINE'S TALE.** By General Sir Leslie Hollis. Demy 8vo. 188 pages. (André Deutsch, 1956.) 15s. Presented by the publishers. (See review in this JOURNAL.)
- U-BOAT KILLER.** By Captain Donald Macintyre. Demy 8vo. 179 pages. (Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1956.) 16s.
- U.S. MARINE OPERATIONS IN KOREA. VOLUME II.** By Lynn Montross and N. A. Canzona. Demy 8vo. 361 pages. (U.S. Marine Corps, 1956.) \$2.50. Presented by the publishers. (See review in this JOURNAL.)
- \*V.C.'s OF THE ROYAL NAVY.** By John Frayn Turner. Demy 8vo. 192 pages. (Harrap, 1956.) 9s. 6d.


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
- BEDOUIN COMMAND.** By Lieut-Colonel Peter Young. Demy 8vo. 203 pages. (William Kimber, 1956.) 21s.

- BLACKBURN'S HEADHUNTERS.** By Philip Harkins. Demy 8vo. 326 pages. (Cassell, 1956.) 16s. Presented by the publishers. (See review in this JOURNAL.)
- CONSPIRACY AMONG GENERALS.** By Wilhelm von Schramm. Demy 8vo. 215 pages. (Allen and Unwin, 1956.) 16s. Presented by the publishers. (See review in this JOURNAL.)
- COOTE BAHADUR.** By E. W. Sheppard. Demy 8vo. 247 pages. (Werner Laurie, 1956.) 25s.
- THE DEAD, THE DYING, AND THE DAMNED.** By D. J. Hollands. Demy 8vo. 451 pages. (Cassell, 1956.) 16s. Presented by the publishers.
- THE FORTRESS.** By Raleigh Trevelyan. Demy 8vo. 222 pages. (Collins, 1956.) 12s. 6d.
- FROM DOWN UNDER TO NIPPON.** By General Walter Krueger. Medium 8vo. 393 pages. (Combat Forces Press, 1953.) 58s.
- GEOFFREY KEYES, V.C., M.C., CROIX DE GUERRE.** By Elizabeth Keyes. Demy 8vo. 278 pages. (George Newnes, 1956.) 21s.
- \*HISTORY OF THE FIFTH ROYAL GURKHA RIFLES. (FRONTIER FORCE). VOLUME II.** Medium 8vo. 522 pages. (Gale and Polden, 1956.) Presented by the Regiment. (See review in this JOURNAL.)
- \*HISTORICAL RECORD OF THE SIXTH GURKHA RIFLES. VOLUME II.** By Lieut-Colonel H. R. K. Gibbs. Demy 8vo. 320 pages. (Gale and Polden, 1955.) Presented by the Regiment. (See review in this JOURNAL.)
- THE HONG KONG VOLUNTEER DEFENCE CORPS IN THE BATTLE FOR HONG KONG, DECEMBER, 1941.** Demy 8vo. 60 pages. (Ye Olde Printerie, Hong Kong.) Presented by L. F. Nicholson, Esq.
- THE MIDDLESEX REGIMENT, 1919-1952.** By Lieut-Comdr. P. K. Kemp. Demy 8vo. 462 pages. (Gale and Polden, 1956.) 25s. Presented by the author. (See review in this JOURNAL.)
- OFFICIAL HISTORY OF THE CANADIAN ARMY IN THE SECOND WORLD WAR. VOLUME II.** By Lieut-Colonel G. W. L. Nicholson. Medium 8vo. 807 pages. (Ministry of National Defence, 1956.) \$3.50. Presented by the publishers.
- THE RELUCTANT LEGIONNAIRE.** By Michael Alexander. Demy 8vo. 196 pages. (Rupert Hart-Davis, 1956.) 16s.
- THE STORY OF THE GUARDS ARMoured DIVISION.** By Captain The Earl of Rosse and Colonel E. R. Hill. Demy 8vo. 320 pages. (Geoffrey Bles, 1956.) 25s.
- THE STRUGGLE FOR THE BORDER.** By Bruce Hutchison. Demy 8vo. 500 pages. (Longmans, 1955.) 30s. Presented by the publishers.

### AIR

- ALPINE PILOT.** By Hermann Geiger. Demy 8vo. 104 pages. (Cassell, 1956.) 10s. 6d.
- MILITARY AIRCRAFT OF THE WORLD.** Reprint from *Flight*. Medium 8vo. 60 pages. (Flight, 1956.) 3s. 6d.
- THE PROVING FLIGHT.** By David Beaty. Demy 8vo. 282 pages. (Secker and Warburg, 1956.) 14s.
- THE QUICK AND THE DEAD.** By W. A. Waterton. Demy 8vo. 237 pages. (Muller, 1956.) 15s.
- SURVIVORS STORY.** By Air Marshal Sir Gerald Gibbs. Demy 8vo. 182 pages. (Hutchinson, 1956.) 18s.
- WAR IN THE AIR.** By Gerald Bowman. Demy 8vo. 224 pages. (Evans, 1956.) 16s.
- WING LEADER.** By Group Captain J. E. Johnson. Demy 8vo. 320 pages. (Chatto and Windus, 1956.) 15s.





## SECRETARY'S NOTES

February, 1956

### ANNIVERSARY MEETING

The Anniversary Meeting will be held at 3 p.m. on Tuesday, 6th March, 1956. The Council will present their Annual Report and Accounts, and there will be an election to fill vacancies on the Council. Copies of the Annual Report and Accounts for 1955 can be obtained on application to the Secretary.

### COUNCIL

#### Elected Members

Lieut.-General C. R. Hardy, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O., R.M., has been elected to the vacancy caused by the retirement of General Sir John C. Westall, K.C.B., C.B.E., R.M.

Captain C. D. C. Noble, D.S.C., V.R.D., R.N.V.R., has been elected to the vacancy caused by the retirement of Captain J. A. Creed, V.R.D., R.N.V.R.

Major-General Sir Julian A. Gascoigne, K.C.V.O., C.B., D.S.O., has resigned on business grounds.

#### Representative Members

Captain G. W. Hawkins, R.N., has accepted the Council's invitation to serve as the Admiralty Representative vice Captain W. A. Adair, D.S.O., O.B.E., R.N., posted.

Air Vice-Marshal G. D. Harvey, C.B., C.B.E., D.F.C., has accepted the Council's invitation to serve as the Air Ministry Representative vice Air Vice-Marshal The Earl of Bandon, C.B., C.V.O., D.S.O., posted.

#### Ex Officio Members

Air Chief Marshal Sir Dermot A. Boyle, K.C.V.O., K.B.E., C.B., A.F.C., has accepted the Council's invitation to become an ex officio Member of the Council on taking up the appointment of Chief of the Air Staff.

Admiral The Hon. Sir Guy H. E. Russell, G.B.E., K.C.B., D.S.O., has accepted the Council's invitation to become an ex officio Member of the Council on taking up the appointment of Commandant, Imperial Defence College, vice Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur P. M. Sanders, G.C.B., K.B.E., A.D.C.

### NEW MEMBERS

The following officers joined the Institution between 7th October, 1955, and 9th January, 1956:—

#### NAVY

Lieutenant-Commander J. S. Pallot, R.N.  
Commander T. Wheeldon, M.B.E., R.N.  
Captain N. W. Duck, D.S.C., R.D., R.N.R.  
Lieutenant-Commander A. M. Dennis, R.N.  
Commander A. T. Darley, R.N.

#### ARMY

Lieutenant J. W. Lawrence, The Seaforth Highlanders of Canada.  
Colonel A. J. Kerry, O.B.E., late Royal Canadian Engineers.  
Captain E. Ansell, The Royal Sussex Regiment.  
Captain D. E. J. Pope, R.A.O.C.  
2nd Lieutenant D. W. L. Robinson, Royal Artillery.  
Captain M. A. Q. Darley, Royal Horse Guards.  
Captain R. B. Salt, Royal Artillery.  
Captain P. L. Morgan, R.A.S.C.  
Captain R. L. C. Tamplin, 17th/21st Lancers.

Captain D. M. R. Eagan, Royal Engineers.  
 Lieutenant P. F. Walter, The Royal Lincolnshire Regiment.  
 Captain P. W. G. Seabrook, Royal Artillery.  
 Major-General T. W. Rees, C.B., C.I.E., D.S.O., M.C.  
 Colonel J. J. Packard.  
 Captain P. K. Upton, 11th Hussars.  
 Lieut.-General Sir Maurice Chilton, K.B.E., C.B.  
 Major K. C. P. Ive, 17th/21st Lancers.  
 Captain H. Rothwell, Royal Signals.  
 Lieutenant M. A. Khwaja, Royal Pakistan Engineers.  
 Lieut.-Colonel S. L. A. Carter, M.B.E., M.C., The Sherwood Foresters.  
 Major E. E. McCurdy, E.D., The Wellington Regiment, N.Z.  
 Lieutenant M. H. Potter-Irwin, Westminster Dragoons.  
 Brigadier H. S. Cilliers, O.B.E., South Africa Staff Corps.  
 Lieut.-Colonel G. E. Swinton, late The East Surrey Regiment.  
 Captain A. C. Garrett, Royal Artillery.  
 Lieut.-Colonel D. H. M. Gibson, R.A.O.C.  
 Major E. W. Manners, M.B.E., 3rd Carabiniers.  
 Captain J. Mollo, The Queen's Royal Regiment, T.A.  
 Captain B. E. Hutton-Williams, M.B.E., Intelligence Corps.  
 Captain R. L. C. Dixon, M.C., Royal Tank Regiment.  
 Brigadier G. R. D. Musson, C.B.E., D.S.O.  
 2nd Lieutenant J. B. J. Halford, Royal Signals.  
 Brigadier G. P. Crampton, O.B.E., M.C., late Indian Army.  
 Major M. E. Keelan-Shaw, 3rd/4th County of London Yeomanry.  
 Captain H. D. R. Mackay, The Highland Light Infantry.  
 Major G. C. Chatfield-Roberts, T.D., The City of London Yeomanry.  
 Major D. L. G. Begbie, M.C., Royal Engineers.  
 Major D. H. Hawkins, M.C., M.M., 15th/19th The King's Royal Hussars.  
 Brigadier J. R. C. Gannon, C.B.E., M.V.O.  
 Major J. D. Power, Royal Artillery.  
 Major P. G. Bennett, Q.A.R.A.N.C.  
 Major H. S. Spens, M.B.E., M.C., T.D., The Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders.  
 Captain A. M. Gabb, The Worcestershire Regiment.  
 Captain B. C. Carter, Royal Artillery.  
 Brigadier B. Fergusson, D.S.O., O.B.E.  
 Lieut.-Colonel C. S. Durnell, O.B.E., late The Queen's Own Royal West Kent Regiment.

#### AIR FORCE

Flying Officer A. R. Stevens, R.A.F.  
 Wing Commander M. D. Thunder, R.A.F.  
 Wing Commander R. R. Goodbody, O.B.E., R.A.F.  
 Wing Commander H. B. Scully, R.A.F.  
 Air Commodore H. E. Nowell, C.B., O.B.E.  
 Squadron Leader R. W. Jordan, D.F.C., R.A.F.  
 Flight Lieutenant A. J. Hone, R.A.F.  
 Flight Lieutenant J. H. J. Lovell, R.A.F.  
 Air Commodore S. C. Elworthy, C.B.E., D.S.O., M.V.O., D.F.C., A.F.C.  
 Flight Lieutenant B. R. Butler, R.A.F.  
 Air Vice-Marshal D. V. Carnegie, C.B., C.B.E., A.F.C.  
 Squadron Leader G. A. White, R.C.A.F.  
 Flight Lieutenant P. Lithgow, R.A.F.  
 Squadron Leader D. W. Bedford, R.A.F.  
 Squadron Leader A. F. Stephenson, R.A.F.V.R.  
 Wing Commander B. D. Sellick, D.S.O., D.F.C., R.A.F.

**CIVIL SERVICE**

F. Grinsted, Esq., Ministry of Supply.  
J. B. Masefield, Esq., Colonial Police Service.

**CORRECTION**

In the list published in the last issue, the details of Major-General W. J. V. Windeyer are cancelled and the following substituted :—

Major-General W. J. V. Windeyer, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O., E.D., Australian Army.

**PRIZE MEMBERSHIP**

Pilot Officer N. M. J. Fraser, R.A.F., has been awarded five years' free membership of the Institution.

**COVENANTED SUBSCRIPTIONS**

The Council hope that many more members will support the scheme for covenanted subscriptions, details of which have been circulated.

This materially assists the Institution as it enables income tax at the full current rate to be reclaimed on each subscription and goes a long way towards meeting the increased essential costs of administration.

To date, there are 1,276 annual and 205 life covenanted members.

Any member who has not received his copy of the scheme or who requires new forms is requested to communicate with the Secretary.

**LIAISON OFFICERS**

With the object of making the facilities afforded by membership of the Institution better known to the Services, the Council have invited the principal Commands at home and overseas to nominate Liaison Officers.

It is hoped that the Liaison Officers will be able to suggest, from time to time, ways in which the Institution can be of greater value to the serving officer.

Liaison Officers are provided with particulars of the Institution and forms to enable them to enrol members without further formality.

The following is a list of officers who have been nominated as Liaison Officers, and the Commands or Establishments they represent :—

<i>Establishment or Command</i>	<i>Name</i>
Amphibious Warfare Headquarters	Lieut.-Colonel N. H. D. McGill, R.M.
Joint Services Staff College ...	Major P. E. C. Tuckey, M.B.E.
British Joint Services Mission, Washington.	Commander B. C. Moth, M.B.E., R.N.

**ROYAL NAVY**

Home Fleet ... ..	Captain J. O. H. Gairdner, O.B.E., R.N.
Flag Officer Air (Home) ... ..	Lieut.-Commander M. L. Y. Ainsworth, R.N.
Flag Officer, Scotland ... ..	Commander J. S. H. Lawrence, R.N.
H.M.S. <i>Excellent</i> ... ..	Commander R. J. L. Hammond, R.N.
H.M.S. <i>Dryad</i> ... ..	Lieut.-Commander A. E. Fanning, D.S.C., R.N.
H.M.S. <i>Vernon</i> ... ..	Lieut.-Commander M. L. Stacey, R.N.
Flag Officer, Submarines ... ..	Captain A. R. Hezlet, D.S.O., D.S.C., R.N.
Reserve Fleet ... ..	Instructor-Commander P. G. Osborn, R.N.
Chatham ... ..	Commander G. H. Evans, R.N., R.N. Barracks.
Devonport ... ..	Commander L. E. S. H. Le Bailly, R.N., H.M.S. <i>Thunderer</i> .

Portsmouth ... ..	Lieut.-Commander R. E. S. Wykes-Sneyd, R.N., R.N. Barracks.
R.N. College, Greenwich ... ..	Major W. S. B. Gunn, M.C., R.A.
Portsmouth Group, R.M. ... ..	Lieutenant F. C. Darwall, R.M.
Plymouth Group, R.M. ... ..	Captain L. Wild, R.M.

## ARMY

Eastern Command ... ..	Lieut.-Colonel W. C. Walker, D.S.O., O.B.E.
Northern Command ... ..	Colonel G. S. Fillingham, M.C.
Northern Ireland District ... ..	Major A. W. R. Currie.
Scottish Command ... ..	Lieut.-Colonel G. L. Auret, O.B.E.
Southern Command ... ..	Major G. B. Griffiths.
Western Command ... ..	Major A. G. Evans.
East Africa Command ... ..	Major J. H. Holmes
Far East Land Forces ... ..	Major H. R. Bestley.
B.A.O.R. ... ..	Lieut.-Colonel T. N. S. Wheeler.
Staff Collège, Camberley ... ..	Lieut.-Colonel F. W. Young, M.B.E.
Pakistan Military Academy, Kakul	Major O. U. Qasim.

## ROYAL AIR FORCE

Bomber Command ... ..	Group Captain L. E. Giles, O.B.E., D.F.C., A.F.C.
Fighter Command ... ..	Squadron Leader B. T. Procter.
Coastal Command ... ..	Wing Commander R. E. G. Van der Kiste, D.S.O.
Flying Training Command ... ..	Wing Commander D. F. Dixon.
Technical Training Command ... ..	Squadron Leader C. E. Blackburn.
Transport Command ... ..	Wing Commander A. Reece, D.S.O., D.F.C., A.F.C.
Maintenance Command ... ..	Wing Commander O. Gradon, O.B.E.
Home Command ... ..	Squadron Leader K. S. Booth.
Far East Air Force... ..	Wing Commander C. N. Foxley-Norris, D.S.O.
Second Tactical Air Force... ..	Wing Commander G. A. V. Clayton, D.F.C.

**GOLD MEDAL AND TRENCH GASCOIGNE PRIZE  
ESSAY COMPETITION, 1955**

The following entries were received :—

- "Take flight and fight."
- "The quality and hair of our attempt brooks no division."
- "More than somewhat."
- "Dixit insipiens."
- "Quis custodiet . . . ?"
- "Tria Juncta in Uno."
- "In trinitate robur."
- "Hard is the stone, but harder still  
The delicate performing will  
That guided by a dream alone,  
Subdues and moulds the hardest stone  
Making the sullen jade release  
The emblem of eternal peace."
- "Carpent tua poma nepotes."
- "We are in the hand of God, brother, not in theirs."
- "Quand ce coq chantera, je changerai."

"Hellish dark and smells of cheese."

"Dum Spiro Spero." \*

"Nimrod."

"'Off with his head!' she said without even looking round."

"By uniting we stand. By dividing we fall."

"Peace is liberty in tranquillity."

### **GOLD MEDAL AND TRENCH GASCOIGNE PRIZE ESSAY COMPETITION, 1956**

Particulars of the current competition will be found in the leaflet in this JOURNAL.

### **MUSEUM**

#### **ADDITIONS**

A naval officer's fighting sword, 1833; another of 1835; an infantry officer's fighting sword, 1803; and a midshipman's dirk, 1885 (9688-9691). Presented by Captain H. T. A. Bosanquet, C.V.O., R.N.

### **JOURNAL**

Offers of suitable contributions to the JOURNAL are invited. Confidential matter cannot be used, but there is ample scope for professional articles which contain useful lessons of recent wars; also contributions of a general Service character, such as strategic principles, command and leadership, morale, staff work, and naval, military, and air force history, customs, and traditions.

The editor is authorized to receive articles from serving officers, and, if found suitable, to seek permission for their publication from the appropriate Service Department.

Army officers are reminded that such articles must be accompanied by the written approval of the author's commanding officer.

### **REPRINT OF LECTURES**

Copies of the lectures given by Field-Marshal The Viscount Montgomery of Alamein are available at 1s. each, post paid.

*A Look Through a Window at World War III.* (October, 1954.)

*Organization for War in Modern Times.* (October, 1955.)

### **ADDITION TO LECTURE PROGRAMME**

A lecture on *Generalship and the Art of Command in this Nuclear Age* will be given by General Sir Richard N. Gale, G.C.B., K.B.E., D.S.O., M.C., A.D.C., on Wednesday, 11th April, 1956, at 3 p.m.

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## SECRETARY'S NOTES

May, 1956

### COUNCIL

#### Chairman of the Council

Air Chief Marshal Sir Norman Bottomley, K.C.B., C.I.E., D.S.O., A.F.C., has been elected Chairman of the Council for 1956.

#### Vice-Chairman of the Council

Admiral Sir Geoffrey Oliver, G.B.E., K.C.B., D.S.O., has been elected Vice-Chairman of the Council for 1956.

#### Vice-Presidents

Field-Marshal Sir Claude Auchinleck, G.C.B., G.C.I.E., C.S.I., D.S.O., O.B.E., LL.D.; Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir Edward Ellington, G.C.B., C.M.G., C.B.E.; and Admiral Sir Charles Little, G.C.B., G.B.E., have been re-elected Vice-Presidents of the Institution.

#### Elected Members

These are recorded in the Proceedings of the 125th Anniversary Meeting published in this issue of the JOURNAL.

#### Ex Officio Member

Major-General P. N. White, C.B., C.B.E., has accepted the invitation of the Council to serve as an ex officio member on taking up the appointment of Commandant, Joint Services Staff College.

### NEW MEMBERS

The following officers joined the Institution between 10th January and 9th April, 1956:—

#### NAVY

Sub-Lieutenant R. H. Roberts, R.C.N. (Reserve).  
Lieutenant J. T. Tomlinson, R.N.  
Commander D. A. Rayner, D.S.C., V.R.D., R.N.V.R.  
Commander J. H. Stenning, R.N.  
Lieutenant-Commander G. L. Milne, R.N.  
Captain M. N. Tugwell, D.S.C., R.N.  
Commander W. A. E. Hall, R.N.  
Lieutenant-Commander I. R. Bowden, R.N.  
Commander P. S. Beale, R.N.  
Captain A. M. Hodge, G.C., V.R.D., R.N.V.R.  
Lieutenant J. F. T. Van Oss, R.N.  
Captain E. A. Brock, R.C.N. (Retd.).

#### ARMY

Major G. R. Dockerill, M.B.E., The King's Own Royal Regiment.  
Captain S. R. O. Shearburn, The Queen's Own Royal West Kent Regiment.  
Captain A. I. Luty, R.A.S.C.  
Captain W. R. Robertson, The Royal Scots Greys.  
Lieut.-Colonel G. A. White, M.B.E., The East Surrey Regiment.  
Major-General C. F. C. Coleman, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., O.B.E.  
Lieut.-Colonel P. G. Palmer, R.E.M.E.  
Lieut.-Colonel U. E. C. Carnegy, Her Majesty's Body Guard.  
Brigadier N. A. Shah, Bahawalpur State Forces.  
Captain P. R. Knowles, Royal Engineers.  
Captain J. N. P. Watson, Royal Horse Guards.  
Colonel G. J. Folkard, late R.A.E.C.  
Lieut.-Colonel J. Morris, The Gloucestershire Regiment.  
Major I. S. Grewal, Indian Army.

## SECRETARY'S NOTES

Lieut.-Colonel D. L. Lloyd Owen, D.S.O., O.B.E., M.C., The Queen's Royal Regiment.  
 Colonel H. M. Salmon, C.B.E., M.C., late The Welch Regiment.  
 Major-General M. H. K. Khattak, Pakistan Army.  
 Major M. H. Broadway, Royal Signals.  
 Major D. E. Harris, The Dorset Regiment.  
 Captain T. A. Batchelar, The Worcestershire Regiment.  
 Captain R. G. A. Leman, The Worcestershire Regiment.  
 Captain J. A. Speirs, 3rd Carabiniers.  
 Major G. Pollard, M.C., M.M., T.D., The Parachute Regiment, T.A.  
 Brigadier R. C. Elstone, O.B.E., M.C.  
 Lieut.-Colonel F. C. Marks, R.A.S.C. (Retd.).  
 Captain A. B. I. Fuller, 3rd The King's Own Hussars.  
 2nd Lieutenant R. P. Wade, R.A.S.C., T.A.R.O.  
 Lieut.-Colonel R. M. Hector, R.A.M.C.  
 Captain E. S. G. Green, late The Gordon Highlanders.  
 Major F. R. I. Williams, The Royal Fusiliers, R.A.R.O.  
 Lieut.-Colonel R. A. Klaehn, M.B.E., C.D., Canadian Army.  
 Captain J. S. Houston, Seaforth Highlanders.  
 Major H. N. Shingal, The Garhwal Rifles, I.A.  
 Major K. Y. Khan, The Deccan Horse, I.A.  
 2nd Lieutenant Abdul Rahman Bin Haji Khamis, Malay Regiment.  
 Major J. G. Sloman, Royal Australian Army Medical Corps.

## AIR FORCE

Wing Commander A. H. Humphrey, O.B.E., D.F.C., A.F.C., R.A.F.  
 Flight Lieutenant T. P. D. La Touche, R.A.F.  
 Squadron Leader L. T. Mersham, R.A.F.  
 Flight Lieutenant G. W. Sicotte, D.F.C., R.C.A.F. Reserve.  
 Squadron Leader R. Crouch, D.F.C., R.A.F.  
 Flight Lieutenant B. R. A. Cox, A.F.C., R.A.F.  
 Squadron Leader R. H. McV. Redfern, R.A.F.  
 Flight Lieutenant S. C. B. Parker, D.F.C., R.A.F.  
 Wing Commander W. J. Burnett, D.S.O., D.F.C., A.F.C., R.A.F.  
 Group Captain G. B. Singh, I.A.F.  
 Flight Lieutenant W. G. Hester, R.A.F.  
 Flight Lieutenant T. J. Bradbury, R.A.F.  
 Squadron Leader J. L. Goldby, R.A.F.  
 Wing Commander C. J. G. Ferguson, R.A.F.  
 Flight Lieutenant W. J. Herrington, R.A.F.

## CIVIL SERVICE

J. W. Simpson, Esq., Ministry of Supply.

## PRIZE MEMBERSHIP

Acting Sub-Lieutenant J. C. List, R.N., 2nd Lieutenant W. R. Sefton, R.A., 2nd Lieutenant M. O. Barton, R.E., and Pilot Officer F. W. Daley, R.A.F., have been awarded five years' free membership of the Institution.

## COVENANTED SUBSCRIPTIONS

The Council hope that many more members will support the scheme for covenanted subscriptions, details of which have been circulated.

This materially assists the Institution as it enables income tax at the full current rate to be reclaimed on each subscription and goes a long way towards meeting the increased essential costs of administration.

To date, there are 1,284 annual and 219 life covenanted members.

Any member who has not received his copy of the scheme or who requires new forms is requested to communicate with the Secretary.

### LIAISON OFFICERS

The following alteration to the list of Liaison Officers, as published in February, has taken place :—

<i>Command</i>		<i>Name</i>
<b>ARMY</b>		
Southern Command	... ..	Lieut.-Colonel D. J. Cable, O.B.E., M.C.

### MUSEUM

#### ADDITIONS

Four army swords, which belonged to members of the Bellasis family (9692-95). Given by Captain R. Oliver-Bellasis, C.B., C.V.O., R.N., and Lieut.-Colonel J. Oliver-Bellasis, D.S.O.

Two small books and a copper book-plate die connected with the sinking of H.M.S. *Royal George*, 1781 (9696). Given by Colonel A. S. Bates.

A walking stick which belonged to Marie Antoinette (9697). Given by Mrs. C. H. L. Alder.

### JOURNAL

Offers of suitable contributions to the JOURNAL are invited. Confidential matter cannot be used, but there is ample scope for professional articles which contain useful lessons of recent wars ; also contributions of a general Service character, such as strategic principles, command and leadership, morale, staff work, and naval, military, and air force history, customs, and traditions.

The editor is authorized to receive articles from serving officers, and, if found suitable, to seek permission for their publication from the appropriate Service Department.

Army officers are reminded that such articles must be accompanied by the written approval of the author's commanding officer.

### CHANGE OF ADDRESS

Members are particularly requested to notify any change of address which will affect the dispatch of the JOURNAL.

Naval officers are strongly advised to keep the Institution informed of their address, as JOURNALS sent to them via C.W. Branch of the Admiralty are invariably greatly delayed.

As a serving officer is liable to frequent changes of station, it is better for such members to register either a permanent home or a bank address.

### POSTAL SERVICE BY AIR MAIL


In order to keep the annual membership subscription to the lowest possible rate it is not economic in normal circumstances for the Institution to send letters, etc., overseas by air mail. Members who require answers by this service should enclose the necessary international reply coupons when making an enquiry.

### REPRINT OF LECTURES

Copies of the lectures given by Field-Marshal The Viscount Montgomery of Alamein are available at 1s. each, post paid.

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*Organization for War in Modern Times.* (October, 1955.)



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## SECRETARY'S NOTES

August, 1956

### COUNCIL

#### Elected Member

Air Chief Marshal Sir Walter L. Dawson, K.C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O., has been elected a Member of the Council in the vacancy approved at the Anniversary Meeting, 1956.

#### Ex Officio Member

Air Vice-Marshal D. H. F. Barnett, C.B., C.B.E., D.F.C., has accepted the invitation of the Council to become an ex Officio Member of the Council on taking up the appointment of Commandant of the Royal Air Force Staff College, Bracknell.

### NEW MEMBERS

The following officers joined the Institution between 10th April and 11th July, 1956 :—

#### NAVY

Lieutenant-Commander H. E. R. Bain, R.N.  
Cadet J. Drent, R.C.N.(R).  
Lieutenant T. I. Scott-Bell, R.M.  
Commander I. G. Mason, R.N.  
Lieutenant-Commander C. B. Koester, R.C.N.(R).  
Commander K. A. Sellar, R.N. (Retd.).

#### ARMY

Colonel G. Weir, Canadian Army.  
Captain P. A. Sweet, Royal Artillery.  
Major D. T. W. Gibson, M.B.E., Royal Signals.  
Lieut.-Colonel W. C. Smith, The Suffolk Regiment.  
Major F. W. A. Hobart, Royal Artillery.  
Captain J. M. N. Lyons, Royal Signals.  
Captain E. M. Rolley, R.A.O.C.  
Captain H. E. H. Newman, Royal Engineers.  
Captain D. R. Jolley, R.A.O.C.  
Captain C. E. Potts, The Worcestershire Regiment.  
Lieut.-Colonel R. E. Loder, The Royal Sussex Regiment.  
Captain G. W. N. Obbard, Royal Engineers.  
Captain H. M. J. Robertson-Young, R.A.S.C.  
Officer Cadet T. C. F. Howard, Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst.  
Captain J. R. Cornell, The Rifle Brigade.  
Captain G. M. C. Cottrill, Royal Artillery.  
Captain R. L. Wallis, R.A.S.C.  
Lieut.-Colonel T. M. Eggar, The London Scottish.  
Captain A. J. W. Rosser, late Royal Engineers.  
Major F. S. Clark, The South Staffordshire Regiment, T.A.  
Captain G. B. Horridge, Royal Artillery.  
Major M. I. Qureshi, Pakistan Army.  
Captain F. E. Hellier, R.A.S.C.  
Lieutenant B. E. Blunt, Royal Artillery.  
Captain W. R. A. Selbie, R.A.S.C.  
Captain D. L. Church, R.A.O.C.  
Captain P. A. Gouldsbury, late Royal Gurkha Rifles (F.F.).  
Captain G. Allsopp, The East Lancashire Regiment.  
Major H. S. P. Brooke, Royal Artillery.  
Lieutenant M. J. Campbell-Lamerton, The Duke of Wellington's Regiment.  
Captain N. I. B. Speller, R.A.S.C.  
Captain the Hon. J. de Grey, M.C., Royal Artillery.

Captain G. A. M. Kelly, R.A.S.C.  
 Captain P. L. Crosby, R.A.O.C.  
 Captain D. C. Boyall, 15th/19th The King's Royal Hussars.  
 Captain R. T. Bogg, The Royal Leicestershire Regiment.  
 Captain D. P. T. Deshon, Royal Artillery.  
 Major P. L. Graham, Royal Artillery.  
 Captain R. L. Stonham, Royal Signals.  
 Captain B. R. Biggs, R.A.O.C.  
 Major G. W. Blackburne, Royal Signals.  
 Captain J. R. M. Dewing, Royal Horse Artillery.  
 Major A. H. Masterman, late The South Lancashire Regiment.

#### AIR FORCE

Flight Lieutenant J. H. Elliott, R.A.F.  
 Squadron Leader A. M. M. Hill, D.F.C., D.F.M., R.A.F.  
 Flight Lieutenant R. W. Gordon, R.A.F.  
 Flight Lieutenant K. M. Oliver, R.A.F.  
 Squadron Leader A. W. Tarry, R.A.F.  
 Wing Commander A. E. Burton, F.R.C.S., R.A.F.V.R.

#### CIVIL SERVICE

N. Hinchliffe, Esq.

#### CORRECTION

In the list of new members published in the last issue, Captain M. N. Tugwell, D.S.C., R.N., should read Captain M. N. Tufnell, D.S.C., R.N.

#### PRIZE MEMBERSHIP

Acting Sub-Lieutenant K. Holliday, R.N., has been awarded five years' free membership of the Institution.

#### COVENANTED SUBSCRIPTIONS

The Council hope that many more members will support the scheme for covenanted subscriptions, details of which have been circulated.

This materially assists the Institution as it enables income tax at the full current rate to be reclaimed on each subscription and goes a long way towards meeting the increased essential costs of administration.

To date, there are 1,287 annual and 225 life covenanted members.

Any member who has not received his copy of the scheme or who requires new forms is requested to communicate with the Secretary.

#### LIAISON OFFICERS

The following is added :—

<i>Command</i>	<i>Name</i>
No. 90 Group, Royal Air Force ...	Wing Commander F. G. Carroll, R.A.F.

The following alterations to the list published in February have taken place :—

<i>Command</i>	<i>Name</i>
Reserve Fleet ... ..	Instructor Commander F. R. Henwood, R.N.
Far East Land Forces ... ..	Major G. E. M. Slater.
Far East Air Forces ... ..	Wing Commander E. C. Badcoe, D.F.C.

#### MUSEUM

##### ADDITIONS

The China Medal awarded to W. A. Collett (9698). Given by Miss S. R. Collett.

A group of five medals awarded to Lieutenant T. Viall (9699). Given by Mrs. G. W. Pritchard.

A group of five medals awarded to Lieutenant D. K. Minto (9700). Given by G. A. Minto, Esq.

Nine medals awarded to relatives of the donor (9701). Given by Mrs. E. A. Riddell.

The service dress uniform of Admiral Sir Walter Henry Cowan, K.C.B., D.S.O., M.V.O., worn by him as Hon. Colonel of the 18th King Edward VII's Own Cavalry (9702). Given by Miss M. G. R. Cowan.

#### CORRECTION

For detail of 9696 in the May, 1956, Journal substitute:—

Two small books and a copper book plate die which belonged to Rear-Admiral Richard Kempfenfelt. Given by Mrs. A. S. Bates.

#### JOURNAL

Offers of suitable contributions to the JOURNAL are invited. Confidential matter cannot be used, but there is ample scope for professional articles which contain useful lessons of recent wars; also contributions of a general Service character, such as strategic principles, command and leadership, morale, staff work, and naval, military, and air force history, customs, and traditions.

The editor is authorized to receive articles from serving officers, and, if found suitable, to seek permission for their publication from the appropriate Service Department.

Army officers are reminded that such articles must be accompanied by the written approval of the author's commanding officer.

#### LECTURES

The programme of lectures for the first half of the 1956-57 session is published with this number of the JOURNAL. Certain lectures are restricted to members only and no exception can be made to this rule other than for guests officially invited by the Council.

There is an extension of the loudspeaker system from the Lecture Theatre to the Reading Room for use as required. Members and their guests will on arrival be accommodated in the theatre until it is full, when the excess number will be directed to the Reading Room.

Tickets are not issued for any lectures and seats cannot be reserved, other than for official guests.

#### REPRINT OF LECTURES

Copies of the lectures given by Field-Marshal The Viscount Montgomery of Alamein are available at 1s. each, post paid.

*A Look Through a Window at World War III.* (October, 1954.)

*Organization for War in Modern Times.* (October, 1955.)

#### CHRISTMAS CARDS

Orders for Christmas cards, specially designed for members of the Institution, can now be placed.

Card A has the crest of the Institution on the outside and inside a reproduction of a black and white sketch of Vanbrugh House in Whitehall Yard, the first home of the Institution. The price, including envelopes, is 12s. a dozen.

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Postage and packing in each case is 10d. for each dozen by ordinary mail.

Members are requested to ensure that the correct remittance, including postage, is sent with their orders. It is regretted that *orders cannot be executed until payment is made.*

Sample cards can only be sent against a remittance of 1s. 2d. for the A type and 1s. 8d. for the B.



## SECRETARY'S NOTES

November, 1956

### COUNCIL

#### Ex Officio Member

Captain A. R. Hezlet, D.S.O., D.S.C., R.N., has accepted the invitation of the Council to become an ex officio Member of the Council on taking up the appointment of Director of the Royal Naval Staff College vice Captain R. A. Ewing, D.S.C., R.N.

### NEW MEMBERS

The following officers joined the Institution between 12th July and 12th October, 1956 :—

#### NAVY

Captain S. W. Roskill, D.S.C., R.N. (Retd.).  
Sub-Lieutenant R. S. D. de Chair, R.N.  
Commander G. B. Harris, R.N.  
Colonel R. C. de M. Leathes, M.V.O., O.B.E., R.M.  
Sub-Lieutenant C. A. Pincombe, R.C.N. (R.) (Retd.).  
Lieut.-Commander H. H. Cook, M.B.E., R.N. (Retd.).  
Chief Officer J. Davies, M.B.E., W.R.N.S.

#### ARMY

Lieutenant J. P. Jordan, Royal Artillery.  
Captain S. McCloghry, Royal Engineers.  
Colonel W. J. Miller, O.B.E., R.E.M.E.  
Captain P. G. Hicks, Royal Artillery.  
Captain R. H. Marshall, Royal Engineers.  
Captain D. M. Jefferis, Royal Engineers.  
Captain A. H. Dennis, Royal Signals.  
2nd Lieutenant G. J. S. Ogden, The King's Shropshire Light Infantry.  
Major A. E. Arnold, M.B.E., Royal Engineers.  
Lieut.-Colonel K. B. Langdon, Royal Artillery.  
Captain A. E. G. Chapman, Ceylon Light Infantry.  
Captain J. W. Herbert, R.A.O.C.  
Major T. A. Matheson, Coldstream Guards.  
Captain P. G. Barry, Royal Tank Regiment.  
Major A. R. L. Taunton, 6th Gurkha Rifles.  
Captain B. Henderson, Royal Artillery, T.A.  
Captain J. F. Ware, Royal Engineers.  
Major R. S. Laws, Royal Artillery.  
Captain F. B. L. Leeson, R.A.S.C.  
Major W. D. McNaughton, M.B.E., 6th Gurkha Rifles.  
Captain J. C. Beck, R.A.E.C.  
Officer Cadet C. R. M. Fillingham, Royal Military Academy.  
Lieut.-Colonel P. H. Smitherman, Royal Signals.  
Captain P. M. Will, Royal Tank Regiment.  
Captain W. F. G. Hayes, B.E.M., R.A.O.C.  
Captain J. L. Donne, Royal Signals.  
Captain E. A. J. Parry, The Worcestershire Regiment.  
Major F. J. T. Durie, M.B.E., Royal Artillery.  
Major M. N. Murphy, R.A.S.C.  
Major J. P. Craw, Royal Artillery.  
Captain A. M. Jenkins, 7th Gurkha Rifles.  
Captain R. A. W. Reynolds, The King's Regiment.  
Lieut.-Colonel J. H. H. Gladstone, R.A.E.C.

Major J. R. Burgess, M.B.E., The Somerset Light Infantry.  
 Lieut.-Colonel The Lord Birdwood, M.V.O., late Indian Army.  
 Lieutenant G. J. W. Elledge, Royal Engineers.  
 Captain P. A. E. Herring, The King's Own Yorkshire Light Infantry.  
 Major C. B. Welch, The Royal Warwickshire Regiment.  
 Captain E. E. Hunt, 13th/18th Royal Hussars.  
 Lieut.-Colonel R. B. Readhead, D.S.O., 12th Royal Lancers.  
 Captain J. W. G. Pirie, The King's Royal Rifle Corps.

#### AIR FORCE

Flight Lieutenant C. G. D. Jonklaas, R.A.F.  
 Squadron Leader R. H. Petchey, R.A.F.  
 Squadron Leader J. D. Edwards, R.A.F.  
 Flight Lieutenant S. L. H. Bostock, R.A.F. (Retd.).  
 Wing Commander A. C. Watson, R.A.F.  
 Flight Lieutenant H. F. Bishop, R.A.F.  
 Air Commodore J. Grandy, C.B., D.S.O.  
 Flight Lieutenant E. J. Atkinson, R.A.F.  
 Flying Officer M. J. O'Brien, R.Aux.A.F. Regiment.  
 Flight Lieutenant J. Pinsent, R.A.F.V.R.

#### CIVIL SERVICE

J. A. Peduzie, Esq., Air Ministry.  
 R. W. Bevan, Esq., Air Ministry.  
 D. C. C. Luddington, Esq., Graduate, Joint Services Staff College.  
 R. E. Hill, Esq., Air Ministry.

#### PRIZE MEMBERSHIP

Acting Sub-Lieutenant A. J. Goodenough, R.N., and Pilot Officer D. C. G. Brook, R.A.F., have been awarded five years' free membership of the Institution.

#### COVENANTED SUBSCRIPTIONS

The Council hope that many more members will support the scheme for covenanted subscriptions, details of which have been circulated.

This materially assists the Institution as it enables income tax at the full current rate to be reclaimed on each subscription and goes a long way towards meeting the increased essential costs of administration.

To date, there are 1,291 annual and 234 life covenanted members.

Any member who has not received his copy of the scheme or who requires new forms is requested to communicate with the Secretary.

#### LIAISON OFFICERS

The following alterations to the list published in February have taken place :—

<i>Command</i>	<i>Name</i>
Portsmouth ... ..	Lieut.-Commander R. F. Park, R.N., R.N. Barracks.
Fighter Command ... ..	Squadron Leader R. D. Sheardown, O.B.E.
Transport Command ... ..	Squadron Leader C. L. Godwin, A.F.C.

## MUSEUM

### ADDITIONS

Three medals and a plaque awarded to Major C. O. von Truenfels, Honourable Artillery Company (9703). Given by Miss R. G. Grice.

Four buttons found on the battlefield of Stoney Creek, 6th June, 1813 (9704). Given by Field-Marshal the Viscount Montgomery of Alamein, K.G., G.C.B., D.S.O.

A full-dress uniform of the King's (Edward VII) Bodyguard for Scotland (The Royal Company of Archers) (9705). Given by Major R. C. Campbell.

A group of three medals awarded to Gunner M. O'Bryan, Coast Brigade Royal Artillery (9706). Given by E. W. Shephard, Esq.

A full-dress busby and an undress cap, 8th King's Royal Irish Hussars (9707). Given by Mrs. Newall Watson.

The Orders, Decorations, and Medals conferred upon Admiral Sir Walter H. Cowan, Bart., K.C.B., D.S.O., M.V.O. (3734). Loaned by Miss M. G. R. Cowan.

## JOURNAL

Offers of suitable contributions to the JOURNAL are invited. Confidential matter cannot be used, but there is ample scope for professional articles which contain useful lessons of recent wars; also contributions of a general Service character, such as strategic principles, command and leadership, morale, staff work, and naval, military, and air force history, customs, and traditions.

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Army officers are reminded that such articles must be accompanied by the written approval of the author's commanding officer.

## LECTURES

The programme of lectures for the second half of the 1956-57 session is published with this number of the JOURNAL. Although information about tickets and reserved seats is always published in the programme, a good many requests for this information are being received. Will members to whom this may refer please avoid the unnecessary work and expense.

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*Organization for War in Modern Times.* (October, 1955.)

### CHANGE OF ADDRESS

Members are particularly requested to notify any change of address which will affect the dispatch of the JOURNAL.

Naval officers are strongly advised to keep the Institution informed of their address, as JOURNALS sent to them via C.W. Branch of the Admiralty are invariably greatly delayed.

As a serving officer is liable to frequent changes of station, it is better for such members to register either a permanent home or a bank address.

**POSTAL SERVICE BY AIR MAIL**

In order to keep the annual membership subscription to the lowest possible rate it is not economic in normal circumstances for the Institution to send letters, etc., overseas by air mail. Members who require answers by this service should enclose the necessary international reply coupons when making an enquiry.

**CHRISTMAS CARDS**

Orders for Christmas cards, specially designed for members of the Institution, can still be placed.

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